[MD] Rorty's Relativism

[Steve Peterson]

Hi DMB,


> Steve said to Marsha:
> I think we should always defend ourselves against the charge of  
> relativism since it is used as an epithet and a way of dismissing  
> someone without having to address their arguments.
>
> dmb says:
> I think you're being unfair here. While it's certainly possible to  
> use the word as a dismissive epithet, there are also thoughtful  
> people who see relativism as a genuine problem, as a real position  
> held by real people with real consequences. Ironically, you seem to  
> be dismissing the whole thing as nothing but dismissive. I mean, do  
> you really think that pragmatists like Hildebrand and Rosenthal are  
> just using the term to dismiss Rorty without having to address his  
> arguments? The stuff they publish is reviewed by their peers and if  
> they were engaged in such shoddy scholarship as that, they'd be  
> very quickly attacked and humiliated for it.

Steve:
The sorts of things that such philosophers who want to engage Rorty  
often say is that Rorty "leaves himself open" to the charge of  
relativism rather than arguing that Rorty is actually endorsing  
relativism. I would think that any pragmatist shouldn't be interested  
in making such a charge personally though they may want to note that  
philosophers of the SOMish persuasion will call him that. The thing  
is, those sorts of philosophers will the same the same thing about  
Putnam and Hildebrand and Rosenthal and Pirsig because from the SOM  
perspective that is exactly what they are.


> Steve continued:
> While we can like the slogan "man is the measure of all things"  
> because it captures the notion that unlike theists and rationalists  
> we are not looking for a great, non-human, ahistorical power to  
> tell us right from wrong, we also still deny being relativists  
> because we deny the absolute-relative distinctions on the same  
> grounds that we deny the objective-subjective distinction. It's the  
> same thing as not wanting to be called a subjectivist.
>
> dmb says:
>
> Yea, that's not a bad way to look at what Pirsig is doing but Rorty  
> and his critics have already managed to reject the subject-object  
> distinction as primary and yet the relativism debate continues  
> despite that. The demise of "objective truth", theism and  
> metaphysics more or less spells the end of absolutism but that  
> shift raises new questions about relativism. I mean, postmodernism  
> in general has been struggling with this issue as it seems to leave  
> no alternative except some kind of relativism and Rorty was among  
> those articulating that postmodern shift. And to the extent that  
> Pirsig resembles this, he's been accused too. Now, because of  
> Rorty, pragmatists of all kinds have to defend themselves against  
> such charges. Pirsig's defense of the MOQ is unusual if not unique  
> but the classical pragmatists use the distinction between  
> relativism and "perspectivism" as a defense.

Steve:
I really don't see how there could be a debate among pragmatists  
about relativism unless it is about Rorty "leaving himself open" to  
to such criticism by others. How can relativism be described in  
pragmatic terms as something to be concerned about? Can you give a  
definition of relativism as you see pragmatists applying to Rorty?


> Steve said:
> Pirsig later brings back the terms subjective and objective without  
> their metaphysical baggage where subjective is just taken to mean  
> social and intellectual patterns or "things that are hard to get  
> agreement about" and objective is taken to mean inorganic and  
> biological patterns or "things that are easy to get agreement  
> about." Absolute and relative could be retooled in the same way,  
> but I still think that we should avoid using such terms because  
> doing so implies accepting an SOM premise that we don't accept. We  
> can just say that some morals are easy to get agreement on and  
> others not so much, and we can argue our case for the morality of  
> our position.
>
> dmb says:
> ...And in the following sections of a Stanford encyclopedia of  
> Philosophy one can see that the issue of Rorty's relativism is of  
> concern to a wide range of philosophers.
> "Epistemological behaviorism leaves no room for the kind of  
> practice-transcending legitimation that Rorty identifies as the  
> defining aspiration of modern epistemology.
> Assuming that epistemic practices do, or at least can, diverge, it  
> is not surprising that Rorty's commitment to epistemological  
> behaviorism should lead to charges of relativism or subjectivism.

Charges by who? SOMers? And what could such people mean by the term  
that should be taken seriously by a pragmatist?

> Indeed, many who share Rorty's historicist scepticism toward the  
> transcending ambitions of epistemology—friendly critics like Hilary  
> Putnam, John McDowell and Daniel Dennett—balk at the idea that  
> there are no constraints on knowledge save conversational ones. Yet  
> this is a central part of Rorty's position, repeated and elaborated  
> as recently as in TP and PCP.

I suspect the issue has to do with Rorty's notion of knowledge as not  
being knowledge *of* something like "The Way Things Really Are" but  
rather the power to be able to use a thing or be able to put it in  
relation to something else for some purpose. Knowledge is a  
linguistic thing for Rorty rather than trying to get into the right  
relationship to the essence of something. He's not saying that  
reality just lets us believe anything we want until someone else  
tells us it ain't so. Beliefs are habits of action for pragmatists  
held to be provisionally true if they lead to successful action and  
discarded when they don't serve.

> 4.1 Critical Responses
> As we have seen in connection with Rorty's attitude to science, it  
> is particularly Rorty's treatment of truth and knowledge that has  
> drawn fire from philosophers. While a great variety of philosophers  
> have criticized Rorty on this general score in a great variety of  
> ways, it is not very difficult to discern a common concern; Rorty's  
> conversationalist view of truth and knowledge leaves us entirely  
> unable to account for the notion that a reasonable view of how  
> things are is a view suitably constrained by how the world actually  
> is.


Since pragmatists want to drop the notion of "how the world actually  
is" it makes perfect sense that SOM philosphers would criticize what  
he doing.


> DMB:
> My point? It's not very reasonable or fair to dismiss these  
> criticisms as some kind of quirky misunderstanding or as otherwise  
> illegitimate. There are smart, sincere people on both sides of what  
> many philosophers consider a legitimate debate. These people don't  
> charge Rorty with relativism to dismiss him but to engage with what  
> he's saying. I mean, in that world it's not too easy to get away  
> with mere name calling or mere dismissal. Acting like that in the  
> world of academic philosophy is likely to get you dismissed. And  
> called names. ;-)

Steve:
It's not that Rorty isn't open to criticism by smart people. It's  
just that I can't see how a pragmatist or anyone not taking the  
subject-object picture for granted could make the particular  
criticism of relativism with respect to Rorty. I'm sure that  
professional philosophers mean something more than what people  
generally seem to be doing with the word relativism, but I also can't  
tell what that is.

Best,
Steve