[MD] Tit's

[MarshaV]

----- Original Message ----- 
From: "Krimel" <Krimel at Krimel.com>
To: <moq_discuss at moqtalk.org>
Sent: Thursday, July 31, 2008 2:52 PM
Subject: Re: [MD] Tit's


>
> [Krimel]
> Experience is perceived as unitary because we are able to synthesis a 
> sense
> of unity out of disparate sensations. For example we can feel something
> round and distinguish a ball from an orange purely through the sense of
> touch and we can translate that into a visual image.
>

Speaking of an orange.  Here's another way to look at it.



Referent Objects:  Orange

According to Madhyamaka, mental labeling, which is always conceptual, 
entails:

. a mental label,

. a basis for labeling,

. a referent object (imputed object, labeled object). The referent object is 
what a label, word, or concept refers to.

Consider the case of the verbal conceptual cognition of a conventional 
commonsense orange with the audio category and meaning/object category 
orange.


Specifically Gelug

In terms of the mental labeling:

. The mental label is the audio category orange and, usually in addition, a 
meaning/object category orange - both being metaphysical entities.

. The basis for labeling may be a spherical shape of orange color - an 
objective entity.

. The referent object is a commonsense orange - a nonstatic collection 
synthesis (tshogs-spyi) as an objective entity.

It is important not to identify the referent object with either the basis 
for labeling or the mental label itself.

. The referent object is not the same as the basis for labeling. The colored 
shapes that appear when seeing or thinking of a commonsense orange are not 
the actual orange. We do not eat a colored shape when we eat an orange.

. The referent object is not the same as the mental label. An actual orange 
is not the word or concept orange, nor is it a conceptual category.

. An actual orange is what the audio category orange and meaning/object 
category orange refers to when labeled on the basis of appropriate colored 
shapes.

In terms of the conceptual cognition:

. The appearing objects are not simply the audio and meaning/object 
categories orange, but rather the audio and meaning/object categories truly 
existent orange.

. The conceptually implied object (object existing as cognitively taken) is 
a truly existent orange. This is what the conceptual category (the concept) 
of "an orange" implies (zhen, clings to) and corresponds to.


Thus,

. what the conceptual category of "an orange" refers to (non-truly existent 
commonsense oranges, as objective entities) is not the same as what the 
conceptual category of an orange corresponds to (truly existent oranges, 
which do not exist at all).

. In other words, the referent object of a conceptual cognition is not the 
same as its conceptually implied object.

In short:

. We see a non-truly existent commonsense orange, which nevertheless appears 
to be truly existent.

. We then conceptualize it as a truly existent commonsense orange.

. In conceptual cognition, we mentally fabricate the conceptually implied 
object (a truly existent orange) and project it onto the referent object (a 
non-truly existent orange as an objective entity that we can see).












http://www.berzinarchives.com/web/en/archives/sutra/level5_analysis_mind_reality/cognition_theory/level_b_fine_analysis/appearance_cognition_nonexistent_phenomena/appear_cogn_nonex_gelug.html#n74982f4c0c84b1c812