[MD] Rorty's Relativism

[Steve Peterson]

Hi DMB,

>
> Steve said:
> I don't know about Sandy [Dr. Rosenthal], but I think you are  
> demonstrating a strange allergy to Rorty. In other words, for some  
> reason that I can't figure out you seem to have an over-active  
> immune system when it comes to him. For example, for someone who  
> sees truth as Pirsig and Rorty do   and as you and I do--as a word  
> used to describe the quality of aesthetic intellectual creations-- 
> the charge of relativism should sound about as on point as the  
> charge of blasphemy does to an atheist, but you seem to need this  
> word to have something to grab onto to try to club Rorty with. The  
> more I read of Rorty the more I agree with Matt K that you just  
> haven't tried to understand Rorty at all. If you gave him a chance  
> I bet you would really dig him.
>
>
> dmb says:
>
> Yes, much to Matt's chagrin I do not like Richard Rorty. I don't  
> think it's quite fair to call it "a strange allergy" or "an over- 
> active immune system" though. I mean, that certainly suggests that  
> my reactions are founded on some personal quirk on my part but what  
> if the guy really is poison? I've learned that there is a whole  
> school of pragmatism that distinguishes themselves in opposition to  
> Rorty's brand of the same. Sandra Rosenthal is a member of that  
> school, the classical pragmatists. Like me, they insist that  
> radical empiricism is central to the whole thing.

Steve:
I suppose the issue has something to do with the "linguistic turn."  
While the classical and neo-classical pragmatists talk about  
experience. Rorty focuses on language. I'd be interested in hearing  
your take on the linguistic turn and what is lost in taking this turn.

As far as radical empiricism being "central to the whole thing," it  
is interesting that Pirsig read James to be saying that he thought  
that radical empiricism was "independent of pragmatism." So it seems  
that someone can be called a pragmatist without talking about radical  
empiricism.

Pirsig:
"James really had two main systems of philosophy going: one he called
pragmatism and the other radical empiricism.
...The second of James' two main systems of philosophy, which he said  
was
independent of pragmatism, was his radical empiricism.  By this he meant
that subjects and objects are not the starting points of experience.
Subjects and objects are secondary.  They are concepts derived from
something more fundamental which he described as "the immediate flux of
life which furnishes the material to our later reflection with its
conceptual categories."  In this basic flux of experience, the  
distinctions
of reflective thought, such as those between consciousness and content,
subject and object, mind and matter, have not yet emerged in the forms
which we make them.  Pure experience cannot be called either physical or
psychical: it logically precedes this distinction.
In his last unfinished work, Some Problems of Philosophy, James had
condensed this description to a single sentence:  "There must always  
be a
discrepancy between concepts and reality, because the former are  
static and
discontinuous while the latter is dynamic and flowing."  Here James had
chosen exactly the same words Phædrus had used for the basic  
subdivision of
the Metaphysics of Quality."

Steve:
Another issue that may separate Rorty from other pragmatists is that  
Rorty doesn't equate truth with "warranted assertability" which is  
why, as I recall, Davidson never wanted to be called a pragmatist and  
why Putnam didn't think Rorty was really a pragmatist.

DMB:
> And may I remind you that ZAMM was criticized for relativism, that  
> Lila begins with Rigel accusing "the author" of relativism and that  
> one of the important things going on in the second book is Pirsig  
> denying that the MOQ is a form of relativism. I mean, we don't like  
> absolutism either but relativism is not the only alternative. This  
> is a pretty serious issue with practical consequences. I mean, if  
> there is no such thing as a universal truth, not even a provisional  
> one, then what happens to universal principles like "human rights"?  
> You don't have to be a reactionary to believe that relativism is a  
> moral disaster, you know?

Steve:
When I hear the charge of relativism being made, all it sounds like  
is an epithet that a Rigel type uses when he disagrees with someone  
else's morality. As I see it, Rigel is going to walk away unconvinced  
by both Pirsig's and Rorty's protestations about being called a  
relativist, but that doesn't make either one a relativist. I  
completely understand that Pirsig and Rorty will be accused of  
relativism by someone like Rigel, but I can't understand how you  
would be interested in making the charge. Isn't asking if morality is  
relative or absolute pretty much the same as asking whether it is  
subjective or objective? It sounds like an atheist accusing another  
atheist of blasphemy. It seems to me that neither you nor Rorty  
should see these questions as on point--that both of you would be  
unconcerned with finding an ahistorical foundation for your current  
beliefs and instead be concerned with whether you have been creative  
enough to invent better alternatives to your current beliefs.



Best,
Steve