[MD] Chance

Ham Priday hampday1 at verizon.net
Mon Jun 9 17:48:40 PDT 2008


[Ron]:
> Really, I am enjoying the exchange. This stuff just bubbles in my head
> and it is very cathartic to be able to express them to you. So, I am
> not stroking your ego as a tactic, I really do appreciate and respect
> your point of view.

I'm encouraged that you find this topic stimulating.  So while you're head 
is still bubbling (with inspiration, I hope), perhaps you can address my 
question.  As I've said before, the most challenging metaphysical question 
is the origin of Difference.  Once you are able to answer that, Heidegger's 
question "Why is there something rather than nothing?" should be child's 
play.

[Ron]:
> Pirsig's method of the intellectual construct of referring to these
> patterns of experience as Dynamic and Static suffice to demonstrate
> his theory.  Plainly, some patterns are denser than others, to use an
> analogy, it works (to my conceptual understanding) a lot like a
> thermodynamic system. " No value" does not exist.  That is why I say
> quite literally, we are Quality.

Okay, value is ubiquitous and all-pervading.  I agree, but only when it is 
removed or reduced from Essence, as in the self/other dichotomy.  From a 
logical perspective, positing the self as "value" makes more sense than 
positing it as as a "negate" or nothingnness', which I have done.

I'm don't know if not Bo Slutvik realized the significance of his statement 
"Intellect is the value of the DQ/SQ divide", but if you simply substitute 
Experience for Intellect in the statement, you'll  have my definition of 
experiential awareness.  That is to say, if the cognizant individual is 
value-sensibility, his experience is derived from his sensation of Value 
which, in turn, is intellectualized into the multiplicity of things 
(patterns) that represent this value.  (In my ontology nothingness is what 
divides the phenomena experienced, and it is inherent in the negate rather 
than value or Essence.)  That's why I call the individual an agent of value, 
and his experience of the world a "valuistic construct".

I don't follow your mention of the thermodynamic system as an anology.  To 
what phase or mode of value is this meant to apply?  Maybe you can elaborate 
on that.

This discussion will be more enlightening to me when I receive an 
epistemological scenario from you similar to the one I've just outlined.

Thanks, Ron.

Essentially yours,
Ham




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