[MD] The levels undressed part 1.

[Magnus Berg]

Hi Bo

Apologies for the delay. Been held up by that thing called work and a trip to 
Monza to experience a Formula 1 race first hand, I can recommend it!


>> Remember to not mention objects when talking about levels, but only
>> how objects interact with each other, i.e. use the experience point of
>> view. The inorganic level is one plane of existence, i.e. one way in
>> which objects interact. The biological level is a completely and
>> discretely different way in which objects interact, i.e. another plane
>> of existence. 
>   
> After discarding the Subject/Object distinction as the most 
> fundamental split it goes without saying that we are not supposed to 
> mention objects, but why "object interaction"? Isn't it supposed to be 
> "quality pattern interaction"?   

Yes, I guess it should. But on the other hand, it would be a little like jumping 
the gun since we haven't yet defined the levels, and thus what those quality 
patterns are.

>> To continue, the inorganic plane of existence is the type of
>> interaction described by physics. 
> 
> To be exact the static intellectual level (by its scientific discipline 
> "physics") does not know the MOQ and its levels, it's business is 
> "nature". And I think some wrong turn is taken by equalizing the Q 
> levels and the scientific disciplines: The inorganic and biological levels 
> may seem straightforward, but with the social trouble starts, it does not 
> fit the scientific counterpart

Actually, I'd say that Systems scientific discipline handles more or less 
exactly what the social level is all about. Generally, the essay lacks lots of 
references which could improve its (and the MoQs) scientific value. And in the 
case of the social level, a pointer to 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Systems_science would probably suffice.

> and at the intellectual things go completely 
> haywire, the 4th. level is SOM and consequently does not exist to/for 
> science.   

You know I don't agree with that. The intellectual level is to many people so 
self-evident that it's simply not visible. It's an underlying assumption that we 
can represent and model anything on paper, in our minds or in a computer. But 
what we represent is not limited to only SOM. ZAMM, Lila and MoQ.org are proofs 
of that.

>> In this level, we see interactions such as gravity, electromagnetism
>> etc. Remember that these types of interactions are not objects, but
>> ways in which objects can interact, or in MoQ terms, types of quality
>> events. 
> 
> "Quality events" are not mentioned in LILA, but this looks fine. 
> "Interaction" is IMO the inorganic level's "expression", a term you 
> provided long ago. 

Never thought of that, that QE is not mentioned in Lila. But I see you're right. 
Anyway, I see no reason to abandon it just because the MoQ is refined in Lila.

>> As mentioned above, the biological plane of existence contains
>> interactions such as taste, smell and touch. 
> 
> "Interaction such as taste"? If you by this mean a particular molecule 
> entering the nose and is sensed as a particular smell, OK  Sensing is 
> the 2nd. level's value of transforming inorganic patterns into biological 
> sense patterns.   

Not quite. It doesn't transform inorganic patterns, the inorganic patterns are 
still there and I thought the 3D pattern matching of the smell and taste organs 
was a great way to show how that duality is accomplished. It's not some magic 
that the MoQ applies to the world to mold it into its level hierarchy. It's 
simply there, we just have to look for it to see how it works.

It's actually a similar inter-level duality physics see in the double-slit 
experiment (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Double-slit_experiment). The scientists 
are perplexed as to why light shows two different sides of itself depending on 
how you measure it. But the truth is simply that the different methods of 
measurements are measuring two different levels of experience.

It's the same as being perplexed over the fact that you can judge the quality of 
tap water by either tasting it, or analyze its chemical composition. These are 
two different levels of experience, just like the wave/particle natures of light 
are.

>> I often use the dimensional metaphor to describe the levels. If you
>> could assign a value to each inorganic quality event, you could then
>> plot those values along, for example, an x-axis. Different inorganic
>> quality events are then pretty easy to compare, and if they are the
>> same type of inorganic quality event, for example weight, you can
>> easily compare them or use them to calculate different things about
>> the objects that were involved in the quality event. 
> 
> Your dimensional example is perfect one way seen, you won't find 
> taste or smell in a chemical formula, or colors in a electromagnetic 
> frequency, but my reservation is that a spatial dimension did not start 
> in another dimension thus it violates the "higher level out of the lower" 
> tenet. Pirsig speaks (for instance) about carbon as the inorganic 
> building block so at some point it was neither dead nor alive - or both. 
> Besides I can't see how the dimensional view will prevent discussion .. 
> about what dimension this or that belongs to        

Why can't a spatial dimension start in another dimension?

Although I wouldn't put it that way. I think you're confusing dimension and 
dimension. I claim that the spatial dimensions (width, height and depth), 
together with time, gravity, mass, etc. are parts of the spatial *level*. But 
you mustn't confuse the dimensional metaphor with the dimensions width, height 
and depth.

Also, regarding the carbon building blocks, you're back in the old fuzzy 
discussion about life again. But the biological level is not about life. They 
just have a sometimes very tight, but mostly very confusing relationship. Either 
way, the relationship is non orthogonal, thus irrelevant.


>> First off, it's pretty easy to realize that smell does depend on
>> matter, in this case gaseous matter. A thing that smells can't smell
>> forever. As it smells, parts of the thing evaporates into the air and
>> a nose nearby can detect it. We can also see that things that smells
>> much evaporates much of itself, either by being transformed in some
>> kind of biological rotting process, or by simply sending off pieces of
>> itself until it vanishes. Other things, such as metal, don't smell
>> much, if at all. 
> 
> Starting to pick nits. A particular molecular configuration is 
> (experienced as) a particular smell by an organism and this 
> relationship neither evaporates or diminishes.

I'm not convinced. Perhaps someone else can shed some light on this?

I have a feeling that each quality event, no matter what level, is destructive 
in nature. Isn't that what the MoQ says about the quality event? In the case of 
smell, you must inhale the smell in order to smell it. Granted, much of the 
smell diminishes just because it's inhaled in your lungs and then exhaled. But 
even if that wasn't the case, the smell organs in your nose *consumes* the smell 
as it smells.

But my main point was that an odor is being evaporated by the originating thing, 
and in the process, the originating thing is consumed. Take for example a white 
board marker pen. If you leave the cap off, you can soon feel it smell at a 
short distance, and if you forget to put it back on, it will continue to smell 
and consume itself until it doesn't smell anymore. And when it doesn't smell 
anymore, it's not working and it's no longer a "white board marker pen".

> That a dead organism 
> decomposes and gives off certain odors that stops when the process 
> is complete is another matter.     

Yes.

>> The MoQ tells us that the big bang was a dynamic event, which created
>> space, time and gravity. But what did the universe right after the big
>> bang exist of apart from that? For example, it seems that each
>> particle in this quantum level below the atomic level has some sort of
>> identity. It's usually called "thisness" and is used to explain why
>> seemingly identical particles are still able to be unique. Some people
>> have suggested that 
> 
> Does the MOQ say anything about the Big Bang at all? Anyway that's 
> a scientific theory and  as said in the first comment the MOQ just says 
> that the inorganic level is DQ's first creation. Physics is not relevant 
> outside physics i.e. outside intellect.    

Pirsig doesn't say anything about the Big Bang, no. But I think the MoQ does if 
you try to make sense out of it. I agree that physics is not relevant outside 
physics, and this is probably why classical physics and quantum mechanics seems 
incompatible. But your last comment about "outside intellect" doesn't make any 
sense to me, probably a SOL thing?


>> Either way, I think science has a lot to learn from the MoQ in the
>> quantum level. The insight that different fields of science are really
>> different metaphysical levels, and as such, different planes of
>> existence, should be investigated much further. Perhaps some of these
>> level borders, i.e. borders between different scientific fields, have
>> been very thoroughly investigated. 
>  
> Here's where we part company and what has paralyzed the MOQ, 
> namely the belief that the scientific fields corresponds to the Q levels. 
> The social level falls outside "sociology's" field and the intellectual level 
> - which is SOM itself - has definitely no place in science. Hence the 
> gross misinterpretations of the latter and your own weird social notion . 

Yes, the social level falls outside sociology, but it's more or less exactly 
what systems science is about, see above. So if you think my notion of the 
social level is weird, you need to first show why systems science is weird and 
as such unreal.

>> Most, if not all, of the examples Pirsig lists in Lila involves human 
>> societies. For example, biological values are things like greed and 
>> lust, 
> 
> To pick more nits, "greed" is an emotion i.e. a social pattern;  striving 
> after wealth and fame. Hunger however is biology (a sensation) The 
> same goes for "lust", the pure sexual urge is biology, while society 
> creates lust.    

I think you're making it too easy. For example hunger is biological if you see 
the person as part of a human society. But if you see the person as a society of 
organs, hunger is social value. Very similar to a scream for more money from the 
department of agriculture for example.

>> while social values are family, church and government. But what is
>> important to note is that these examples work exactly like their
>> smaller counterparts. Greed on the micro scale would be when a stronger
>> molecule devours a smaller one; the result is an even stronger molecule
>> at the expense of the smaller. 
> 
> This is a bit mysterious. "..a stronger molecule devours a smaller" 
> what's that? Molecules exist in countless fashions in an organism 
> without devouring each other except as cancer or in the digestive tract, 
> but at this plane no greed (emotion) is involved. Not even hunger 
> which belongs to the biological level 

I wasn't talking about molecules *in* an organism. I was talking about free 
molecules (in a primordial soup).

>> Lust is a more equal attraction between two molecules, sometimes
>> resulting in the social institution called family. 
> 
> "Molecule" is that an organism? And "attraction" the sexual act? And is 
> it a family when two molecules chemically combine? 

Not if they combine *chemically*, only if they combine biologically. A 
biological bond is much more dynamic, but also more fragile, than a chemical 
bond. So it fits very well with higher levels being more dynamic than lower ones.

>> Take for example a small multicellular animal. Social value makes sure
>> the animal stays viable, i.e. works 'as a whole', even if it's changed
>> slightly between every generation. 
> 
> Social value at work before the social level? It's not social value that 
> keeps an organism "viable", it only keep Magnus going ;-).      

If you could stop making these cheap comments, we might have better luck 
interchanging ideas. They're not funny, they only show your inability to 
understand what I'm trying to say.

	Magnus