[MD] Consciousness (explained?)

[Ham Priday]

Greetings, Platt --

You have provided an excellent summation of six individual interpretations 
of Consciousness (if RMP is included).  The points of convergance should 
also be useful for future reference on this subject.  I commend you for an 
impressive piece of analytical reporting on a difficult subject!

With regard to your conclusion that no one "with the possible exception of 
Ham" has posited consciousness as the ground of being, I'd like add this 
note by way of clarification.  Consciousness is the ground of "being" to the 
extent that value-sensibility is the ground of Consciousness (being-aware).

Also, whether consciousness belongs to the "intellectual level" or not, it 
is a finite reduction of Sensibility which (like Value) is absolute in 
Essence.  My hypothesis is that finitude is a "negated subset" of 
"absoluteness" that creates or actualizes the primary mind/matter dichotomy 
from which all difference is derived.

Thanks for a most interesting and challenging query, Platt.

Best regards,
Ham

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

> Hi Andre, Bo, Ham, Willblake, John, All:
>
> Interesting reactions and responses to my queries about consciousness
> and how it's presented, treated and interpreted with the MOQ as the
> primary reference.
>
> First, from Andre came perhaps the most definitive Pirsig quote on the
> subject:
>
> "At the time we are aware of millions of things around us...aware of
> these
> things but not really conscious of them unless there is something
> unusual or
> unless they reflect something we are predisposed to see. We could not
> possibly be conscious of these things and remember all of them
> because our
> mind would be so full of useless details we would be unable to think.
> From
> all this awareness we must select, and what we select and call
> consciousness
> is never the same as the awareness because the process of selection
> mutates
> it. We take a handfull of sand from the endless landscape of awareness
> around us and call that handfull of sand the world.
> "Once we have the handful of sand, the world of which we are
> conscious, a
> process of discrimination goes to work on it. This is the knife." ZAMM  (p
> 75).
> 'Classical understanding is concerned with the piles and the basis for
> sorting and interrelating them'' (the Aristotelian, dialectical method and
> classification?). Romantic understanding is directed toward the handfull
> of
> sand before the sorting begins' (note this is separated from the 'endless
> landscape') (ibid,p76)
>
> So for Pirsig, consciousness is a biological selection mechanism
> operating within a background of awareness described metaphorically as
> an "endless landscape." (Note that "experience" is not mentioned.)
>
> Secondly, Bo views consciousness as "a direct product of S/O," citing
> Descartes as originator of the mind (consciousness) /matter division. As
> such, consciousness is firmly ensconced in the intellectual level as is
> awareness, both being intractably subjective.The metaphor of
> an"endless landscape" of ZAMM becomes an "aesthetic continuum" in
> Lila. Previously Bo has waxed metaphorical, referring to all embracing
> ocean while we necessarily focus on the waves. (See a similar metaphor
> from Pirsig below.)
>
> Thirdly, Ham the Idealist quotes extensively from Donald Hoffman who
> expands on the Idealist's belief that nothing exists until consciously
> perceived. He proposes that an existence, independent of your personal
> observation, is maintained by "systems of conscious agents." Thus, for
> Hoffman (and presumably Ham) "Consciousness is fundamental in the
> universe, not a fitfully emerging newcomer."  Though I don't understand
> Ham's concept of a "negate" or "nothingness," I guess his metaphor for
> consciousness is a "cosmic void."
>
> Fourthly, John Carl reflects Pirsig's view that consciousness and
> selection (choice) are intimately connected and adds to that mix the idea
> of "self" as the "self-evident choice of consciousness." Thus self is real
> but the contents of self (consciousness) are illusory. John cautions us
> not to take his current thinking as his final word on the subject,
> suggesting tentatively that perhaps DQ is a "meta-consciousness."  He
> agrees with Ham that the selection mechanism of consciousness
> presupposes values and likes Ham's description of the process as
> "value sensibility."
>
> Finally, Willblake2 says consciousness is NOT the same as experience.
> It's what's behind experience -- the "I" (self) of experience as it were.
> Metaphorically, Willblake2 compares consciousness to "the page of a
> book. It is the white background. On that page there are words,
> sentences, feelings, experiences. One must not confuse  the writing for
> consciousness itself."
>
> A couple of conclusions. With the possible exception of Ham, no one is
> willing to say that consciousness is the ground of being. Behind
> consciousness is something else that can only be described
> metaphorically, never definitively  In Lila, for example, there's this
> passage:
>
> "He stopped for a second by the beach and just stared at the endless
> procession of waves moving slowly in from the horizon.
> The south wind was stronger here and it cooled him. It was steady, like a
> trade wind. Nothing interfered with its flow toward him over the huge
> ocean. 'Vast emptiness and nothing sacred.' If ever there was a visible
> concrete metaphor for Dynamic Quality this was it." (Lila, 32)
>
> Everyone seems to agree that consciousness per se is not the end all
> and be all. There is a mysterious something behind and/or beyond
> supporting it. What that something is we can only obliquely surmise. As
> the quantum physicist Eddington exclaimed:
>
> "Something unknown is doing we don't know what -- that is what our
> theory amounts to. It does not sound a particularly illuminating theory. I
> have read something like it elsewhere --
>
> . . . The slithy toves,
> Did gyre and gimble in the wabe."
>
> A pretty good definition of DQ I'd say -- toves finding value in the wabe.
>
> My other conclusion is simply that Bo is right -- consciousness belongs
> in the intellectual level. It's the "mind" of the mind/matter split. 
> Pirsig
> says so himself. Note 32 of LC:
>
> "Since the MOQ states that consciousness (i.e., intellectual patterns) . .
> ."  and then adds, "A question arises if the term 'consciousness' is
> expanded to mean 'intuition' or 'mystic awareness.' Then computers are
> shut out by the fact that static patterns do not create Dynamic quality."
>
> Since all respondents to my inquiry exhibit "intuition" of something
> transcending consciousness -- and by implication something surpassing
> the intellectual level -- they can be said, unlike some self-appointed
> "intellectuals" here who will remain nameless, to be DQ creators.
>
> Thanks for your responses. If I've misrepresented anyone's ideas, I
> apologize in advance.
>
> Regards,
> Platt