[MD] Birth of subjects & objects

[Ham Priday]

 Joe --

> Horse makes possible this discussion, for which I thank him
> very much!  I do not think a cavalier attitude "hang the rules"
> to be a good start.  If this is a part of your ontology,
> I fear the worst.

I, too, am grateful for this forum, and am certainly bound by its rules. 
You suggested (in what I believed to be an off-line message) that "our 
confusion may not sit well with others," asking: "what rules apply?"  I was 
referring above to our rules of engagement, not those of Horse and the MD. 
I have already "offended" many here by my assertions, and expect that the 
introduction of any concept that is inconsistent with the MoQ doctrine will 
annoy the loyalists.  So far, that hasn't stopped Bo, Platt, Matt, Ron, and 
others from taking a critical view of Pirsig's philosophy and offering 
alternative perspectives.  I think Horse would agree that such exchange is 
not only beneficial for the forum but keeps Pirsig's philosophy alive and 
well.

> My own background is 6 years formal study of Thomistic
> philosophy in a monastery.  I was also taken with "The City of God"
> by Augustine.  I have studied the thought of Gurdjieff and
> Ouspensky in a group for 4 years, and on my own for 20 years.
> I have posted on MOQ discuss for the last 6 years. I am impressed
> with the openness and "smarts" of the posters.  I am a retired
> self-employed plumber by trade.

That's a fascinating background, Joseph, and it helps explain why you might 
have a different take on the MoQ.  I would think Gurdjieff's theories would 
be as inimical to the Thomists as it is to the Pirsigians, but I was 
surprised to learn that Marsha, among others, has expressed interest in New 
Ageism.  I'm no authority on this philosophy, and it's been awhile since I 
read Ouspensky, so perhaps I'm out of touch with it.  How do you think it 
relates to the MoQ, and do you feel it is at all compatible with Pirsig's 
Quality hierarchy?

[Ham, previously]:
> I think the terms "inner" and "outer" equate to "subject"
> and :object" in the MoQ, except that Pirsig does not regard
> them as dual "realities" or entities, but as "patterns" of Quality.
> This effectively eliminates self-consciousness as a "second
> reality" in his ontology.  In other words, Pirsig does not
> acknowledge thoughts, feelings, sensations, etc., as
> proprietary to a self.  They are merely social or intellectual
> patterns of Quality experienced (latched onto?) by the
> biological organism, while the observing self is also only
> an abstracted pattern.

[Joe]:
> I disagree that in Pirsig's thought "patterns" and "realities" are
> disparate entities inasmuch as Qualities are values in existence.
> IMO as I read Pirsig I find self-consciousness, proprietary-
> awareness of thoughts, feelings, sensations as the structure of
> the social level.  SOL is the structure of the intellectual level.

You see, this ideology has never "sat well" with me.  It's one thing to say 
that thoughts and ideas are influenced by the social environment, but quite 
another to regard them as "created" by society.  Again, we are all 
"thinking" creatures, regardless of our contact with society.  We all have a 
sense of our own values, despite what we learn from intellectuals, 
scientists, and self-styled "moralists".  Aristotle believed that 
Rationality was the essence of man, Schopenhauer called it Will, to Spinoza 
it was Desire.  My own view is that the self is essentially 
value-sensibility.  Our values can and do change over time, for many 
reasons, but they are proprietary to the self and not transferrable

> In the writings of Gurdjieff and Ouspensky I read more
> about the mechanical "I" which can evolve to a conscious "I".

What is the "mechanical I", and how is it different from the conscious "I"? 
I can't conceive of an "I" or a "self" that is not conscious.  Indeed, I 
find such a notion paradoxical by definition.

> IMO you misread Pirsig by attributing to him a dismissal
> of selfness.  His struggle is self.

He certainly struggled as a teacher and philosopher, but his hierarchy 
rejects selfness as anything but an abstraction, and he demeans 
individualism at every turn, as do the MoQists here.  They see egoism as 
unhealthy, unenlightened, even dangerous.  If this isn't dismissing 
selfness, their pronouncements deceive me.

> IMO your description of physical reality being based in
> awareness has no foundation and is not real. I do not agree
> with your concept that "conscious awareness" is a sensible
> contingent.  IMO "conscious awareness" is the quality of
> evolution to the social level.  Oops Evolution!  A value in existence.

The phrase "value in existence" is meaningless to me, Joe, as is "the 
quality of evolution".  What quality or value does evolution have apart from 
man's perception of it?  Do you not believe awareness to be "sensible", or 
is your disagreement my positing of sensibility as one of two primary 
"contingencies"?

Also, could you briefly outline your understanding of creation, that is, how 
the universe emerged as a self-sustaining, differentiated system and what 
your believe to be man's role in existence.  That would give me some some 
basis on which to compare your philosophy with what I know about other 
ontologies.

Thanks, Joe.  This could be interesting, once I get on-board with your 
thoughts.

Regards,
Ham