[MD] The relativity of the MoQ

[Steve Peterson]

On Aug 27, 2009, at 1:26 PM, X Acto wrote:

> See, I think this was Daves beef,
> Rorty did'nt have betterness and value
> to support his claims so his ideas were
> colored as a kind of relativism.
>

Hi Ron,

Pirsig doesn't have any sort of copyright on "betterness."

 From Rorty's Philosophy and Social Hope:

	"Pragmatists do not believe there is a way things really are. So they 
want to replace the appearance-reality distinction by that between 
descriptions of the world and ourselves which are less useful and those 
which are more useful. When the question 'useful for what?' is pressed, 
they have nothing to say except 'useful to create a better future.' 
When they are asked, 'Better by what criterion?', they have no detailed 
answer, any more than the first mammals could specify in what respects 
they were better than the dying dinosaurs. Pragmatists can only say 
something as vague as: Better in the sense of containing more of what 
is good and less of what is bad. When asked, 'And exactly what do you 
consider good?', pragmatists can only say with Whitman 'variety and 
freedom,' or with Dewey, 'growth.' 'Growth itself,' Dewey said, 'is the 
only moral end.'"
	"The are limited to such fuzzy and unhelpful answers because what they 
hope is not that the future will conform to a plan, will fulfil an 
immanent teleology, but rather that the future will astonish and 
exhilarate. Just as fans of the avant garde go to art galleries wanting 
to be astonished rather than wanting to have some specific expectation 
fulfilled..."
	"So if Whitman and Dewey have anything in common, it is their 
principled and deliberate fuzziness. For principled fuzziness is the 
American way of doing what Heidegger called 'getting beyond 
metaphysics.'

That sounds a lot like dynamic quality to me, and it sounds like Pirsig 
and Rorty have a lot in common.

"Principled fuzziness." Do you like that?

Best,
Steve