[MD] Quick one: causation

[Krimel]

[dmb]
Krimel, if you think about it, Pirsig's claim that Quality is a phenomenal
reality, as opposed to the cause behind the experience, is perfectly
consistent with radical empiricism. This says that experience IS reality,
not that it is caused by reality. Kant's transcendental idealism is not
exactly the same as the British idealism being discussed, but the concept of
there being something beyond what's experienced is essentially the same
thing. This cause can be thought of in terms of physical objects (substance)
or some Hegelian rational Spirit but in both cases this cause is itself not
experienced. Radical Empiricism says we can't make any claims about such
things. In both cases, we're dealing with ghost stories. 

[Krimel]
Well isn't that exactly what Kant says about TiTs? Since they lay outside of
experience we can't say much about them?

But saying that there is something external to the individual does not mean
that whatever that is, is a sufficient cause. The inferential method of
reason allows us to make statements and acquire knowledge about lots of
things that we can not experience directly. My experience of you, Dave is
completely indirect but I don't hold that as grounds for questioning your
existence. You are, to me, an amalgamation of a set of experiences, mostly
two dimensional in nature. I construct of them experience of all sorts but I
would not claim for a second that my experience of you defines you. You are
a TiT. You exist as you, a whole set of patterns known and experienced by
you but unknown and not experience by me. 

If our experience, radical or otherwise, is no guide to what the future
holds then it is useless, meaningless.

It is not SOM to claim that you and I have different sets of experiences.
Neither is it SOM to express a belief in TiTs. It only becomes SOM when we
start to talk about the nature of those TiTs or to make claims about them as
'substance'. Any such claims are inferential and tentative and must be
tested. As you quoted someone else as saying, "...the test of the true is
the good."

[dmb]
In fact, that's essential what he's saying about causation itself. It is an
idea used to explain why one experience follows another. Like substance,
it's a pretty fabulous idea that let's us do all kinds of things but it's
still just an idea. Same goes for subjects and objects, which is why the
claim that Quality is a phenomenal reality isn't just a matter of
subjectivism. 

[Krimel]
Pirsig claims that the MoQ is not a form of absolute idealism. What I see
you proposing is just that. Pirsig also claims the MoQ is not a form of
absolute materialism which is what you seem to think I propose. I doubt that
either of us is correct about the other but let's assume we are. Whether we
live in a world of ideas or of substance the same data must be dealt with.
You can not use this metaphysical squabble to run away from empirical
evidence. But you do it all the time. If the propositions of idealism and
materialism produce identical evidence that leads to identical conclusions
what the fuck difference does it make?

[dmb]
Maybe now you're starting to see what the basic problem is? 

[Krimel]
There are lots of problems, Dave. I weary sometimes that you seem to believe
that because I don't understand them in the way you do I don't understand
them at all. You seem to be claiming that if something can not be
"experienced" or "experiencable" it does not exist. 

An idea exists for you because you can experience it. I agree. I would say a
hammer exists because I hit my thumb with it. The format of my experience is
stimulation of various nerves and nerve pathways they are the encoding of
data that I strong suspect are also encoded and encodable into a variety of
formats that I can not ever decode.

Without going all Ham on you, I would also add that knowledge and experience
are incomplete and we can talk about TiTs to the extent that what we say can
be formatted in the form of experience. There are great many things that I
believe exist but I can not and will not ever experience them. In fact I
believe of almost everything that does exist. But they are all in principle
are lease potentially encodable in a format I can decode. If not then
whether or not the have any form of existence is irrelevant.

[dmb]
I'm going all the way through ZAMM again for the first time in a long time.
Won't you join me? Oh, wait, never mind. School begins this week. I'm
listening to the whole book but I probably won't have very much time to
discuss it, but still. You really should take another crack at it. I've long
suspected (and often accused) you of not being able to understand the
solution BECAUSE you don't see what the problem is. Now I'm quite sure this
suspicion is correct and so talking to you about the MOQ is really quite
pointless. But I enjoy it very much and so I'd be personally grateful if you
made the effort.

[Krimel]
I'm not sure how to do this but it sounds like a good idea. I did it about a
year ago but I am always up for another round of ZMM. I think I have
mentioned that I read ZMM just after college about the time it was first
released in paperback. I saw it as fitting into a literary trend at the time
that included, Castaneda, Ram Das, and the like. I had recently taken
courses in world religion and a course specifically on Chinese religion that
included Taoism. 

It was a very long wait for Lila. Even reading Lila for the first couple of
times I saw it as an extension of the Taoist themes laid down in ZMM. It was
only when I came to this forum that I found people didn't get this. Perhaps
it is the taint of Zen in Pirsig's account that causes the confusion. Or
perhaps it is that while Pirsig's instinct for the crux of the matter is
excellent his understanding of these central issues is often off the mark;
for example, "formatting", random access, Kant and most especially
evolution.