[MD] Discrete & Dependent

MarshaV marshalz at charter.net
Sat Sep 20 13:19:18 PDT 2008


Greetings Magnus,



At 02:47 PM 9/20/2008, you wrote:
>Good afternoon! (At least it was afternoon when I started writing)
>
>>>I get kind of sad reading this, it seems you have given up on much 
>>>of what reality is about and only see it as dead, conceptualized 
>>>static patterns, as if you're seeing the world through a TV.
>>Not true.  I am trying to understand the basis of "reality".  I 
>>have no dog in this fight.   As I begin to see through the illusion 
>>of reification, it all becomes more beautiful.  Do you get that?
>
>Actually, no. To "see through" an illusion, do you mean that you 
>begin to realize that the illusion was false, or that it's true?

I understand that what I thought and believed to be true, is not 
true.  It passed way of understanding was an illusion.   "See 
through" was an incorrect phrase.  It's all an adjustment to my 
conceptual understanding.




>>>What I said was that the *scale* is experiencing the weight, not 
>>>the human user of the scale. The scale itself. It's man made, but so what?
>>The "scale" is experiencing the weight?  It's all analogy.  Conceptual.
>>This morning I was wondering what is wrong with 
>>conceptual?  Nothing really.  What IS wrong is misinterpreting 
>>it.  So why the sudden silence when I said it's conceptual?   Is it 
>>that 'conceptual' is translated into 'subjective'?  And therefore 
>>less than 'reality'?
>
>I translate conceptual into "an intellectual static representation 
>of something else", and phenomenal into "a dynamic, cutting edge, 
>real-time experience". Note that the real-time experience is always 
>of a certain level, but it can be any level, also intellectual.
>
>Perhaps I'm trying to mold your conceptual/phenomenal split into 
>something you didn't intend? But I don't see conceptual as 
>subjective, it's rather more closely related to what we usually mean 
>by objective. Either way, it does sound less real than phenomenal 
>because of its static nature.

Here I could go on for a very long time.  I am suggesting that humans 
have really no access to the phenomenal external world.  (Unless of 
course you are a Buddha.)   If you have a direct experience of an 
external world, the moment you add a word or image to the experience, 
it overlayed with pattern.  And that would be conceptual pattern.



>>ALL CONCEPTUAL.  I am NOT saying that there isn't a phenomenal 
>>world.  I think there is.  It's that our experience of it is 
>>conceptualized.  Mostly.
>
>I may be lost as to what you mean with conceptual. Of course my 
>story about the elephant is conceptual to us, but not to the elephant.

The elephant in your mind is conceptual.  Any speculation you do for 
that elephant is conceptual.  The minute you attach a word or image 
to your experience of elephant it is conceptual.  All your methods to 
recognize an elephant is conceptual.  All that you know about 
elephant behavior is conceptual.  Have you ever directly experienced 
an elephant without your thoughts and images?  Have you ever directly 
experienced the moon without your thoughts and images?

Nothing wrong with concepts.  But they are not direct experience of a 
phenomenal world.



>>>What? Is the fact that you can *think* something, proof of it 
>>>being conceptual?
>>Yes.
>
>I disagree. The thought of the original phenomenon is of course 
>conceptualized and static and dead and all, but not the original 
>phenomenon at the time of experiencing it.

This seems to be true.  I think I originally used 'static and dead', 
but that is much too negative.  I was trying to make a point and 
exaggerated.  I like patterns.  They are not dead, and aren't 
terribly static either.


>>>The experiences you mentioned, touch, see, smell, hear and taste, 
>>>are just biological value. Are you saying that only biological 
>>>value are real to you?
>>No, conceptual experiences are real too, empirically real, 
>>conventionally real.  A real that is dependent on ever-changing, 
>>collections of overlapping, interrelated, inorganic, biological, 
>>social and intellectual, static patterns of value.
>
>Be careful with that slogan. You know it doesn't mean anything if 
>you can't connect it to a coherent model of reality.

It might not be the conventional model of reality, but it's the model 
I'm working with.  How is it incoherent?



>>Biological experiences are immediately conceptualized.  I do not 
>>see them as much different than analogs.
>
>I disagree again. In my essay I claim that biological value are 
>based on the 3D fitness of different molecules. If two molecules fit 
>well, (like the computer game Tetris but in 3D), it's biologically 
>high value. In such a scenario, there are no concepts involved, only 
>a real-time, cutting-edge experience.
>
>It's only in larger animals that biological value is almost 
>immediately conceptualized, but there is still such a thing as 
>direct biological experience.

YES there is, I totally agree.


>>Yes, gravity is an experience, a conceptual experience.
>
>A "conceptual experience"? Perhaps I got your phenomenal/conceptual 
>split all wrong after all?


I think I need to declare a disclaimer.  I'm just working with what I 
have at the moment.  I make very definitive statements, but for sure 
I'm thinking, playing, testing & etc.  I'm not a trained scientist, 
but doing my best see if this hangs together, and where it might lead next.

It feels like I've entered Sophie's World.


Marsha





.
.

Shoot for the moon.  Even if you miss, you'll land among the stars.........
.
. 




More information about the Moq_Discuss mailing list