[MD] Catching up to Pirsig

[Ham Priday]

Krimel and Kieffer --



 [Krimel]:
> What Pirsig seems want in his account of evolution is similar
> to what he wants when talking about iron filings having a
> "preference". He wants a universe filled with purpose and
> free will, a universe that can in some sense be held morally
> accountable.

What is the purpose of the universe, and who holds it "morally accountable"?

If morality is already there, inherent in the universe, it is accountable 
for itself.  Then the "moral purpose" is evolution as we experience it, and 
it doesn't need an "evaluator".  Is this the teleology Pirsig wants?  Does 
it make epistemological sense?

> Preference and intention are so integral to our nature that we
> see them in everything. ...
> Any philosophy that attempts to imbue the universe with purpose
> and intent is just regressing to the intellectual equivalent of
> sucking its thumb.

Exactly.  So the precept of purpose and intent is "our nature", not that of 
the universe.  In other words, morality is subjective, and the meaning of 
existence is realized in the value sensibility of the individual.  This is 
precisely what I mean by being-aware.  Awareness in proprietary to the 
individual subject.  WE are the universe's evaluators.  WE are the agents 
who bring value into a relational world as evolving objects and events.  It 
is our appraisal, our judgments, that determine what is moral.  The basis of 
any morality system is the collective aggregate of individual value 
preferences.  This is why subjectivity cannot be dismissed in a value-based 
philosophy.

[KO]:
> All this not withstanding the fact that there is no detectable trace
> of a wispy 'I' pervading my brain or body and therefore that 'I' is
> really illusory along with any will-power i appear to have.
> The wikipedia page on Teleology refers to this viewpoint as
> 'intrinsic finality'.

 [Krimel]:
> Right, there is that watered down version of teleology that would
> classify the Heat Death as teleology. Unfortunately I don't think
> that is the kind of teleology Pirsig is seeking to prop up. I think
> he is trying to construct a philosophical thumb to suck.
>
> But don't let me get away with ignoring your point about the
> illusory "I".  "I" just don't have time for that ATM.

That's too bad, because Pirsig's "philosophical thumb" is what we're all 
sucking on in the life experience.  Only it's our realization that value 
lies beyond the experience of otherness, that it's the "ultimate reality" 
from which we are estranged at creation.  Value is essential to our finite 
being-aware.  It is our vital link to Absolute Essence.

I submit that your "teleological problem" is Pirsig's refusal to acknowledge 
the subject as value-sensibility.

Essentially yours,
Ham