[MD] Consciousness

[Platt Holden]

Hi Steve, 

> >>> Platt:
> >>> If the levels can be identified by the reactions of their 
> >>> experiencing
> >>> participants as Pirsig suggests in that answer, then the levels
> might
> >>> be better named as follows:
> >>>
> >>> Inanimate    (Inorganic)
> >>> Instinctual   (Biological)
> >>> Institutional (Social)
> >>> Individual     (Intellectual)
> >>> Ineffable      (Aesthetic)
> >>>
> >>> These names have a several of advantages. 1)The basic static nature 
> >>> of
> >>> the lower levels as being static (objective) is made clear.
> 
> Steve:
> 
> I don't see how inanimate and instinctual are more clearly objective 
> than inorganic and biological. Plus, are plants instinctual?

Inhabitants of these levels behave predictably and measurably which is why 
they are the patterns science studies and creates theories about. Plants 
instinctively seek nourishment and attempt to reproduce.   
 
> Platt:
> >>> 2) The social level is clearly identified as human (as Pirsig 
> >>> insists).
> 
> Steve:
> Social and institutional may be the most synonymous pair here, anyway. 
> But social morality sounds right to me compared to institutional 
> morality.

I don't know of any moral pattern that isn't represented institutionally, 
beginning with the family and extending to the nation-state.  

> Platt,
> >>> 3) The importance  of
> >>> the arts in putting us in touch with DQ is highlighted ("Beauty 
> >>> leads  the
> >>> way forward" -- Gelernter)
> 
> Steve:
> You've added a fifth level of evolution that I don't think is needed. 
> Everything already fits into the four static levels plus DQ 
> formulation.

Creating and enjoying art is not an intellectual pursuit (the level of 
science and reason) although an intellectual pursuit can be artful, as 
Pirsig describes in SODV. 

> Platt:
> > Inanimate suggests the level so named is populated by static patterns
> > unable to perceive or adjust to DQ which is what my renaming of the 
> > levels
> > was intended to convey...- Merriam Webster defines inanimate: "a. not 
> > endowed with life or
> > spirit." That's the meaning I intended to convey. Patterns at all 
> > levels
> > include motion.
> 
> Steve:
> In my view, all levels are populated by static patterns since that is 
> what the levels refer to--they are types of patterns of value.

Yes, with humans having the added capability of responding to DQ. An 
example of static inorganic motion is weather, biological motion--birds 
flying, social motion--people commuting, intellectual motion--you and I 
writing.

> But even if you are right that inorganic patterns cannot respond to 
> dynamic quality, why is inanimate better than inorganic at making the 
> point you want to make?

"Inanimate" is more descriptive of static than "inorganic" IMO.
 
> >> Steve:
> >> If inorganic objects experience as Pirsig
> >> says, then that experience has a leading edge. Right?
> >
> 
> Platt:
> > Lower levels patterns may experience DQ as the "leading edge." But, I 
> > don't
> > think they can "perceive or adjust to it."
> 
> Steve:
> I guess it just depends on what you mean by perceive or adjust. 
> Certainly lower levels won't perceive or adjust intellectually or 
> socially.
> 
> You've accepted that inorganic patterns can be thought to experience 
> and that experience has a leading edge which is known as dynamic 
> quality. It seems to me that that should settle the issue.

Experiencing DQ and responding to DQ are different capabilities.     
 
> Platt:
> > In the context of deciding the
> > morality of executing an individual accused of a capital crime, Pirsig
> > wrote:
> >
> > "And beyond that is an even more compelling reason; societies and 
> > thoughts
> > and principles themselves are no more than sets of static patterns. 
> > These
> > patterns can't by themselves perceive or adjust to Dynamic Quality. 
> > Only a
> > living being can do that. The strongest moral argument against capital
> > punishment is that it weakens a society's Dynamic capability-its 
> > capability
> > for change and evolution." (Lila, 13)
> 
> Steve:
> The point Pirsig makes with the above is simply that social and 
> intellectual patterns cannot exist without biological and inorganic 
> patterns. Intellectual patterns evolve out of social patterns which 
> evolve out of biological patterns. New thoughts only happen in the same 
> way that all other thoughts evolved--on the shoulders of lower level 
> patterns. Biologically killing a person is not merely the destruction 
> of a biological pattern but also the destruction of a source of ideas.
> 
> But anyway, something about this whole line of discussion seems wrong 
> to me. We start with experience is Quality and see experience in terms 
> of dynamic and static aspects of Quality including recognizing 
> ourselves as an experiencing subject as an idea, an intellectual 
> pattern that is part of the static aspect of Quality. Then from the 
> perspective of experiencing subjects we identify other objects like 
> rocks and classify them as inorganic patterns and ask if they 
> experience, too. We are no longer in the perspective of radical 
> empiricism when we ask ourselves what it must be like to be a rock. In 
> fact, we are about as far removed from that perspective as imaginable. 
> We are trying to figure out if a rock's experience is also DQ/sq. The 
> question itself seems to me to be outside the MOQ perspective and may 
> need to be unasked. Then there is the pragmatic maxim: what are the 
> consequences of believing that a rock's experience is DQ/sq versus only 
> sq?

Asking if a rock experiences is a category error. Rocks are heaps incapable 
of experiencing, not wholes like atoms and cells which can experience at 
their own levels.   

> > Platt:
> > Those who believe lower level patterns can respond to DQ should offer 
> > some
> > examples that are not simply explained by cause and effect. "But 
> > Dynamic
> > Quality cannot be part of any cause and effect system since all cause 
> > and
> > effect systems are static patterns." (LC, Note 56)
> 
> Steve:
> But it isn't about our explanations about how the rock behaves, is it? 
> Aren't we trying to take the perspective of a rock here? What does it 
> mean to respond to dynamic quality anyway? Is ultimate reality 
> something we can get closer to or further away from?

The story of the brujo illustrates what it means to respond to DQ. There 
are other examples in Lila. As for "ultimate reality," I doubt if we can 
get any closer than pure experience. As the mystics say, talking about it 
takes us further away. That puts academics out of touch wouldn't you say?

Thanks, Steve. Always good to bounce ideas off one another.

Platt