[MD] Discrete & Dependent

MarshaV marshalz at charter.net
Fri Sep 19 13:27:45 PDT 2008


At 03:46 PM 9/19/2008, you wrote:
>Hi again Marsha
>
>>>But in that case, yes, I agree that in the MoQ, there are no 
>>>things-in-themselves, i.e. a thing does not exist independently of 
>>>other things, only in relationships with other things.
>>But isn't it like the moment you interact with phenomenon, like 
>>conceptualize this phenomenon, it is no longer the phenomenon, but 
>>the static, conceptualized-version, with it's relationships 
>>severed, it processes altered.  It seems to me it would be as the 
>>difference between dead and alive.
>
>The conceptualized version of a phenomenon is, in my view, an 
>intellectual pattern representing the original phenomenon. And yes, 
>the intellectual representation is very different from the original, 
>it's so different that it refuses any attempts of comparison. Very 
>much dead, I agree.
>
>For example, I'm really looking forward to eating that last piece of 
>blueberry pie my fiancee made a few days ago. I remember how 
>yesterday's piece tasted but that memory only serves to increase my 
>longing. The only thing I can really do is to eat that last piece, 
>and while I'm eating, the phenomenon is very much alive. As I'm 
>eating, I don't want to think about anything else, don't want to 
>watch TV because that would only distract me from the biological 
>gooood experience. But afterwards, it will again be just a dead 
>memory. A conceptualized, intellectualized, dead, static pattern.
>
>>I doubt that science ever gets to direct experience of phenomenon 
>>without conceptualization.  And this is where science gets 
>>defensive and wants to walk away from such a point-of-view.   It's 
>>a total lack of humility.  (Such nerve I have!!!)   But we both 
>>know there are lots of examples where new theories were ignored 
>>because there was so much already invested in the old.
>
>I'm not sure it *never* gets to direct experience. Take for example 
>an old fashioned scale used to weigh fish and vegetables on the 
>market place. To use such a scale, you put what you want to weigh on 
>one side, and then put the counter weights on the other until the 
>sides are balanced. Perhaps not very high-tech science, but as the 
>scale does its job, it is experiencing inorganic value first hand. 
>It's when we are done and say that the fish weighed 0.5kg that we 
>have conceptualized (and killed) the experience.

Hello Magnus,

I would imagine the conceptual pattern of fish 
(opposite-from-non-fish), scales, vegetables, have long ago taken 
control of the experience of such things.  A fish cannot be separated 
from water without major alterations separating it from interconnect 
processes.  Or the fact that nature knows nothing about "fish".  It a 
name directly given to our conceptualization.  The system we use to 
measure weight is man-made, the idea of weight itself is man-made, 
etc., etc., etc.   I cannot see where there would be much direct 
experience in that transaction at all.  We conceptualize.  That's 
what we do.  There is the experience of analog on analog on analog.




>But you're probably right most of the time. That's how science has 
>come to work. A theory is first formulated, and to test it, one must 
>do the observation and conceptualize it to verify it against the theory.
>
>>Yes, I agree a pattern only exists in relationship with other 
>>patterns of the same level.  Maybe interacting with patterns on 
>>other levels too.
>
>Yes, patterns are able to interact with patterns of other levels 
>too, but only via the inter-level dependency.
>
>>>>And it doesn't mean that the idea of one independent, falling 
>>>>piano is the best point-of-view either.
>>>
>>>No! Wow, that sparked some ideas. Thanks for rattling my cage. :)
>>I think you're making fun of me.  I know only enough to be 
>>dangerous, but I think you got my idea.
>
>No Marsha! I was *not* making fun of you. That was a very serious 
>and honest thanks for putting your finger on something that I took 
>for granted, but at a closer look wasn't that obvious.
>
>Usually when we want to show what a dynamic experience is, we use 
>biological tastes, or smells, or perhaps a beautiful scenery passing 
>by when you're out jogging. Afterwards, these dynamic experiences 
>are conceptualized and converted into dead intellectual static 
>patterns. But intellectual experiences can be dynamic too. And that 
>is what you gave me with that comment about the piano.
>
>So, again. Thanks!
>
>>Now here's where I get downright weird.  I do not believe gravity, 
>>or a "law of gravity" exists.  There's no phenomenon there, it all 
>>conceptual.   Intellectual patterns that are useful.  Have I sent you fleeing?
>
>Huh? No phenomenon? Perhaps you would change your mind if you tried 
>zero-G? Not that I have, but that way, you could first hand compare 
>gravity vs. no gravity. Just an idea.

Are you saying gravity is a tactile experience?   Can I touch, see, 
smell, hear or taste gravity?  No?  It must not be phenomenal 
entity.  I can think it.  It must be a conceptional entity.

See, this is where it gets sticky.


Marsha



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Shoot for the moon.  Even if you miss, you'll land among the stars.........
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