[MD] Ironistic Metaphysics

[Steve Peterson]

Hi DMB,

> Steve said:
> I agree that Pirsig often seems to use metaphysics that way, and if  
> that is what we always mean by metaphysics, it is indeed impossible  
> to argue about having one. But then we can still ask, do we need to  
> model our thinking about knowledge on vision at all? Do we have to  
> think of ourselves as wearing cultural glasses that come between a  
> mental eye and its object and prevent us from knowing the world as  
> it really is?
>
> dmb says:
> Ah yes, I remember that one too. It could be that Matt got the idea  
> elsewhere but I think the objection to "ocular metaphors" comes  
> from Rorty. As you indicated by putting it in terms of "a mental  
> eye and its object", this objection is something like an attack on  
> SOM wherein the correspondence theory of truth says that real  
> knowledge exists when our subjective understanding "sees" objective  
> reality clearly and accurately. This objection is a good one when  
> it's used to identify such a theory of truth or the assumptions  
> that support it. But this problematic theory of truth is only  
> associated with ocular metaphors. We can't always apply the  
> objection just because some explanation or the other uses "seeing"  
> or "eyes" (or eye glasses) as a metaphor. I mean, Pirsig doesn't  
> think the glasses sit between the world and our eyes so much as he  
> thinks the glasses constitute the world as we understand it. He's  
> talking about the mythos, that evolved pile of analogies upon  
> analogies that co
>  nstitutes our reality. Or, to put it quite simply, the objection  
> doesn't apply to the MOQ because it already explicitly rejects of a  
> single objective truth. Also, please notice that the glasses are  
> used to "interpret experience", not to see objective reality.

Steve:
But Pirsig talks about the possibility of taking the glasses off. I  
can't see how that works if the glasses "constitute the world as we  
understand it." But maybe I'm pushing too hard against the text here  
since it was written to make a different point about the mythos as  
you say.


> Steve said:
> But I'm very attracted to the paintings in a gallery bit: ".. if  
> Quality or excellence is seen as the ultimate reality then it  
> becomes possible for more than one set of truths to exist.  Then  
> one doesn't seek the absolute "Truth."  One seeks instead the  
> highest quality intellectual explanation of things with the  
> knowledge that if the past is any guide to the future this  
> explanation must be taken provisionally; as useful until something  
> better comes along."
>
> Steve interjects:If he expects something better to come along, then  
> he sounds to me like an ironist about his own creation. [AND] ...He  
> is not willing to say that any particular metaphysics is true, then  
> he sounds like an ironist to me.
>
>
> dmb says:
>
> Maybe this is only a semantic debate but I don't think there is  
> anything particularly ironic about the position that says truths  
> are provisional. That, and the unwillingness to declare  
> metaphysical truths, just means you're not an absolutist or a  
> religious fanatic.

Steve:
I suppose it is about semantics. I introduced the term here because I  
thought it may be a useful term to for understanding and talking  
about what Bo is doing with the M in MOQ as compared to the way I  
think Pirsig is using it. What is really "ironic" for me is that Bo  
has found more to agree with in what I've said than anyone else!

Steve said previously:
> As far as I know, metaphysics is not taken to be the creation of ways
> of talking about reality/experience but the search for THE way of
> talking about it, i.e. trying to find the language in which the
> universe itself demands to be spoken about and to find the correct
> sentences that the universe demands be said about it.


Steve:
This traditional (I think) view of metaphysics is what I see Bo as  
using when he says things like "the MOQ IS reality." While I see  
Pirsig as talking about his "metaphysics" as a way of talking about  
reality and one of an inexhaustible possibilities for talking about  
reality. In other words, I see Pirsig as an ironist while Bo is  
reading him as a traditional metaphysician. But I could be wrong. At  
least no one seems to like the distinction I've been trying to draw.


DMB:
> For Rorty, I think, it's not so easy to escape the charge of  
> relativism. Sandra Rosenthal thinks that's exactly what he is.

Steve:
I don't know about Sandy, but I think you are demonstrating a strange  
allergy to Rorty. In other words, for some reason that I can't figure  
out you seem to have an over-active immune system when it comes to  
him. For example, for someone who sees truth as Pirsig and Rorty do  
and as you and I do--as a word used to describe the quality of  
aesthetic intellectual creations--the charge of relativism should  
sound about as on point as the charge of blasphemy does to an  
atheist, but you seem to need this word to have something to grab  
onto to try to club Rorty with. The more I read of Rorty the more I  
agree with Matt K that you just haven't tried to understand Rorty at  
all. If you gave him a chance I bet you would really dig him.

Best,
Steve