[MD] Static Self

Marsha marshalz at charter.net
Mon Jul 7 10:48:18 PDT 2008 


Greetings,

Just for the record, what is the relationship of the word 'individual' to 
the word 'self'?  Would that be an autonomous individual like Ham's 
autonomous self?

Marsha




----- Original Message ----- 
From: "Ian Glendinning" <ian.glendinning at gmail.com>
To: <moq_discuss at moqtalk.org>
Sent: Monday, July 07, 2008 11:59 AM
Subject: Re: [MD] Static Self


> Gav, Platt, there is a lot of truth in that ... a topic I would dearly 
> like
> us to discuss - the individual / intellectual connection - clarifying
> recurring potential confusions.
>
> Clearly the SOMist received wisdom of "individual" that Gav refers to is 
> an
> intellectual concept ... but I think there is more to the intellectual 
> level
> than just this conception of the individual. It doesn't help Platt to 
> simply
> cast the social as bad and the individual as good. There are good and bad
> conceptions of both, as Gav points out.
>
> Personally, getting a lot out of Al MacIntyre (After Virtue) at the moment
> on this. He has an overtly Christian / Theist / reformed-ex-Marxist 
> agenda,
> (which makes him a difficult read for me) but his view of individual human
> experience - as a "narrative" intersecting with all other individual
> narratives (ie collectively) with a history, a now, and importantly a 
> future
> forseeable on the basis of a shared tradition of mythological telos - I 
> find
> compelling. Basically his analysis of virtue (internal and external 
> "goods")
> concludes that they are context dependent, and that context is
> the intersecting narratives.)
>
> Ian
>
> On 7/7/08, Platt Holden <plattholden at gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>> Exactly why I consider the intellectual level to be the individual level.
>> It
>> holds high the value of the individual by fighting the efforts of the
>> collectivist social level to dominate and put everyone in the service of
>> the
>> Giant, i.e., the "public good.".
>>
>> On Mon, Jul 7, 2008 at 5:21 AM, gav <gav_gc at yahoo.com.au> wrote:
>>
>> > the individual is borne of the intellectual level - it is an idea.
>> > the idea of oneself as an autonomous agent evolves from and opposes the
>> > purely social (bicameral?) level of consciousness....which operates by
>> the
>> > control of the collective via a deity, king etc.
>> >
>> >
>> > --- On Mon, 7/7/08, david buchanan <dmbuchanan at hotmail.com> wrote:
>> >
>> > > From: david buchanan <dmbuchanan at hotmail.com>
>> > > Subject: [MD] Static Self
>> > > To: moq_discuss at moqtalk.org
>> > > Received: Monday, 7 July, 2008, 5:46 AM
>> > > Ham said to Craig and Marsha:
>> > > Pirsig...has put man in a cosmic "vat" by denying
>> > > him the autonomy of free choice and self-determination.
>> > > ...the MoQist view of what man is -- not an entity, not a
>> > > self, not even a proprietary subject, but patterns of value
>> > > in a field of quality.  There is no "free agency"
>> > > in such a construct because the "field" itself is
>> > > the operand of the patterns. The static patterns, in other
>> > > words, are programmed by DQ.
>> > >
>> > > "To the extent that one's behavior is controlled
>> > > by static patterns of quality it is without choice.  But to
>> > > the extent that one follows Dynamic Quality, which is
>> > > undefinable, one's behavior is free." (Robert
>> > > Pirsig in Lila)
>> > >
>> > > Ham continued:
>> > > I've been unable to find any references to
>> > > individuality, individualism, individual freedom,
>> > > self-determination, proprietary awareness, or personal
>> > > autonomy.  Instead, in all these quotes citing
>> > > "subjects", "mind", "life",
>> > > and "free", there is the presumption of a
>> > > collective consciousness being dominated or controlled by
>> > > DQ.
>> > > Unless you can provide a statement by the author supporting
>> > > the individual as the conscious locus of existential reality
>> > > or the agent of value in the world, I don't see how you
>> > > can refute my "self in a vat" characterization of
>> > > his philosophy
>> > >
>> > > dmb says:
>> > > There are no supporting references to individualism and
>> > > there is no self in a vat either. As I've tried to
>> > > explain once or twice already, the MOQ rejects some basic
>> > > metaphysical assumptions but you're reading the MOQ as
>> > > if those assumptions still figured into what Pirsig is
>> > > saying. Like many philosophers over the last century or so,
>> > > he rejects the assumptions of subject-object metaphysics,
>> > > which is known around here as "SOM". Your
>> > > questions clearly emphasize the individual's awareness,
>> > > personal autonomy and the like. There is a common sense
>> > > level in which these concepts make a great deal of sense,
>> > > but here we are talking about a philosophy that rejects a
>> > > lot of the traditional ideas about subjectivity and
>> > > objectivity. Listening to you and Marsha discuss the matter
>> > > is like listening to Ayn Rand trying to convince a Buddhist
>> > > monk to be more selfish. But the difference is not really
>> > > that stark. We don't need to go East to see what this
>> > > rejection looks like or what it means. Pirs
>> > >  ig's pragmatism and radical empiricism are enough. In
>> > > fact, you could go back 100 years and find it in the work
>> > > of Dewey and James. They rejected SOM, adopted radical
>> > > empiricism and did so in plain english. John Stuhr explains
>> > > it pretty well in his introduction to Dewey. Stuhr is the
>> > > editor of an anthology that was assigned reading in a grad
>> > > school course on pragmatism. As I understand it, every
>> > > thing he says here about Dewey could also be said of
>> > > Pirsig, James and other classical pragmatists. He says,...
>> > >
>> > > "At the outset, it is vital to distinguish Dewey's
>> > > theory of experience and his 'empiricism' from the
>> > > philosophical traditions and theories which he seeks to
>> > > overcome and abandon. Dewey's major criticisms of
>> > > traditional empiricism are neatly summarized in 'The
>> > > Need for a Recovery of Philosophy". Here Dewey rejects
>> > > the traditional view of experience as something subjective
>> > > and psychical, as 'particularistic' or composed of
>> > > discrete sense data assembled by the understanding, as
>> > > primarily an affair of knowing, as directed primarily at
>> > > the past, and as something separate from and opposed to
>> > > thought.
>> > > How, then, does Dewey positively characterize experience?
>> > > In the beginning to understand his view, it cannot be
>> > > overemphasized that Dewey is not using the word
>> > > 'experience' in its conventional sense. For Dewey,
>> > > experience is not to be understood in terms of the
>> > > experiencING subject, or as the interaction of a subject
>> > > and object that exist separate from the interaction.
>> > > Instead, Dewey's view is radically empirical:
>> > > experience is an activity in which subject and object are
>> > > unified and CONSTITUTED as partial features and relations
>> > > within this ongoing, unanalyzed unity. Dewey warns us not
>> > > to misconstrue aspects of this unified experience-activity:
>> > > distinctions made in reflection. If we don confuse them, we
>> > > invent the philosophical problem of how to get them
>> > > together.
>> > > The error of materialists and idealists alike - the error
>> > > of conferring existential status upon the products of
>> > > reflection - is the result of neglect of the context of
>> > > reflection on experience."
>> > >
>> > > dmb continues:
>> > > In addition to those passages where Pirsig simply declares
>> > > his MOQ to be a form of pragmatism and radical empiricism,
>> > > there is also this explanation about the limits of
>> > > traditional empiricism, which assumes SOM and limits
>> > > experience to what can be known through the five sense
>> > > organs and which is known as sensory empiricism.
>> > >
>> > > "The MOQ RESTATES the empirical basis of logical
>> > > positivism with more precision, more inclusiveness, more
>> > > explanatory power than it has previously had. It says that
>> > > values are not outside of the experience that logical
>> > > positivism limits itself to. They are the ESSENCE of this
>> > > experience. Values are MORE empirical, in fact, than
>> > > subjects and objects. (Hot stove example is here) ...This
>> > > value is more immediate, more directly sensed than any
>> > > 'self' or any 'object' to which it might
>> > > later be assigned. ..It is the primary empirical reality
>> > > from which such things as stoves and heat and oaths and
>> > > self are latter intellectually constructed. Onces this
>> > > primary relationship is cleared up an awful lot of
>> > > mysteries get solved. The reason values seem so
>> > > woolly-headed to empiricists is that empiricists keep
>> > > trying to assign them to subjects or objects. You can't
>> > > do it. You get all mixed up because values don't belong
>> > > to either group. They are a separate category all their own
>> > > ..but showing
>> > >   that, of course, is a very big job..." (Lila 66-7,
>> > > near the end of chapter 5)
>> > >
>> > > dmb continues"
>> > > Compare Dewey's phrases "distinctions made in
>> > > reflection" and "products of reflection"
>> > > with Pirsig's notion of things as "intellectually
>> > > constructed". Compare Dewey's "unanalyzed
>> > > unity" with Pirsigian notions like "indefinable
>> > > quality", "pre-intellectual experience" or
>> > > "undifferentiated aesthetic continuum". These are
>> > > ways of talking about the static/dynamic split, where the
>> > > distinctions, reflections and intellectual constructions
>> > > are all static while the primary reality is dynamic and
>> > > prior to all that. More to the point for our purposes here,
>> > > both of them are trying to explain how the individual
>> > > subject is derived from experience rather than the locus of
>> > > experience. They both insist than this is a case of giving
>> > > existential status to an idea, of treating a concept about
>> > > or interpretation of experience as if it were the cause of
>> > > experience, the pre-requisites of experience. It is in this
>> > > sense that they reject the the subjective self and objective
>> > > reality. Like I said, these
>> > >   are perfectly fine AS CONCEPTS. But when we take them as
>> > > metaphysical assumptions, we can get very confused,
>> > > especially if we read Dewey, James or Pirsig as if they
>> > > hadn't abandoned those assumptions.
>> > >
>> > > I sincerely hope that helps.
>> > > dmb
>> > >
>> > >
>> > >
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