[MD] The Role of Evolution, Time and Order

[Ham Priday]

Hi Bo (Marsha mentioned) --


You know, I've been reading your posts regularly for three years and, like 
Marsha, have never really understood your argument with Pirsig.  Each 
message is articulated in clear English and treats the alleged issue a bit 
differently than the last, but I still don't see what the issue is.

For example, on 2/9 at 2:46 AM, you write:

> OK, the  basic argument in ZAMM is a pre-existing reality
> before the subject becomes aware of the objective world.
> Thus the pre-something (now called Quality) must necessarily
> be the DQ that spawns static qualities. In the first sketch the
> static part was just the S/O (called "intellect"). The mystery is:
> Why postulate that DQ spawns the MOQ and remains
> unscathed outside of metaphysics?

I see no problem defined in your first three sentences.  Only in the final 
sentence do you allude to a problem ("mystery'), and it seems to be one of 
your own making.  Where does Pirsig postulate that DQ spawns the MOQ?   The 
MOQ is a metaphorical theory "spawned" by a philosopher, not by DQ.  Giving 
you the benefit of the doubt, I have to assume what you are really asking 
is: How does the appearance of difference and contrariety arise from a pure 
(undifferentiated) source?  Indeed, this is the central paradox of 
metaphysics, and the multi-level, multi-pattern scheme proposed by Pirsig 
does not address it.

You then elaborate on the "mystery" as a "language" problem ...

> "Before language" is valid in the MOQ where the basic distinction
> is Dynamic/Static and where language can be a static social pattern,
> but not in the SOM where the basic distinction (in this case) is
> language/reality. SOM's paradox-creating nature immediately shows
> that nothing can be before language. Anthony obviously spots the
> flaw, but merely reinforces it.

If the problem is one of language or semantics, it can be remedied simply by 
restating the premises more logically.  If it is a conceptual problem, 
however, either the theory itself is wrong or we do not comprehend it 
correctly.  You say that Anthony "spots the flaw but merely reinforces it." 
What Anthony reinforces is the fact that the MOQ is a set of (man-made) 
concepts, which your previous assertion "DQ spawns the MOQ" seems to ignore:

[Quoting Ant]:
> "This is not to say conceptualisation in itself is a problem (for
>  the MOQ is a set of concepts) but the confusion of concepts
>  for reality itself is."

Have you not confused the concepts with the reality?   Isn't this precisely 
your "problem"?

You conclude ...
> Conceptualisation is very much a problem in the language/reality
> variety of SOM that Pirsig suddenly wants the MOQ to be subordinate
> to ...shown in the Quality/MOQ super- metaphysics. What medium
> did Pirsig use to show that there is a Quality outside/before language?

Again, Bo, the ENTIRE THEORY is named "Metaphysics of Quality".  Thus, the 
MOQ cannot logically be subordinated to its theoretical components -- either 
in language or in reality.  That words are used to explain a philosophy does 
not mean that existence is a "language/reality" dualism.  (That's an 
artificial duality we can do without!)  If you're equating language with 
Intellect, Pirsig listed it as the first of four blocks (levels) in his box 
of static qualities.  And he specifically placed Dynamic Qualilty outside 
the box, providing the following explanation:

"You will notice that Dynamic Quality is not shown in any block.
 It is in the background. This seems the best way to represent it.
 It is not only outside the blocks, it pervades them but it goes on
 where the blocks leave off."   -- [RMP: SODV paper]

The only "mystery" to me is why Pirsig's presentation knocks you off your 
seat.

Essentially perplexed,
Ham