[MD] Creativity and Philosophology, 2 (from 2005)

[John Carl]

Steve, Matt, and all,
Last night or the night before while clicking through archives and links and
what-not I came across this interview, with the following insight into the
question:


BAGGINI: I like the idea of “philosophology” as opposed to real philosophy.
And I am sure that one of the main trappings of academic philosophy is that
it encourages the former rather than the latter. But I'm not sure the
distinction is as neat as you present it, and this is what I think serves as
an obstacle to the reception of the MOQ.



PIRSIG: No, it isn't neat, since most philosophologists also philosophize
and most philosophers also philosophologise.

On Tue, Aug 4, 2009 at 7:59 AM, Steven Peterson <peterson.steve at gmail.com>wrote:

Hi Matt,
>
> Let me grant that you've successfully "fuzzed-up" the distinction
> between philosophy and philosophology that Pirsig and others would
> like to keep distinct.


So from my reading of this quote, the distinction was "fuzzed-up" even
before Matt.  It was intended as a fuzzy distinction by its creator.  Pirsig
also talks about doing philosophology himself, but his primary orientation
is as philosopher who is a half-assed philosophologist, rather than the
other way around.

How this relates to the debate is the distinction is not who we are, it is
in what we do -   In the moment I can do philosophy or I can do
philosophology.  There is a clear distinction,  in the moment of doing,
which is not fuzzy.  Which one I am, is determined by which one I am doing.
 And it changes.


>
> You've said that Pirsig wants us to keep this distinction because it
> frees him from the criticisms of academia. Can you see any other
> purpose for which this distinction could still be useful?
>

Well I don't agree with that "reason" as Pirsig's.   He plainly wants the
criticisms of academia.  I mean, who wouldn't?  I can't imagine anything
more exciting than waking up and finding academia criticizing me.

BAGGINI: Your alter-ego Phaedrus is the epitome of the lone philosopher. He
doesn't ignore other philosophers completely, but he doesn't have
well-informed fellow philosophers to push him and test him, and he develops
his own philosophy mostly independently from that which has gone before. I
would suggest, however, that he makes the opposite error of the
philosophologists he seems to feel superior too: they spend too much time
rehearsing the ideas of others, but he underestimates the extent to which
others can help us to raise our game and think better.



PIRSIG: Any time others want to help me raise my game and think better, I'm
all for it. The problem has been that those academic others who should be
engaging the Metaphysics of Quality have remained silent for 31 years in
contrast to the response of the general public.



John