[MD] When is a pattern not static?

[Ham Priday]

DMB says:
It might help to look at the difference between Ham's unchanging foundation 
and Steve's unfiltered experience. I think Ham's confusion is a consequence 
of trying to understand Dynamic Quality as some kind of foundational 
reality, as something that exists on its own apart from experience, as if DQ 
were a simple substitute for SOM's objective reality or Kant's 
things-in-themselves. But in the MOQ, experience IS reality and the terms 
"static" and "dynamic" both characterize experience. William James also used 
these terms to characterize experience. As he put it, experience is like the 
movements of a bird, full of flights and perchings. Dewey's work in art and 
aesthetics gets at this idea pretty well too. All three of these guys 
(Pirsig, James and Dewey) are radical empiricists and they're all looking 
closely and critically at SOM. It's no good trying to understand static and 
dynamic without first understanding that.

Ham adds:
Except for your amazing news that "James and Dewey are ...looking closely 
and critically at SOM" (I assume from DQ Heaven), this comparison is pretty 
much on target.

It might be helpful to mention that I reserve "existence" for experiential 
(objective) reality, assuming that what does not exist (Essence) simply 
"IS".  In existential terms, Essence "is absolutely".  Eckhart's concept of 
God was "perfect Is-ness".  Everything else is the "appearance of being" 
derived from the reduction (negation) of Essence.  (It is this concept, 
which is not part of Pirsig's metaphysics, for which I am accused of 
"theism".)

Thus, as regards your third sentence, I would say that, in Essentialism, 
experience is Value (or value-sensibility) transformed by the intellect into 
discrete phenomena distributed in space/time.  I refer to such phenomena as 
"essents" to distinguish differentiated objects and events from the 
undifferentiated Whole.  Localization of objectivized value is the function 
of the brain, which is derived like everything else in existence from the 
primary Sensibility/Otherness dichotomy.  (Incidentally, I did not model my 
ontology after James, Dewey, or Pirsig, and accept no responsibility for any 
comparisons made with their ideas.)
Thanks for the analysis, David.

--Ham