[MD] Discrete & Dependent
MarshaV
marshalz at charter.net
Fri Sep 19 13:27:45 PDT 2008
At 03:46 PM 9/19/2008, you wrote:
>Hi again Marsha
>
>>>But in that case, yes, I agree that in the MoQ, there are no
>>>things-in-themselves, i.e. a thing does not exist independently of
>>>other things, only in relationships with other things.
>>But isn't it like the moment you interact with phenomenon, like
>>conceptualize this phenomenon, it is no longer the phenomenon, but
>>the static, conceptualized-version, with it's relationships
>>severed, it processes altered. It seems to me it would be as the
>>difference between dead and alive.
>
>The conceptualized version of a phenomenon is, in my view, an
>intellectual pattern representing the original phenomenon. And yes,
>the intellectual representation is very different from the original,
>it's so different that it refuses any attempts of comparison. Very
>much dead, I agree.
>
>For example, I'm really looking forward to eating that last piece of
>blueberry pie my fiancee made a few days ago. I remember how
>yesterday's piece tasted but that memory only serves to increase my
>longing. The only thing I can really do is to eat that last piece,
>and while I'm eating, the phenomenon is very much alive. As I'm
>eating, I don't want to think about anything else, don't want to
>watch TV because that would only distract me from the biological
>gooood experience. But afterwards, it will again be just a dead
>memory. A conceptualized, intellectualized, dead, static pattern.
>
>>I doubt that science ever gets to direct experience of phenomenon
>>without conceptualization. And this is where science gets
>>defensive and wants to walk away from such a point-of-view. It's
>>a total lack of humility. (Such nerve I have!!!) But we both
>>know there are lots of examples where new theories were ignored
>>because there was so much already invested in the old.
>
>I'm not sure it *never* gets to direct experience. Take for example
>an old fashioned scale used to weigh fish and vegetables on the
>market place. To use such a scale, you put what you want to weigh on
>one side, and then put the counter weights on the other until the
>sides are balanced. Perhaps not very high-tech science, but as the
>scale does its job, it is experiencing inorganic value first hand.
>It's when we are done and say that the fish weighed 0.5kg that we
>have conceptualized (and killed) the experience.
Hello Magnus,
I would imagine the conceptual pattern of fish
(opposite-from-non-fish), scales, vegetables, have long ago taken
control of the experience of such things. A fish cannot be separated
from water without major alterations separating it from interconnect
processes. Or the fact that nature knows nothing about "fish". It a
name directly given to our conceptualization. The system we use to
measure weight is man-made, the idea of weight itself is man-made,
etc., etc., etc. I cannot see where there would be much direct
experience in that transaction at all. We conceptualize. That's
what we do. There is the experience of analog on analog on analog.
>But you're probably right most of the time. That's how science has
>come to work. A theory is first formulated, and to test it, one must
>do the observation and conceptualize it to verify it against the theory.
>
>>Yes, I agree a pattern only exists in relationship with other
>>patterns of the same level. Maybe interacting with patterns on
>>other levels too.
>
>Yes, patterns are able to interact with patterns of other levels
>too, but only via the inter-level dependency.
>
>>>>And it doesn't mean that the idea of one independent, falling
>>>>piano is the best point-of-view either.
>>>
>>>No! Wow, that sparked some ideas. Thanks for rattling my cage. :)
>>I think you're making fun of me. I know only enough to be
>>dangerous, but I think you got my idea.
>
>No Marsha! I was *not* making fun of you. That was a very serious
>and honest thanks for putting your finger on something that I took
>for granted, but at a closer look wasn't that obvious.
>
>Usually when we want to show what a dynamic experience is, we use
>biological tastes, or smells, or perhaps a beautiful scenery passing
>by when you're out jogging. Afterwards, these dynamic experiences
>are conceptualized and converted into dead intellectual static
>patterns. But intellectual experiences can be dynamic too. And that
>is what you gave me with that comment about the piano.
>
>So, again. Thanks!
>
>>Now here's where I get downright weird. I do not believe gravity,
>>or a "law of gravity" exists. There's no phenomenon there, it all
>>conceptual. Intellectual patterns that are useful. Have I sent you fleeing?
>
>Huh? No phenomenon? Perhaps you would change your mind if you tried
>zero-G? Not that I have, but that way, you could first hand compare
>gravity vs. no gravity. Just an idea.
Are you saying gravity is a tactile experience? Can I touch, see,
smell, hear or taste gravity? No? It must not be phenomenal
entity. I can think it. It must be a conceptional entity.
See, this is where it gets sticky.
Marsha
.
.
Shoot for the moon. Even if you miss, you'll land among the stars.........
.
.
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