[MD] Quick one: causation

[MarshaV]

At 04:36 PM 1/17/2009, you wrote:
>[Marsha]
>"In the MOQ there are no things in themselves."    (Copleston)
>
>http://robertpirsig.org/Copleston.htm
>
>[Krimel]
>This is a statement in reference to Copelston not to Kant. It reads in
>context as follows:
>
>[Copelston}
>In the second half of the nineteenth century idealism became the dominant
>philosophical movement in the British universities. It was not, of course, a
>question of subjective idealism. If this was anywhere to be found, it was a
>logical consequence of the phenomenalism associated with the names of Hume
>in the eighteenth century and J. S. Mill in the nineteenth century. For the
>empiricists who embraced phenomenalism tended to reduce both physical
>objects and minds to impressions or sensations, and then to reconstruct them
>with the aid of the principle of the association of ideas. They implied
>that, basically, we know only phenomena, in the sense of impressions, and
>that, if there are metaphenomenal realities, we cannot know them...
>
>[Pirsig]
>This is what the MOQ states. Right away it diverges from the absolute
>idealism that follows. Quality is a phenomenal reality.
>
>[Copelston]
>...The nineteenth-century idealists, however, were convinced that
>things-in-themselves, being expressions of the one spiritual reality which
>manifests itself in and through the human mind, are essentially
>intelligible, knowable...
>
>[Pirsig]
>In the MOQ there are no things in themselves.
>
>[Krimel]
>I see no refutation here just a statement on the par with, "gosh it's ugly."
>
>I agree that many in the MoQ perhaps even Pirsig especially, treat it as
>though it were pure phenomenology. Or to say it another way is it purely an
>examination of internal subjective states. But if we regard "reality" as a
>process, then this seems to me that to focus all of the attention on a
>particular part of the process, the perceiver, and to claim that the
>perceived is a phantom that doesn't exist at all. What Kant says of TiTs is
>that they are unknowable as such. But this is not to say that what is known
>is not derived from them or is not a reflection of them. In his account of
>Kant's position Pirsig points out how the "idea" or phenomenon of motorcycle
>is a process of perception that comes into "being" as the interaction
>between something external and the observer. Claiming that there is nothing
>external is not that same thing as claiming that the external can not in
>principle be fully known. I would see Kant as saying the later and I do not
>see Pirsig as abolishing this. That would be abolute idealism even solipsism
>and as you can see above Pirsig says, "This is what the MOQ states. Right
>away it diverges from the absolute idealism that follows. Quality is a
>phenomenal reality."


Greetings Krimel,

Sorry, it wasn't a good time to go through the entire paper so I just 
sent you the URL.   So you don't buy static _patterns_ of value.  Or 
you think that spov are independent entities?   You think there are 
independent objects, things-in-themselves?  And subjects that 
perceive them too?


Marsha







.
.
The Universe is uncaused, like a net of jewels in which each is a 
reflection of all the others in a fantastic, interrelated harmony without end.
.
.