[MD] Chance

[Ham Priday]

Ron --


> Ham, this is a good topic. I think what throws off MoQ understanding
> is where in Lila, he begins to give examples of how looking at classical
> physics in terms of Quality relationships, changes how you
> conceptualize.
> I'm not really sure he meant those examples to be taken as MoQ gospel
> or not.  Pirsigs books are much more than a metaphysic, and much less.

The concept of "quality relationships" comes very close to animism, where 
conscious feelings are attributed to inanimate objects.  This may please the 
poetic nature of Pirsig's readers, but it is sheer fantasy.  My point is 
that there is no need to extend value sensibility into the physical world, 
since it is value from which our experiential reality is constructed in the 
first place.  If Pirsig wanted to base his ontology on value, why did he 
ignore the subjective entity that is the very locus of value?  Even you, as 
a follower of the MoQ, have asserted that "We are Quality"; if that is true, 
surely human beings and their experience should be central to a metaphysics 
of Quality.

[Ham, previously]:
>  Pirsig has not defined his DQ as absolute, immutable, or immanent,
> so we are left to understand it only in relational terms.

[Ron]:
> In the meaning of Absolute, I take to be unchanging. I would agree,
> neither Quality, DQ or SQ are unchanging. So yes we are only left
> with relational terms. It is this understanding which takes Quality off
> the chess board with Classical logic. Which is what you are using as
> a standard criteria to base your assessments.  I think this is why
> laypeople grasp it more readily than someone who is well versed in
> classical metaphysics.  I imagine it would seem incomplete to them.

You exaggerate my philosophical competence, Ron.  I'm as much a "lay person" 
as anyone else in this forum, with only a smattering of metaphysical study, 
most of it quite recent.  But, yes, there are standards by which a 
metaphysical thesis may be measured.  For one thing, any stated proposition 
that defies empirical evidence should be duly accounted for.  (This would of 
course include notions like "rocks prefer a stationary position." )  The 
thesis should be consistent throughout and define all uncommon or "special" 
terms used by the author.  I also expect a metaphysical ontology to explain 
the 'whys' and 'hows' of creation sufficiently to offer a purpose or meaning 
for existence.  For a philosopher of world prominence, I think Mr. Pirsig 
has defaulted on some of these requirements.

[Ham, previously]:
> ... A pattern is a particular form or configuration of something.
> According to your analysis, that something is Quality.  But
> quality is an experienced attribute, which means that it is
> dependent on the "experiencer", the conscious subject of the
> experience.  Again, that does not qualify as the fundamental source.

[Ron]:
> Why not?  It certainly ties into why it can not be defined.

I don't follow your reasoning.  That the author is unable to define 
something doesn't make it fundamental.  There is no rule that what is 
fundamental must be undefinable.

 [Ham, previously]:
> In my philosophy, Essence is absolute and fundamental.  It is not
> dependent on anything.  Objects and events are perceived "reductions"
> of Essence experienced (intellectualized) from Value. ...
> Value is a sensed attribute of Essence.  It is the "substance" of
> experience, not the primary source.  Being-aware is a dichotomous
> property of the cognizant self which exists "outside the loop" of Essence.
> It is the individuated self, not Essence, that is dependent on value.

[Ron]:
> Don't  we need value to realize Essence?

Of course we need value to experience finitude.  We are value-sensible 
entities, so we're designed with the grist for experience.  But being 
value-sensible doesn't our realization of Essence.  If it did, there would 
be no atheists or nihilists.  Such concepts are intuitional and require 
metaphysical reasoning.  Even then, we can't prove our case.  And that fact 
ensures our freedom as agents of value.  As I've said before, if we had 
access to absolute knowledge, we would not be free agents.  My contention is 
that individuated experience affords an extrinsic perspective of essential 
value.

[Ron]:
> What you do not consider is what that entity is comprised of itself,
> which is value, a value sensible entity composed of value.

I've considered it, but it makes no sense epistemologically.  If I'm 
comprised of Value -- my body, my mind, my experience -- then I'm only able 
to recognize what is NOT value.  The mode of awareness, besides orienting 
all objects and events in space/time, is to experience that which is "other" 
to us.  (That's the principle of the self/other dichotomy.)  We know 
ourselves only as the locus of awareness.  To understand ourselves as 
"beings", we must see ourselves as others see us -- as objective organisms. 
Self-awareness come first in human development; the latter takes time and 
continuous contact with other individuals.

[Ron]:
> I feel our perception of being aware is based on the grammatical
> expression of self/other. Self/other is an illusion of the perception
> of complex patterns of energy of varying degrees of density or value.
>
> This is where we part ways, In MoQ, I believe, we participate on every
> level for we are it. Value is sensed by value, our senses are composed of
> value which transform patterns. From inorganic to organic to social to
> intellectual all transforming at varying rates and density infinitely
> which is why it can not be defined as absolute and immutable..

But your "pattern" is itself Value, is it not?  So you have value sensing 
value, which is a logical
tautology.  Experience must differentiate otherness in order to perceive 
objects.  How does one differentiate value from value?  .

[Ron]:
> We are Quality.
> From the thoughts in our head to the edge of the universe
> And beyond.

Your concept has a nice ring to it, but this epistemology doesn't hold up 
logically.

Best regards,
Ham