[MD] Chance

[Ham Priday]

Hi Ron -- 

> This discussion illustrates the need for clarity in meaning in MoQ
> terms. What has to be realized is that Quality is dynamic as per
> Krimel.  Dynamic quality has meaning only in reference to static
> quality and their context of reference. Therefore Ham mixes
> context and understandably comes out with conflicts.
>
> As Ham shows us, when we use DQ/SQ intellectually to define
> the intellectual concept of Quality it creates modulations
> of the container paradox.  Essentially rendering DQ null
> and void, leaving us to discuss this static realm that is now
> separated from it's source which plays right into Hams thesis.
> We say he's got it wrong but we are unable to precisely tell him
> why he's mistaken about DQ.

Then, why don't you explain it for me, Ron?   A workable ontology should 
cogently relate the finite, differentiated world of experience to the 
fundamental, undifferentiated reality.

If, as you say, DQ has meaning only in reference to SQ, then they are 
mutually dependent potentialities or modes.  In that case, there could be no 
DQ without SQ, which in existentialist philosophy translates to "Being 
precedes Essence".  Does Pirsig believe there is no Dynamic Quality without 
Static Quality?  If so, DQ is "created" by SQ and is not the ultimate 
reality.  We should then have to look elsewhere for the primary source of 
existential reality.

In my philosophy, Essence is absolute and fundamental.  It is not dependent 
on anything.  Objects and events are perceived "reductions" of Essence 
experienced (intellectualized) from Value.  Since Essence is metaphysically 
irreducible, difference can only arise through the negation of Essence which 
actualizes awareness and otherness as a dichotomy.  This is the "dualism" 
that Prisig has failed to acknowledge but which is necessary to complete his 
ontology.   In other words, he needs to posit a primary source.  The source 
may involve quality or value as a function of its epistemology or teleology, 
but Quality cannot logically stand by itself as the source of either 
existence or experience.

Show me where I'm wrong about the MoQ.  If you can provide an interpretation 
that accounts for the origin and appearance of objective reality, I'll be 
most eager to hear it.  Otherwise, I shall continue to regard Pirsig's 
"metaphysical thesis" as an aesthetic euphemism for the biological evolution 
of mankind.

Thanks for pointing out the need for more clarity in the MoQ.

Regards,
Ham