[MD] moq thought experiment 1.

[Ham Priday]

Hi Squonk [Ron mentioned]--

> I have problems with this also.
> But it does seem to be behind the moq in some sense.
> I used to accept this uncritically.

[Ham]:
> You talk about the experience of total darkness being extrapolated
> to infinity. Does this lead to the logical principle that ultimate reality 
> is
> undifferentiated?  You then quote Hume who has categorically rejected
> the possibility of reasoning to a uniformity principle, thus refuting the
> argument you seem to be making by inference.

[Squonk]:
> Yes!? That's it. It's a problem for the moq Ham.
> Nietzsche did the same thing before his mental collapse.
>
> There is only a contradiction if you assume i am defending the moq.
> I'm not.  What i'm arguing for is the problem associated with
> extrapolation, and this is what the moq seems to do.
> I sincerely believe we all experience quality events, but i am not at all
> sure anymore that this indicates a source of experience; i think it
> describes some experiences, which is not the same thing.

Okay, we're now on the same wavelength, and I see your line of reasoning.
(Ron, incidentally, has voiced a similar complaint.)

The problem with MoQ is an epistemological one which I believe can be 
minimized, if not eliminated, by the word 'sensibility' in place of 
'experience' when we talk about values.  For example, you said . . .

> I think Quality is similarly derived, even though it is clearly 
> experienced
> on many occasions, sometimes many times in a day. But i think each
> occasion is unique and situational.   My problem with your Essentialism is
> that some of your axioms are not experienced at all.

In my epistemology, the cognizant self is defined as "value-sensibility", 
and that which is experienced is "otherness".  Otherness is the Being that 
is experienced (objectivized) when the self intellectualizes value.  In 
other words, relational objects and events are intellectual constructs of 
value.  Now, Pirsig states that the value experience is "pre-intellectual", 
and I agree.  So, why refer to it as "experience"?  IMO that's what causes 
the confusion, including your comment that my axioms "are not experienced at 
all."

Pirsig cites the hot stove analogy as a crude illustration of what he means 
by directly-sensed value.  But he calls it experience.  Obviously the 
sensation of pain is an experience: neuorologists classify it as a 
"proprioceptive response to stimulation" -- in this case, physiological 
trauma.  Yet, we sense value when listening to a beloved piece of music, 
enjoying a well-prepared meal, capturing a magnificentl sunset, or 
witnessing a brutal attack on a child.  The source of this value isn't the 
particular objects or events we're experiencing; it's proprietary to our 
self, to our own value-sensibility coming into being through experience.

Value sensibility is clearly pre-intellectual in that it is our affinity for 
the Essence from which we are estranged as negated entities.  I submit that 
intuitive insight, personal preferences, our sense of freedom, justice and 
morality, esthetic appreciation, and "state of mind" are all psycho-somatic 
manifestations;  ("psycho-" for aware, "somatic" for being).  Thus, to 
define the individual is a being-aware is to acknowledge that the essence of 
selfness is psycho-somatic.  Although I'm accused of being an SOMist, 
being-aware is not a duality, it's a dichotomy in the same way that 
existence is a dichotomy.  (Of course, my problem with the MoQ is that it 
dismisses the concept of self as an active agent of value, instead positing 
selfness as an SQ pattern.)

I hope this sheds some light on the issue of objective experience vs. 
subjective sensibility, as viewed by an essentialist.

You've made a good point, Squonk. Sorry I was so slow to catch on.

Regards,
Ham