[MD] Empirical and Historical

[Ham Priday]

On 7/23/09 4:13 PM, Joseph Mauer wrote:


> I have trouble with the perception of  "the absolute, immutable source."
> This is your conception of what you want me to understand.  How do
> you perceive it?  Is it a matter of your faith?  My perception of
> undefined DQ can be conceptualized only by analogy or metaphor.
> Does "dynamic", "undefined" have any meaning?   Is a conception of
> "evolution" more or less reasonable than the conception of  "absolute,
> immutable source"?

Joe, my concept of an absolute source is no more a "matter of faith" that 
Pirsig's concept of
a dynamic quality.  He doesn't perceive this "reality", he intuits it, just 
as I intuit Essence.  The metaphysics of Essence and Quality are both 
hypotheses that their authors happen to believe in.

Since we can only judge a hypothesis by its intrinsic "reasonableness", this 
is the more significant question than "faith" from the standpoint of 
philosophical meaning.  Analogy and metaphor are useful in communicating 
concepts that involve indefinable (non-empirical) elements, but euphemisms 
themselves are not a measure of metaphysical validity.  Let me put forth my 
arguments for Essentialism vs. the MoQ, and you tell me which is more 
reasonable.

1)  I submit that a proper metaphysical theory must be based on a 
transcendent foundation; that is, it should encompass the diversity and 
change of nature while also accounting for its source.

2)  Essence, as I define it, is the ultimate and unconditional reality of 
which differentiated existence is only a finite manifestation.  Pirsig does 
not define Quality as the primary source but equates it to evolutionary 
reality (existence).

3)  The Essentialist believes that man is uniquely endowed with reason and 
value-sensibility which enables him to make moral judgments and convert 
value into systems and policies that make his world a better place.  The 
MoQist believes that the world automatically moves to betterness and that 
man is just a byproduct of nature with advanced neurological development.

4)  The core morality of Essentialism is that the individual's role is that 
of a "free agent" of value in an anthropocentric universe.  The morality of 
MoQism is that value (DQ) becomes better over time and that man 
(collectively) evolves through several historical stages in order to keep up 
with an evolutionary universe.  There is no role for the individual, except 
to use "intellect" as a means of rising above biological and social 
"patterns" and latching onto DQ.

> The conception of quality, beauty, goodness, value is no less or
> no more reasonable, relative to an individual subject than Essence is
> less or more reasonable, relative to a subject.   Its explanatory power
> for every day use, however, e. g. evolution, is much more refined than
> the analogy to an "absolute immutable source", the perception of which
> will admit of no creation, or differentiation through the ages. The
> undefined is only perceived by analogy or metaphor, not conceived
> by attaching a meaning to a word.  This is the strength of the MOQ
> where perception of the undefined is the basis for the defined conception.
> Undefined DQ has meaning.

You are arguing for moral pragmatism in an evolutionary world, which is not 
fundamental philosophy.  Morality may be "more refined" than metaphysics 
because it deals with "more practical" social and cultural issues.  But 
unless you have the value-sensibility to know what is good (for the 
individual?  for mankind?  for the world?), you are mired in a sea of 
controversy.  I don't know what you mean by "the perception of which will 
admit of no creation, or differentiation through the ages."  I have a 
hypothesis for Creation, too, and the differentiation of existence is 
ageless.  There is no special virtue in not defining what is ineffable.  My 
"definitions" represent what I posit in my thesis.  The strength of a 
metaphysical theory lies in the overall concept rather than in word 
definitions.

> There is no form of logic that can separate the concept "quality" from
> "absolute, immutable source."   I have to appeal to an analogy.  I have to
> trust my perception and I find "DQ evolution" is more worthy of trust
> than "ABSOLUTE, IMMUTABLE SOURCE".

Okay, I get the point that the term "absolute, immutable source" doesn't 
charm you.  But you must understand that there is a world of difference 
between what is "absolute" and "immutable" and what is "finite" and 
"transient".  Nothing in existence meets the former.  Nothing in Essence 
meets the latter.  The MoQ world boils down to nothing more than the SOM 
world divided into four arbitrary levels.

--Ham

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> On 7/22/09 3:25 PM, Joseph Maurer wrote:
>
>
>> Hi Ham,
>>
>> I am pursuing a thread on MOQ Evolution.  Your statement:
>> "But the ultimate source of sensibility, value, change and difference
>> is itself immutable" is flat out contradicted by description of the
>> evolution of QUALITY by Pirsig.
>
> Unfortunately you may be right, Joe.  If Pirsig's Quality (even as DQ) is
> "evolutionary", it cannot represent the absolute, immutable source.  An
> esthetic property like quality, beauty, goodness or value does not equate 
> to
> Essence, anyway, because it is relative to the subject.  Furthermore,
> implied in my use of "absolute" is the notion of perfection, and a perfect
> source is immutable because it has nothing better to "evolve to".
>
> I realized it was going out on a limb to suggest that Pirsig intended
> Quality to be the primary source of existence.  However, the author of MoQ
> equated Quality with Reality.  And since its equivalent connotation 
> 'Value'
> is derived from the source and figures prominently in my ontogeny, there
> seemed to be a commonality of sorts between our philosophies.  But you 
> have
> now astutely pointed out the incompatability.
>
>> My sense is that for Pirsig evolution is not speculation, but the
>> metaphysical description for levels of Quality. These levels become
>> the metaphysical basis for morality.
>
> Quite frankly, I have never bought into this theory.  Morality is not
> intrinsic to the universe.  The basis for morality is value sensibility,
> which is a subjective property.  That is why individuals collectively (in
> different cultures) adopt different moral systems.  The ability to discern
> value, as in worthiness, excellence and goodness, is a distinctly human
> function.  It is this finely-tuned human attribute which affords the
> individual free choice within a virtually infinite range of options.  If
> Value were universal, free choice would be impossible, and "evolution to
> betterness" would be an automatic progression (without man).
>
> Value, like intellect and passion, is not an extracorporeal realm of the
> cosmos but a sensibility realized only by human beings.  As an 
> essentialist,
> I believe that value-sensibility is not only the essence of man but the
> meaning and purpose of his life-experience.  What disturbs me about the
> Quality thesis is that Pirsig refers to man only in the collective or
> cultural sense, and his "cosmic morality" leaves the reader without a 
> sense
> of individual purpose.  Instead, man simply appears on the scene as a
> byproduct of nature, as if to fulfill a "level of quality", and is swept
> along in its inexorable movement toward betterness.  In my opinion, the
> thesis falls short of defining man's role in existence.
>
> Thanks for making this point, Joe.  I'll be interested to see if the
> Pirsigians can reconcile these differences, even if they have no reason to
> do so.
>
> Essentially yours,
> Ham