[MD] differences between MoQ and SOM

[Ham Priday]

Platt --

[Ham, previously]:
> Thus, for example:
> 1)  students carry backpacks
> 2)  my wife carries a backpack
> 3) :. my wife is a student.
>
> Or -- following Pirsig's construction:
> 1)  birds can fly
> 2)  birds are composed of cells
> 4) :.cells can fly.

[Platt]
> In the first example, the premise is questionable.
> In the second example, if you add the word "exclusively"
> as Pirsig does in his syllogism, then the conclusion would
> be logically correct  Right? (See Craig's explanation.)

In logical syllogisms, the first premise is usually a given; so that they 
would be expressed as  propositions like  IF birds can fly, IF students 
carry backpacks, IF professors exercise choice, etc.

[Craig's explanation]:
> Pirsig's position is that chemistry professors ARE NOT
> composed exclusively of atoms.  Atoms are not alive,
> don't have tenure & don't know chemistry.
> The MoQ levels address this issue.

Of course Craig is right.  Not only are atoms not alive, they are not aware. 
Therefore they have no knowledge, no values, and no morality.  But to learn 
why Pirsig chose this analogy to claim
decision-making on the part of atoms, I checked out my paperback LILA to 
discover that he was .  actually talking about the Free Will/Determinism 
controversy.  His point was that "the difference between these two points of 
view is philosophic, not scientific."  Unfortunately, however, he makes 
several assertions in this paragraph that are unfounded and confusing to 
anyone unfamiliar with his peculiar view of cosmic morality.

For example:

- "The 'Laws of Nature' are moral laws."  (Free Will?)

- "Chemistry professors smoke pipes and go to movies because irresistible 
cause-and-effect forces of the cosmos force them to do so."  (Determinism?)

- "We can just as easily deduce the morality of atoms from the observation 
that chemistry professors are, in general, moral."  (Then comes the 
syllogism to "prove" it.)

With all due respect to the author, this is nonsense.  First of all, Pirsig 
himself as much as tells us that experience creates our reality, which 
suggests that any Free Will or Determinism perceived in existence is an 
attribution by the cognizant subject.  What must occur before the experience 
of process and causes is individuated awareness and its sense of Value. 
Pirsig calls this sensibility "pre-intellectual experience", but he does not 
posit it as proprietary to the subject.  In fact, he gives as much 
value-sensibility to atoms and other objective phenomena as he gives to the 
individual who observes them.  If man is not a free agent, where is the Free 
Will?   Whose will is it that creates the universe?  Obviously, Pirsig wants 
to be on the side of the objectivists who claim that everything is the 
result of cause-and-effect determinism.

[Platt]:
> The premise is accepted by many physicists who believe all is
> simply different forms of energy. That's at the root of Pirsig's
> criticism of SOM. How does "everything is different forms of
> energy" explain quality?  In fact, how does it explain "different
> forms?"  (That's when "oops" comes in.)  As for configuring
> atoms of a person, I'm sure you're familiar with, "Beam me up,
> Scotty."  Fiction now, but who knows?

Apart from the "oops" factor and the fact that the MoQ is a metaphorical 
representation of physical existence, do you really believe that a human 
being is no more than a particular arrangement of atoms or energy patterns?

Regards,
Ham