[MD] Percepts and Concepts

[Ham Priday]

Krimel --

Did you mean "precepts" and concepts?  (I don't know what a percept is --  
slang for perception, I guess.)

[Krimel]:
> But the problem with your approach is that you seem to think
> that Value is "out there" waiting to be realized. Well that and you
> think that emotion is a response to value. It is not. Emotion is the
> value. Emotion tells us immediately whether something is good,
>  bad or neutral. It motivates us to act.

Value is neither "out there" (the MoQ thesis) nor "in here".  It is the 
individual's primary sensibility of otherness -- that which is other to the 
self.  Because we are dependent on the brain and proprioceptive neural 
system for sensory information, we are never aware of "Pure Value" which is 
the metaphysical  source of sensibility.  Instead we realize value 
relationally as our attachment, desire or affinity for that which transcends 
us.  Value colors our experience of differentiated things and events, which 
is why we tend to attribute value to objects.

Emotion IS a response to value but not Value itself.  The response mechanism 
is tricky to analyze, and the fact that semantics are largely subjective 
compounds the problem.  For example, Pirsig describes "experience" as 
primary apprehension, whereas I define experience as the actualization of 
objective phenomena, which is secondary to value-sensibility and often 
involves the intellect.  Also, "emotional responses" generally connotes 
behavioral manifestations due to hormonal secretions, heart rate, blood 
pressure variations, etc.  Speaking as a reductionist, the fundamental human 
interaction with Value is Sensibility.

> But I do agree that Value is only significant to whoever is doing the
> evaluation whether it is a zebra being stalked by a lion or a commuter
> stuck in traffic. While I agree that Value is not a property of the 
> external
> world I don't think it is a property of the subjective self either. Value
> arises from the interaction of the individual with the environment.

Good.  Then you agree with me that the realization of Value is subjective, 
and that Value is the subject's connection to metaphysical reality (we'll 
call it "the environment" for the present).

> Value in the way that Pirsig uses it describes well the way that
> individuals experience Value. He is starting his "metaphysics" not with
> "things" but with "appearances". It is not about "what is" but how things
> "seem". This renders his position, especially as pushed by Dave, as purely
> phenomenological, purely subjective.

Fine.  Experiential existence is the world of appearances.  I'm a 
phenomenalist, too, so I can buy that.  But Pirsig's thesis is confined to 
this experiential world.  He offers no metaphysical foundation for 
evolution's "moving to betterness", and he reduces the human being to a 
"collection of interacting patterns".  If Quality or Value is fundamental 
reality, and its experience is primary, why does he reject man, the 
"experiencer", as its agent?

> Pirsig is quite right that reality is undefined. It is continuous,
> infinitely divisible. Humans are equipped with the capacity to
> break that continuous stream into "meaningful" units. This is how
> we abstract concepts or definitions from the continuous flux.
> Concepts are mental representations or encoding of physical
> experience. They are not only valuable they are essential to
> human interaction and survival. The problem comes when they
> are taken to "be" what they merely represent. OR when they
> become so automatic that we can't see past them.
>
> This is a tricky problem that seems really simple but turns out
> to be very hard to grasp. I think the distinction James makes
> between percepts[?] and concepts really helps to clarify the situation.
> I suspect given the number of times these "memes" have been used
> since I brought them up about a month ago that others find them
> useful as well.

If "percept" is James's special terminology, could you kindly explain its 
meaning?   Otherwise, I will confuse it with "precept", which is defined as 
"a principle intended as a general rule of action."  (I see that "percept" 
is defined in Webster's as "an impression of an object obtained by use of 
the senses."  Is that how James defines it?)

> The distinction between them is important. A percept arises from the
> physical interaction of an organism with the world. Energy is converted
> to neural impulses. In this direct interaction we come as close to contact
> with an external world as it is possible to come. This kind of interaction
> is common to all living things and we can see it spread across the realm
> of biology as a variety of strategies that have evolved to capitalize in 
> it.
>
> Any biological creature sufficiently complex enough to move, develops at
> its front end, sensors that detect physical stimuli. They also have the 
> ability
> to discriminate whether those stimuli have Value in terms of should I move
> toward or move away from this.

You say "they" have the ability to discriminate; what does "they" refer to? 
The way your sentence is constructed, it appears to be the sensors 
themselves.  If that's your intention, the behavior you're describing is no 
more than a simple reflexive response, as in Pirsig's hot stove analogy.  It 
reduces "value" stimuli to pain, fear, and the survival instinct, hardly 
examples of subjective value discrimination.

The rest of your lengthy post is a neuro-physiological analysis of feelings 
and emotions which is a bit too specious for my taste.  Possibly it was 
meant for David, who seems to have an aversion to concepts.  But inasmuch as 
I don't view Value or its realization as an organic or synaptic process, I 
see little point in commenting on it.  Besides, the philosophical ground is 
covered in the discussion above.

Thanks for your thoughtful response, Krimel, and Happy Independence Day.

--Ham