[MD] Democracy

[Ham Priday]

Hi Ron --


Is X Acto now your avatar?

> Parmenides in his arguements about the non existence of voids
> or "nothing" turned the verb "to be" into a substantive form.
> He argued that the concept of “nothing” does not exist therefore
> movement or change is an illusion because it required movement
> within a “void” rationalizing that "be-ing" or "is" is timeless and
> unchanging and whole.  The reality of the world is one being.

I have argued that 'beingness' is the intellectual precept of differentiated 
otherness.  The experienced world, and all phenomena within it, is perceived 
as being because the human existent that perceives is a "being-aware".  Lest 
there be any doubt, I maintain that there is a difference between existence 
(the experienced world) and absolute reality.  Ultimate reality is not 
defined by either SOM or MOQ.  It is not subject or object, relations or 
difference, but is the "potentiality for difference" whereby the value of 
negated otherness (being) is realized.

> Parmenides claimed that truth may not be known via perception
> that it may only be known by reason. What Parmenides does not
> consider is that Reason is ta endoxa, and therefore a product of
> language and culture.

Your sophistry is amazing!  It forced me to look up 'ta endoxa' which, 
according to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy means "accepted things" 
or "accepted opinions".  I take this term to be the logical equivalent of "a 
given" (e.g., a proposition or premise that is universally accepted as 
stated).  If that's correct, I don't see why a ta endoxa statement is any 
more a "product of language or culture" than any other statement.

> All my literature maintains what we today know as classical
> essentialism is attributed to Plato, what Plato was arguing in his
> idealism is that "entities" or "forms" are an abstraction divorced
> from the physical world. Despite the fact Plato taught that ideas
> are ultimately real, and different from non-ideal things--indeed,
> he argued for a distinction between the ideal and non-ideal realm.
> Between the abstract universal and the concrete particular.
> The difference is that Plato founded his idealism on the assumption
> of "essentialism".
>
> By Plato insisting on making the distinction between "appearance
> and reality" he re-enforced the notion of "forms" as eternal and
> unchanging wholes or"entities" which we find again are ta endoxa,
> and therefore a product of language and culture or the "universal".

Yes, I was somewhat surprised to see this label applied to Plato in my 
Internet searches.  But that he distinguished the "ideal abstract" from the 
"non-ideal concrete" is not the point, since even his universals 
("essences") are differentiated.  Being is differentiated, Consciousness is 
differentiated, and so is Pirsig's Quality.  Everything in existence implies 
cause-and-effect, change, and relations.  Considered logically, experiential 
existence is an infinite regression.  Only an absolute source with the 
potential to negate otherness can resolve the paradox.

> Plancks constant and the observable symetry of particals
> dissolves notions of observer relativity in quantum mechanics.
> Quantum physics is indeed still based in human sensibility,
> but that sensibility is cross-referenced with mathematical
> calculation. They each verify the other. I think you and
> Parmenides share much in common, although your ideas
> of a value-centic experience is much more viable than
> anything we have of record of Parmenides work, IMHO.
>
> It was not my intent to conflagulate essentialism and Platonic
> idealism, but I do think I have a case in the origin of essentialistic
> concepts.

I'll accept the label along with your compliment, Ron, despite the 
renunciation of Parmenide's theory that change is illusory.  But can you 
accept my concept of Absolute Essence, even if we disagree on how difference 
is derived from it?

Thanks, Ron.  Great to talk with you again.

Essentially yours,
Ham