[MD] Wanted: A proper foundation

Ham Priday hampday1 at verizon.net
Mon Jan 19 14:53:00 PST 2009


Bo, Marsha, Krimel, and all causation theorists --

Most people agree that experiential reality is a dualism.  Mind and matter, 
form and substance, subject and object, awareness and being, are some of the 
ways it has been defined.  Philosophers have traditionally sought to reduce 
this duality to a monism, as in Pantheism, First Cause, the Overman, and 
Oneness.  Their reasoning is obvious: Duality is not primary but connotes a 
division (of something) into two parts or phases.  The challenge has been to 
determine precisely what that primary "something" is.

Now along comes Robert Pirsig who proposes a solution to the challenge. 
"Substance is a subspecies of value," he argues; "Between the subject and 
the object lies the value. ...When you reverse the containment process and 
define substance in terms of value the mystery disappears: The world of 
objects and the world of values is unified."  He defines the primary source 
as Value and calls it "Dynamic Quality", thereby supposedly eliminating the 
paradox of subject/object duality.  Pirsig's theory is the foundation of an 
ontology he calls "The Metaphysics of Quality".  Instead of 
cause-and-effect, the MoQ would have us believe that "particles 'prefer' to 
do what they do."  (Particles "value" other particles, don't you see?)

Pretty neat, huh?  Except that there are two fallacies in Pirsig's thesis.

The first is that what he calls "static quality" is not static but an 
evolving system of "conflicting patterns of values."  And the fundamental 
source of these patterns is left undefined except for the name "Dynamic 
Quality" which denotes change and movement where none is called for.  I 
won't harp on this anomaly, as it is mainly a semantic malapropism.

The second fallacy is more critical, however, because it defies common 
understanding as well as what we know about value.  Value is the measure of 
a thing's relative worth or significance.  Since, as Protagoras observed, 
"man is the measure of all things", unless the value we're talking about is 
quantitative and can be measured on a scale or by objective analysis, it has 
to be "realized" by a value-sensible agent, which is to say, a human being. 
This rules out "value preferences" made by atoms and other inert objects. 
It also repudiates value as the "primary "cause", inasmuch as man was not 
present when the universe was created.

Now, it's quite possible that Pirsig had something else in mind than 
aesthetic or sensible value.  If so, he doesn't define it.  Instead, he 
defines objects as "inorganic and biological values" and subjects as "social 
and intellectual values".  And he doesn't tell us what creates value or 
where it comes from.  The bottom line is that we are left with an uncaused 
source that cannot exist independently of man's sensibility.  This has led 
to continuing confusion and speculation concerning fundamental reality.  To 
wit...

On 1/19 Marsha said:
> Entities exist by convention and are best represented as patterns,
> ever-changing, interrelated, mutually dependent static patterns of value.

Bo said:
> The point is that SOM does NOT recognize anything before subjects
> and objects.  THAT was James' and Pirsig's revolutionary insight.
> [snip]
> James suggested a metaphysics of a dynamic something ahead of
> static subjects and objects, Phaedrus (of ZAMM) did the same but
> called the first part Quality, the second (S & O) part he called
> "intellectual Quality" (the first MOQ's only level).

Krimel quoted Lao Tsu:
"Spirit and matter are both one in their origin, yet
different in appearance.  This unity is a mystery -- truly the
mystery of all mysteries, the gate to all spirituality."

Clearly neither "convention" nor "intellect" can be the source of existence, 
since they presuppose the existence of man, in the same way that value does. 
Lao-Tsu's "one in origin" is the missing link in the MoQ.  My own thought, 
as most of you know, is that Pirsig is to be commended for focusing on 
Value -- as an SOM phenomenon.  But whatever role value plays in  existence 
comes from the sensible subject, not the inanimate world of objective 
experience.  We realize value by conjuring up this universe of 
differentiated being and responding to its finite components positively or 
negatively, according to our unique value-sensibilities.

I have no argument with Pirsig that Value is REAL.  But its reality points 
to the ultimate source of all difference and contrariety -- Absolute 
Essence.  Without this primary source you have neither existence nor a 
proper ontological foundation for philosophy.

Respectfully submitted,
Ham





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