[MD] moq thought experiement 1.

[Ham Priday]

Hi Craig (Marsha quoted) --


 [Ham, previously]:
> Pirsig...has put man in a cosmic "vat" by denying him
> the autonomy of free choice and self-determination.

[Craig]:
> What source do you have for this view of Pirsig?  It doesn't sound
> true to the MoQ.

Ask Marsha where she got this definition of human being:
> Sentient beings are not things, not selves even, but clusters of
> interrelated, ever-changing, inorganic, biological, social and 
> intellectual
> static patterns of value interacting within a field of Dynamic Quality.

Even if this is not a direct Pirsig quote, it represents the MoQist view of 
what man is -- not an entity, not a self, not even a proprietary subject, 
but patterns of value in a field of quality.  There is no "free agency" in 
such a construct because the "field" itself is the operand of the patterns. 
The static patterns, in other words, are programmed by DQ.

Here are some of Pirsig's own statements alluding to mankind:

"Objects are inorganic and biological values; subjects are social and 
intellectual values."

"All life is a migration of static patterns of quality toward Dynamic 
Quality."

"Natural selection is Dynamic Quality at work."

"Mental patterns do not originate out of inorganic nature.  They originate 
out of society, which originates out of biology which originates out of 
inorganic nature.  And . what a mind thinks is as dominated by social 
patterns as social patterns are dominated by biological patterns and 
biological patterns are dominated by inorganic patterns.  There is no direct 
scientific connection between mind and matter."

"To the extent that one's behavior is controlled by static patterns of 
quality it is without choice.  But to the extent that one follows Dynamic 
Quality, which is undefinable, one's behavior is free."

I've been unable to find any references to individuality, individualism, 
individual freedom, self-determination, proprietary awareness, or personal 
autonomy.  Instead, in all these quotes citing "subjects", "mind", "life", 
and "free", there is the presumption of a collective consciousness being 
dominated or controlled by DQ.

Unless you can provide a statement by the author supporting the individual 
as the conscious locus of existential reality or the agent of value in the 
world, I don't see how you can refute my "self in a vat" characterization of 
his philosophy.

Thanks, Craig,
Ham