[MD] Chance

[Ham Priday]

Hi Marsha -- 

[Ham, previously to Ron]::
> I'm mostly about concepts, as I believe you are also.  So, as far as we 
> can help it, let's try not to get mired in word games.

[Marsha]:
> Sorry to interrupt, but what is your concept of concepts?

What I mean by a concept is the fundamental idea (i.e., theoretical 
conception) as opposed to a descriptive allegory or metaphor about the idea. 
For example, "All the world's a stage,
and all the men and women merely players", from Shakespeare's As You Like 
it, is a simile for the meaninglessness of human existence.  "I am a dream 
walking" evokes an emotional impression of life as ephemeral and 
non-substantive.  These are poetic metaphors intended to convey attitudes or 
feelings about reality without offering a theoretical foundation for the 
idea.

When we use an esthetic word like Quality in a metaphysical context, there's 
a tendency to euphemize it in all sorts of ways that the author may not have 
endorsed.  This leads to philosophical confusion and a profusion of word 
games to see who is more "creative" at exploiting the word's meaning.  Not 
good for Pirsig.

As you know, I'm a literalist who believes that abstract concepts can be 
defined (even in a negative sense, if necessary) in such a way that they 
take the form of a logical proposition or axiom.  I think there is a need to 
do this with philosophy, as witness the efforts of Wittgenstein and Russell 
who were recently brought to my attention.  It's not that we have to 
translate all concepts into mathematical equations, but we should have a 
logically structured theory in mind when presenting ideas in s forum like 
this.

Designing a hierarchy is a way of categorizing a variety of disparate 
elements into a unified framework, and this Pirsig has done very well.  The 
value concept is significant for an understanding of finite experience. 
However, the selection of elements in the MoQ is arbitrary in that it must 
accommodate Pirsig's notion of Quality, which itself is unconventional.  He 
sees patterns as "static" (although they support evolution and process) and 
calls the ground of reality "dynamic" (which imputes change where none is 
called for.)  Moreover, the hierarchy of static values he presents as an 
ontology has no comprehensible relation to the DQ which is fundamental to 
his thesis.  He resists positing a primary source or cause of the hierarchy 
on the grounds that "definitions would destroy the concept".  As a result, 
the MoQ is left without a metaphysical foundation.

To sum up, there's a place for metaphor and poetry in philosophy, but 
metaphysics is not the place.  If we're aiming to propose a new and unique 
philosophy to the world, it must have a more substantial base to stand on.

Appreciate the question, Marsha.

Best regards,
Ham