[MD] The Menu/Reality issue

[X Acto]

The received view of theories is a position in the philosophy of science that identifies a scientific theory with a set of propositions which are considered to be linguistic objects, such as axioms. Frederick Suppe describes the position of the received view by saying that it identifies scientific theories with an "axiomatic calculi in which theoretical terms are given a partial observation interpretation by mean of correspondence rules." [1] The received view is generally associated with the logical empiricists.
Recently, the received view of theories has been displaced by the semantic view of theories as the dominant position in theory formulation in the philosophy of science.


The semantic view of theories is a position in the philosophy of science that holds that a scientific theory can be identified with a collection of models. 
The semantic view of theories was originally proposed by Patrick Suppes in “A Comparison of the Meaning and Uses of Models in Mathematics and the 
Empirical Sciences”[1] as a reaction against the received view of theories popular among the logical positivists. Many varieties of the semantic view propose 
identifying theories with a class of set-theoretic models in the Tarskian sense, [2] while others specify models in the mathematical language stipulated by 
the field of which the theory is a member[3]
-Wiki
 
Ron:
As we can see, Bodvar supports a positivists view with the "recieved view of theories" by stating that MoQ IS reality and S/O M 
IS intellect. We may also see the correspondence with the semantic view that theories are identified with models with the Pirsig
view of MoQ and SOM being such theoretical models.
 
Also we see the comparison with the positivists view of deductive reductionism and analytic v.s. inductive observation.
 
 
  "
 

 
 "Analysis and reductionism
Analysis is the activity of breaking an observation or theory down into simpler concepts in order to understand it. 
Analysis is as essential to science as it is to all rational enterprises. It would be impossible, for instance, to 
describe mathematically the motion of a projectile without separating out the force of gravity, angle of projection 
and initial velocity. Only after this analysis is it possible to formulate a suitable theory of motion.
Reductionism in science can have several different senses. One type of reductionism is the belief that all fields 
of study are ultimately amenable to scientific explanation. Perhaps a historical event might be explained in 
sociological and psychological terms, which in turn might be described in terms of human physiology, which 
in turn might be described in terms of chemistry and physics. The historical event will have been reduced to a 
physical event. This might be seen as implying that the historical event was 'nothing but' the physical event, 
denying the existence of emergent phenomena.
Daniel Dennett invented the term greedy reductionism to describe the assumption that such reductionism was 
possible. He claims that it is just 'bad science', seeking to find explanations which are appealing or eloquent, 
rather than those that are of use in predicting natural phenomena. 
Arguments made against greedy reductionism through reference to emergent phenomena rely upon the fact 
that self-referential systems can be said to contain more information than can be described through individual 
analysis of their component parts. Examples include systems that contain strange loops, fractal organization 
and strange attractors in phase space. Analysis of such systems is necessarily information-destructive because 
the observer must select a sample of the system that can be at best partially representative."-wiki
 
Ron:
This is where we see how Pirsigs interpretation trumps Bodvars, Pirsigs interpretation embraces induction.
 
 "Induction
One solution to this problem is to rely on the notion of induction. Inductive reasoning maintains that if a situation 
holds in all observed cases, then the situation holds in all cases. So, after completing a series of experiments 
that support the Third Law, one is justified in maintaining that the Law holds in all cases.
Explaining why induction commonly works has been somewhat problematic. One cannot use deduction, 
the usual process of moving logically from premise to conclusion, because there is simply no syllogism 
that will allow such a move. No matter how many times 17th century biologists observed white swans, 
and in how many different locations, there is no deductive path that can lead them to the conclusion that 
all swans are white. This is just as well, since, as it turned out, that conclusion would have been wrong. 
Similarly, it is at least possible that an observation will be made tomorrow that shows an occasion in 
which an action is not accompanied by a reaction; the same is true of any scientific law.
One answer has been to conceive of a different form of rational argument, one that does not rely on deduction. 
Deduction allows one to formulate a specific truth from a general truth: all crows are black; this is a crow; 
therefore this is black. Induction somehow allows one to formulate a general truth from some series of 
specific observations: this is a crow and it is black; that is a crow and it is black; therefore all crows are black".-wiki