[MD] moq thought experiment 1.

[Ron Kulp]

Ham:
Although I'm accused of being an SOMist, being-aware is not a duality,
it's a dichotomy in the same way that existence is a dichotomy.  (Of
course, my problem with the MoQ is that it dismisses the concept of self
as an active agent of value, instead positing selfness as an SQ
pattern.)

Ron:
Hello Ham, Although I'm not sure what the difference between a dichotomy
and dualism is, SOM does represent both concepts traditionally.
By the way we are all SOMists to some degree or another here in the
west.

I have to say that you captured the ideas of self fairly well, I think
Pirsig does allude to the self as an active agent of value , in fact
that is the best description for it. I think the concept of an
"autonomous"
self isolated in space is the static representation it seeks to break.
It is the dichotomy which is the illusion of a finite perception and
semiotics.
"Active agent of value" describes well the statement of "we are Quality"
the self, being an active agent of quality. Nicely put to terms Ham.
As far as I can see, Essentialism and MoQ agree on this point.

Thank you





-----Original Message-----
From: moq_discuss-bounces at lists.moqtalk.org
[mailto:moq_discuss-bounces at lists.moqtalk.org] On Behalf Of Ham Priday
Sent: Friday, July 11, 2008 5:13 PM
To: moq_discuss at moqtalk.org
Subject: Re: [MD] moq thought experiment 1.


Hi Squonk [Ron mentioned]--

> I have problems with this also.
> But it does seem to be behind the moq in some sense.
> I used to accept this uncritically.

[Ham]:
> You talk about the experience of total darkness being extrapolated
> to infinity. Does this lead to the logical principle that ultimate
reality 
> is
> undifferentiated?  You then quote Hume who has categorically rejected
> the possibility of reasoning to a uniformity principle, thus refuting
the
> argument you seem to be making by inference.

[Squonk]:
> Yes!? That's it. It's a problem for the moq Ham.
> Nietzsche did the same thing before his mental collapse.
>
> There is only a contradiction if you assume i am defending the moq.
> I'm not.  What i'm arguing for is the problem associated with
> extrapolation, and this is what the moq seems to do.
> I sincerely believe we all experience quality events, but i am not at
all
> sure anymore that this indicates a source of experience; i think it
> describes some experiences, which is not the same thing.

Okay, we're now on the same wavelength, and I see your line of
reasoning.
(Ron, incidentally, has voiced a similar complaint.)

The problem with MoQ is an epistemological one which I believe can be 
minimized, if not eliminated, by the word 'sensibility' in place of 
'experience' when we talk about values.  For example, you said . . .

> I think Quality is similarly derived, even though it is clearly 
> experienced
> on many occasions, sometimes many times in a day. But i think each
> occasion is unique and situational.   My problem with your
Essentialism is
> that some of your axioms are not experienced at all.

In my epistemology, the cognizant self is defined as
"value-sensibility", 
and that which is experienced is "otherness".  Otherness is the Being
that 
is experienced (objectivized) when the self intellectualizes value.  In 
other words, relational objects and events are intellectual constructs
of 
value.  Now, Pirsig states that the value experience is
"pre-intellectual", 
and I agree.  So, why refer to it as "experience"?  IMO that's what
causes 
the confusion, including your comment that my axioms "are not
experienced at 
all."

Pirsig cites the hot stove analogy as a crude illustration of what he
means 
by directly-sensed value.  But he calls it experience.  Obviously the 
sensation of pain is an experience: neuorologists classify it as a 
"proprioceptive response to stimulation" -- in this case, physiological 
trauma.  Yet, we sense value when listening to a beloved piece of music,

enjoying a well-prepared meal, capturing a magnificentl sunset, or 
witnessing a brutal attack on a child.  The source of this value isn't
the 
particular objects or events we're experiencing; it's proprietary to our

self, to our own value-sensibility coming into being through experience.

Value sensibility is clearly pre-intellectual in that it is our affinity
for 
the Essence from which we are estranged as negated entities.  I submit
that 
intuitive insight, personal preferences, our sense of freedom, justice
and 
morality, esthetic appreciation, and "state of mind" are all
psycho-somatic 
manifestations;  ("psycho-" for aware, "somatic" for being).  Thus, to 
define the individual is a being-aware is to acknowledge that the
essence of 
selfness is psycho-somatic.  Although I'm accused of being an SOMist, 
being-aware is not a duality, it's a dichotomy in the same way that 
existence is a dichotomy.  (Of course, my problem with the MoQ is that
it 
dismisses the concept of self as an active agent of value, instead
positing 
selfness as an SQ pattern.)

I hope this sheds some light on the issue of objective experience vs. 
subjective sensibility, as viewed by an essentialist.

You've made a good point, Squonk. Sorry I was so slow to catch on.

Regards,
Ham

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