[MD] Rorty's Relativism

[Steve Peterson]

Hi DMB:

> dmb says:
> It's pretty safe to say that Pirsig would agree that the search for  
> the essence of Truth and Reality, whatever that means, is futile.

Steve:
I'm reminded of Pirsig's pursuit of the Ghost of Reason, his attempt  
to show that the essence of reason is something other than what was  
previously thought. The pursuit can be thought of as ending in  
showing that reason has no essence or that Quality actually is the  
essence of reason (and Truth and Reality). Do you see Quality as an  
essence? If so, I think this issue would constitute a departure from  
the tradition of pragmatism, so I suppose not. It is a way of talking  
about radical empiricism. It is pure experience. But then, Quality is  
more descriptive of what pure experience is like than radical  
empiricists would be comfortable with. You'll have some 'splainin to  
do among the academics anyway.


DMB:
> But the way he makes a distinction between Quality itself and our  
> many marvelous analogues, as described in the passage above, marks  
> a big difference between his view and Rorty's. The idea that  
> philosophy is a form of literary criticism, which is consistent  
> with his idea that conversation is our only constraint or that  
> intersubjective agreement is all we can hope for, reflects his  
> brand of linguisticized pragmatism. But it seems to me that Rorty  
> was trapped within those secondary analogs whereas Pirsig is very  
> interested in the Quality, in the immediate experience from which  
> these analogs  are derived.

Steve:
To say that Rorty is "trapped within...analogues" sets up an  
appearance-reality problem that Rorty would deny. Talking about  
reality won't bring us any closer to or further from reality. It  
won't make anyone's immediate experience any more immediate. What  
talking will do is take undescribed reality and put it under a  
description. So Rorty wouldn't have seen any use in appealing to  
undescribed reality to make our assertions true since our talk will  
always be reality under some description. So I'm wondering what you  
can hope for that Rorty couldn't have hoped for. What can you say  
about the morality of, say, slavery that Rorty could not say?

I don't think you've supported your assertion that Rorty is a  
relativist from a pragmatist perspective. (Of course he is from the  
SOM perspective, we all are.) I think all we have so far is that you  
think Rorty was a relativist because he didn't talk about experience.  
But you haven't explained why talking about experience gives you a  
better foundation for your ethical or factual assertions than Rorty  
could claim to have.


DMB:
> Think about the difference this way. Rorty rightly attacks Modern  
> epistemology and the correspondence theory of truth (where truth is  
> defined as the proper correspondence between subjective  
> understanding and objective reality) and basically concludes that  
> we shouldn't be doing epistemology. By contrast, the radical  
> empiricist also rightly attacks Modern epistemology or, more  
> specifically, traditional empiricism but he doesn't conclude that  
> we shouldn't be doing epistemology. I mean, radical empiricism is  
> an epistemological position and it happens to be a position that  
> supports the role of immediate experience in the formation of  
> concepts, knowledge and truth with a small "t".
> Does that make sense to you? See what a huge difference there at  
> this crucial point. Adopting radical empiricism is very different  
> from rejecting epistemology altogether. Not to be snarky, but it  
> seems to me that Rorty's view lacks quality because it lacks  
> "Quality" in the Pirsigian sense.
> And Quality is what prevents relativism.

Steve:
Rorty saw reality as putting causal pressures on our beliefs. I can't  
see the difference between saying Quality prevents relativism and  
saying that reality simply won't allow us to have certain beliefs.  
Neither view is any help in explaining why liberalism is better than  
fascism when there are nut jobs out there who believe that fascism is  
better. Rorty could make a strong argument for liberalism and could  
argue against fascism as well as anyone and far more effectively than  
most. What he wouldn't do in such arguments is point to some  
ahistorical foundation for liberalism as was done by the Founding  
Fathers, but then, neither would you, so I find it strange for you to  
be calling him a relativist. Somehow you must be claiming more of a  
foundation for your beliefs than Rorty was willing to claim for his,  
but unless you are claiming Quality as an essence, I can't see how it  
could serve as such a foundation.

Best,
Steve