[MD] Regarding The Fundamental Nature of The Intellectual Level

[MarshaV]

----- Original Message ----- 
From: "Arlo Bensinger" <ajb102 at psu.edu>
To: <moq_discuss at moqtalk.org>
Sent: Tuesday, July 15, 2008 12:30 PM
Subject: Re: [MD] Regarding The Fundamental Nature of The Intellectual Level


> [Marsha]
> Sounds to me like science and reason (EVEN of the S/O kind) are social 
> systems.
>
> [Arlo]
> I think what Pirsig is saying (correctly) is that the intellectual level 
> (ideas) is something that emerges from the social interactions of 
> individuals, not from "individuals alone" or "individuals observing 
> nature". What he is pointing out is two-fold, first that "intellectual 
> descriptions of nature are always culturally derived" and second that 
> "intellect" is not a function of the biological brain of wo/man but of the 
> social interactions that wo/man comes to participate in. That is, it 
> requires social activity for the emergence of intellect.

Greetings Arlo,

Maybe in an everything-is-connect-to-everything sort of way.  This battle 
between the collective and the individual seems a waste of time.  If the 
individual is an illusion, and it is, then the collective is a group of 
illusions.  -  There are collections of interrelated and ever-changing 
patterns.  That seems to be the important point.  The patterns in the Social 
Level tend to function in an unconscious manner.  The patterns in the 
Intellectual Level seem to function, as Peter has suggested, more to solve 
problems by manipulating symbols in a more deliberate manner.  There is a 
relationship between the two levels.   Cannot see it being more complicated 
than that.

Marsha

p.s.  In the olden days when I was a youngster, the text books stated things 
like, 'The pioneers forged their way West, taking their wives."  As if woman 
weren't subjected equally to every danger and difficulty.  The women too 
were pioneers.  So thanks for the wo/man.  It looks a bit clumsy, but the 
pattern it sets up is of higher quality.



>
> In the latter case, an "idea" is never the function of "one individual", 
> but of that "one individual participating in a social dialogue". In the 
> former case, he is assailing "objectivity" that says that the "individual" 
> can observe nature "unbiased by cultural associations", even to the point 
> of suggesting that what the individual "sees" is as much a function of 
> cultural derivation as whatever post-sight description s/he may apply.
>
> You will never find, then, an intellectual pattern that is not rooted in 
> the social milieu from which it emerged, whether its mathematics or 
> philosophy. Nor will you ever find an intellectual pattern that is not 
> polyphonic (containing many voices).
>