[MD] moq thought experiment 1.

[Ham Priday]

Squonk --

> Hold on a moment please: You refer here to the presentation of my
> arguments from analogy. But i am referring to the logic you employ
> within your own Essentialism. You have not addressed this point Ham.
> This is most important.

Whether your propositions were analogous or not, grouping them in the way 
you did implies that they lead to a logical conclusion; namely, that 
Pirsig's "excellence in human affairs" and Ham's "shared experience of 
discourse" are (or can be) "elevated to a cosmic principle".  I deny this 
conclusion.  Human experience cannot logically identify a "metaphysical" 
principle.  If, by Cosmic, you mean "universal" in the sense of predictable 
or empirical, then I misunderstood your question.

Specifically, what is the point about Essentialism that you want me to 
address?  I had asked you for an example of a "cosmic principle" I have 
postulated from personal experience.  So far you haven't cited one.

 [Ham, previously]:
> Utilitarianism is the principle of scientific objectivism and is based on
> the premise that truth and goodness equates to "what works".

[Squonk]:
> A. In order to understand happiness one simply has to experience happiness
> for oneself.  If one accepts that it is good to be happy, and if one 
> observes
> the same behaviour in other people, it can be argued that it is a good for 
> people
> to be happy by employing it as a postulate in a moral philosophy.
>
> B. Happiness is neither intuitive or intellectual; it is a subjective 
> feeling.
> The whole point of my argument from analogy is to extrapolate from finite
> experience to infinite Cosmic principle pars Hume:

I suppose one could call this a form of logical deduction.  However, the 
quality of "happiness" is, as you say, subjective experience.  As such it 
doesn't fall into the category of utilitarian phenomena.  Happiness has no 
quantitative standard of measurement, therefore is not pragmatically 
testable.  It is "good" for people to be happy because individuals equate 
pleasure with goodness. No cosmic principle is implied in that precept.

[Ham, previously]:
> Causation is an intellectual interpretation of temporal experience,
> not a Cosmic principle. If man did not experience reality as a
> continuum of events, cause-and-effect would be meaningless.

[Squonk]:
> Causation is also concerned with effects: How does a tiny Oak seed
> grow into a huge Oak tree?
> One argument suggests that it is not possible for the effect to be greater
> than the cause, for example. This is not a temporal question.
> In fact, this is how God can be derived as the supreme cause; not of
> temporality, but of ultimate being, with that which is the effect being 
> less
> than the cause.
> I suspect you know this Ham.
> It is therefore understandable that it may be argued that God is the 
> ultimate
> good.
> Modern scientific thinking recognises that the Cosmos is actually 
> increasing
> in complexity, and that complexity may be a cause of life.
> This goes against the grain of entropy.
> With respect to my argument from analogy, the moq identifies excellence
> and raises this to a cause.
> With respect to your essentialism, the cause is dealt with in purely 
> logical terms.

To argue that God is the ultimate good is an argument from human inference. 
Unless it can be established that 1. There is a God, and 2. Goodness is 
derived from God, the argument is only an analogous idea, not a cosmic law 
or metaphysical principle.

Hume's 'Enquiry' contains the following argument:

"All the objects of human reason or enquiry may naturally be divided into
 two kinds, to wit, Relations of Ideas, and Matters of Fact.
 Of the first kind are the sciences of Geometry, Algebra, and Arithmetic;
 and in short, every affirmation, which is either intuitively or 
demonstratively
 certain. ... Propositions of this kind are discoverable by the mere 
operation
 of thought, without dependence on what is any where existent in the 
universe. ...
 Matters of fact ... are not ascertained in the same manner; nor is our 
evidence
 of their truth ...of a like nature with the foregoing. The contrary of 
every
 matter of fact is still possible; because it can never imply a 
contradiction ...
 We should in vain, therefore, attempt to demonstrate its falsehood. ..."

He concludes that "there is no uniformity principle, that there is no good 
argument of any kind for uniformity.  (I would imagine that Hume's 
"Uniformity Principle" is roughly equivalent to your "Cosmic Principle".) 
He goes on to say that "... there is no known connexion between the sensible 
qualities and the secret powers; and consequently ... the mind is not led to 
form such a conclusion concerning their constant and regular conjunction, by 
any thing which it knows of their nature. ...I say then, that, even after we 
have experience of the operations of cause and effect, our conclusions from 
that experience are not founded on reasoning, or any process of the 
understanding for UP."

Squonk, I'll grant you that concepts are formed by the intellect and based 
on human experience.  That makes even empirical deductions fallible from a 
metaphysical standpoint. But if metaphysical hypotheses were bound by the 
laws of logic, there would be no concepts, no ontologies, no reality theory 
consider.  We reason, inductively and deductively, from the evidence of 
experience.  We have no alternative for resolving the riddle of existence. 
If not for philosophy, we would all be nihilists or theists.  Essentialism 
is no different than Idealism.  Existentialism, or Qualityism in this 
regard.  So, what is it you want me to confess about my philosophy?  That it 
is unreasonable, implausible, or subjective?

If you could cite specific examples to demonstrate my errors in logic or 
reasoning, I'd be happy to address them.

Thanks, Squonk.
--Ham