[MD] Levels Talk

[Magnus Berg]

Hi Matt

Sorry about the delay. Got busy with taxes but also took a few days "off" to 
slow down a little.


Matt Kundert wrote:
> Hey Magnus,
> 
> I believe you've misunderstood my intentions.  For one, you say, "didn't we
> say that we would try finding the 'correct' division of the static levels?"
> Oh, no, no, no.  Remember?  There are no criteria available for that to be
> applicable?  All that stuff?  The difference between the two of us is, still
> apparently, that you think you are doing something different than I am in
> talking about all this levels stuff, but the only major difference is that
> you think you are looking for the "correct" division between levels.

I was referring to our exchange 27/4:

 > Magnus:
 > you say that DQ is betterness as opposed to correctness. Then it's not very
 > far-fetched to claim that SQ (since it *is* opposed to DQ) has quite a few
 > similarities with correctness.

 > Matt:
 > I thought about continuing on in that direction, so since you've also thought
 > the same thing, it might make sense to explore it.

Perhaps I mistook you for meaning that we should explore a possibly correct 
version of the levels? Wishful thinking on my part?


> Which is just as well, because the problem for me has always been that I
> become bored far too quickly with this kind of conversation.  I became bored
> while I rewrote my old classifications.  You say they're too anthropocentric,
> but I'm not sure what else a description of human evolution is supposed to
> be.

Here's a clue. You are trying to make a "description of human evolution", while 
I'm trying to make the levels fit the whole universe.

But frankly, aren't they supposed to describe our *reality*? Not just the 
fraction of it called "human evolution"?

> I tried to really read what you were saying, but I just don't see it.  I
> just don't get excited about sensation.

I hope I'm not wrong in assuming at least some people here have some interest in 
pursuing other disciplines than just philosophy?

If we're supposed to describe some system that describes the most general 
aspects of our reality, isn't it prudent to first of all learn as much as 
possible about the specifics of that reality, and then generalize from there?

I try to make an effort to follow your (often quite interesting, to a point) 
descriptions about the history of philosophy and how we may prove anything about 
anything. But I'm frankly not sure I'm able to contribute anything there. On the 
other hand, I think I *am* able to contribute something about how a level system 
may look like, and I thought this was the thread to do it in, the name you 
picked *does* imply that.

So, if I may, I would suggest a more open minded attitude towards the different 
specific sciences. Philosophy is often called "the first science", but it would 
have nothing to do if it weren't for the others, so it's a very symbiotic 
relationship between them.

> Your argument about the Quality
> event is interesting, but I'm not sure why you've either 1) construed Pirsig
> as saying that a single Quality event creates a single subject and a single
> object or 2) barring fidelity, why you would want to suggest that.  I think
> that that part requires some firming up on your part.

Huh? How would you describe the quality event? That's how Pirsig describes it in 
ZMM, and he doesn't really talk about it much in Lila.

> And without it, you
> lose your particular way to interpret Pirsig's definition of what a level is:
> a "unique _way to_ experience reality," as opposed to the way I think most
> everyone else interprets it, as something like a "unique _kind of_
> experience/reality."

Sure, "kind of" is better than "way to". My mistake, I'm Swedish.


> As I see it, you have at least two major tasks: 1) establish your "Quality
> event" premise and 2) explain why your interpretation of a level doesn't
> reintroduce the subject/object problem that Pirsig avoided by making
> experience synonymous with reality.  In your interpretation, the "experience"
> and "reality" are separated by a space, but in the one I would attribute to
> Pirsig, the two are connected by a slash.  As I see it, Pirsig collapsed the
> experience/reality distinction to collapse the knower/known distinction, but
> that seems to me exactly what you are resurrecting, placing "how we know
> reality" at the center again, which was the problem with SOM in the first
> palce.

No, I don't separate "reality" and "experience". What made you think I did?

And I don't see how I reintroduce the s/o problem. I just use the quality event 
as Pirsig used it, I have just moved it into a level context.


> Magnus said: Don't you realize the *realness* of such level borders? It's not
> an ad-hoc border that I just made up one day to solve some thought
> experiment, it's simply the real deal.
> 
> Matt: Sure, I'm talking about reality, too.  Most of what we are talking
> about is real.  It has to be and we run no real risk of not.  However, you do
> need to explain _why_ we should split things up the way you do.

Because they are orthogonal
Because there are no fuzzy borders
Because they have that strict level dependency that the MoQ say they should have
Because they show how the history of the universe have played out according to 
these different planes of existence.

But since you and most others here get bored when I try to talk about these 
things, I guess there's no point in doing it.

> People claim over and over, like a mantra, that Pirsig's philosophy, his
> model of reality, the Metaphysics of Quality, is better than other models
> available.  How so?  That's _not_ a dismissive challenge: it is simply the
> challenge that must be faced

Actually, it doesn't *have* to be faced. If enough scientists are convinced, 
they will start incorporating the MoQ into their daily work, and if just one 
reaches some breakthrough result that wouldn't be possible without the MoQ, 
people will start taking the MoQ seriously.

	Magnus