[MD] Rorty's Relativism

[Steve Peterson]

Hi DMB,

> Steve said:
> To say that Rorty is "trapped within...analogues" sets up an  
> appearance-reality problem that Rorty would deny.
>
>
> dmb says:
> No, it does not set up the appearance-reality distinction. The  
> appearance-reality distinction is within the analogues. If  
> experience IS reality, as the radical empiricist says, then  
> appearance is reality. Of course, it has to be understood that this  
> claim is not being asserted from within SOM. I mean, this is not a  
> claim that subjective appearance are the objective reality because  
> subjects and objects are both seen as derived concepts.
>
>
> Steve said:Talking about reality won't bring us any closer to or  
> further from reality. It won't make anyone's immediate experience  
> any more immediate.
>
> dmb says:
> Well, according to Pirsig, talking about reality is exactly what  
> takes us further away from reality because reality is pre- 
> conceptual, pre-verbal experience. The immediacy of experience is  
> known best when we shut the hell up. That's probably THEE major  
> difference between Pirsig and Rorty. If a guy wanted to obscure  
> this difference, he'd do well to ignore that fact that Pirsig is a  
> philosophical mystic and ignore radical empiricism or at least  
> convert it to panrelationalism, as our fiend Matt does. I mean, if  
> we "take undescribed reality and put it under a description" we  
> have already lost the undescribed reality, we have only shown that  
> we have the wrong idea about what pure experience is, the wrong  
> idea about what "pre-intellectual reality" means. I agree that  
> "Rorty wouldn't have seen any use in appealing to undescribed  
> reality" and I think that's exactly what sets him apart from Pirsig.


Steve:
I agree that this is a difference between Rorty and Pirsig, but for  
Rorty this isn't a problem. He would just ask you to tell him what he  
needs to know about undescribed reality that he is missing. All your  
talk about undescribed reality is reality under a description.

I disagree with you that language can take us out of reality. If we  
take an evolutionary view of language then we see language as a tool  
for using reality rather than as a limited representation of reality.  
The Buddha resides as comfortably in a sentence as in a motorcycle.

But while this is an interesting difference between Rorty and Pirsig,  
let's keep in mind that we don't need to choose just one...

"One can then examine intellectual realities the same way he examines  
paintings in an art
gallery, not with an effort to find out which one is the "real"  
painting, but simply to enjoy and keep those that are of value.   
There are many sets of intellectual reality in existence and we can  
perceive some to have more quality than others, but that we do so is,  
in part, the result of our history and current patterns of values." Lila


> Steve said:
> I think all we have so far is that you think Rorty was a relativist  
> because he didn't talk about experience. But you haven't explained  
> why talking about experience gives you a better foundation for your  
> ethical or factual assertions than Rorty could claim to have.
>
> dmb says:
> Again, did we not already agree that nobody here is looking for a  
> foundation? (about five times) Why do you keep insisting that  
> foundationalism is the only way to avoid relativism.


Steve:
It isn't that I think foundationalism is the only way to avoid  
relativism. On the contrary I think that avoiding foundationalism is  
the best way to avoid relativism. I think that foundationalism is the  
only position from which one normally makes the charge of relativism,  
so I can't see how a pragmatist like you or Hildebrand is interested  
in making this charge against another pragmatist. I still can't  
figure out what you mean in calling Rorty a relativist. You quoted  
Rorty admitting that he can't appeal to any foundation for his belief  
that liberalism is better than Nazism and you called it irresponsible  
for him to do so. If you agree with him that there is no such  
foundation then I don't get it. Can you tell me what you mean by  
relativism if you don't think it means lacking a foundation for moral  
claims? You are frustrated that I keep bringing up essences but you  
haven't told me what you mean by relativism without foundationalism.



> Steve said:
> Rorty saw reality as putting causal pressures on our beliefs. I  
> can't see the difference between saying Quality prevents relativism  
> and saying that reality simply won't allow us to have certain  
> beliefs. Neither view is any help in explaining why liberalism is  
> better than fascism when there are nut jobs out there who believe  
> that fascism is better. Rorty could make a strong argument for  
> liberalism and could argue against fascism as well as anyone and  
> far more effectively than most. What he wouldn't do in such  
> arguments is point to some ahistorical foundation for liberalism as  
> was done by the Founding Fathers, but then, neither would you, so I  
> find it strange for you to be calling him a relativist. Somehow you  
> must be claiming more of a foundation for your beliefs than Rorty  
> was willing to claim for his, but unless you are claiming Quality  
> as an essence, I can't see how it could serve as such a foundation.
>
>
> dmb says:
> There you go with the essences and foundations again. Sigh.
>
> As you probably know (but apparently forgot) Pirsig's claims about  
> the superiority of liberalism over fascism is almost exactly the  
> opposite of an ahistorical claim. He makes that claim on the basis  
> of the evolutionary relationship between social and intellectual  
> values. Such claims cannot be supported by reference to pre- 
> intellectual experience. The difference between social and  
> intellectual values is practically defined by the difference  
> between fascism and liberalism. That difference is an historical  
> difference and is asserted from with static reality.

Steve:
Of course I remember Pirsig's evolutionary hierarchy, but that is  
just as "off the table" as essentialism is in this discussion since  
you set out to defend the classical pragmatist's claims that Rorty is  
a relativist. (Recall that Pirsig was calling the classical  
pragmatists rather than Rorty relativists with his bit on the Nazis.)  
Rorty can make the same sort of historical arguments against fascism  
that Rosenthal and Hildebrand can make, can't he? How does radical  
empiricism make their arguments against the Nazis any stronger than  
Rorty's?

Plus, Rorty makes such distinctions as Pirsig's distinction between  
social and intellectual values in various ways, too. For example, he  
says, "I see 'orthodox' (the people who think that hounding gays out  
of the military promotes traditional family values) as the same  
honest, decent, blinkered, disatrous people who voted for Hitler in  
1933. I see 'progressivists' as defining the only America I care about."

I still can't figure out what you would like him to say to avoid  
being a relativist. Instead of saying "I see 'othodox'..." if he had  
said "The Anti-Metaphysics of Rorty says that 'orthodox'..." would  
that free him of the relativist charge???

For this discussion to go anywhere and for you to back up your claims  
that Rorty is a relativist while the classical pragmatists avoid this  
charge through radical empiricism, you really need to answer at least  
one of the following...
i. what you mean by relativism if not lacking a foundation for moral  
claims
ii. what sort of arguments about the moral superiority of one  
position over another the classical pragmatists can make that a  
linguistified pragmatist like Rorty can't make
iii. what Rorty could say that would convince you that he is not a  
relativist
or iv. just eat some humble pie since Rorty is not a relativist

Best,
Steve