[MD] Empirical and Historical

[Ham Priday]

Hi Bo --



On 7/24/09 at 2:29 AM you wrote:

> Agree, I find no difference between "absolute" and "dynamic quality",
> but what's more, I find no difference between concepts (language) and
> those realities. If this latter distinction is upheld nothing can 
> transcend
> SOM, everything we THINK or SAY is just subjective words about
> an immutable reality out there.

The point is that there IS an absolute and immutable reality, not just "out 
there" or "in a concept", but transcending all of what we perceive as space 
and time.  It is the primary source and essence of experiential existence. 
But we can only experience it as objectified Value.

 [Ham, previously to Joe]:
> Okay, I get the point that the term "absolute, immutable source"
> doesn't charm you.  But you must understand that there is a world of
> difference between what is "absolute" and "immutable" and what is
> "finite" and "transient".  Nothing in existence meets the former.
> Nothing in Essence meets the latter.  The MoQ world boils down to
> nothing more than the SOM world divided into four arbitrary levels.

[Bo]:
> What's the difference? The MOQ postulates an absolute immutable
> source that has spawned the known static levels. The ocean have finite
> and transient forms (waves and currents) but is absolute and immutable
> in itself because waves and currents are water too. This is the DQ/SQ
> relationship and must necessarily be the one between your absolute
> and finite.

The difference between waves and the ocean is but a difference between form 
and substance.
Difference ITSELF is what distinguishes existential reality from Essence, 
and difference is all we really know.  Anything else must be 
intellectualized or intuited.  Yet within this differentiated world are 
clues to the ineffable source and to the meaning of individuated experience. 
All that's required are reason, value sensibility, and an inquisitive mind. 
I dare say these requisites are abundantly available in the participants of 
this forum.

> But the many quasi moqists of this site (not Joe though!) do just what
> you say: "... boil the MoQ down to nothing more than the SOM world
> divided into four arbitrary levels". Could not have said it better.

Thanks for the compliment, Bo.

Essentially yours,
Ham

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

>> > On 7/22/09 3:25 PM, Joseph Maurer wrote:
>> >
>> >
>> >> Hi Ham,
>> >>
>> >> I am pursuing a thread on MOQ Evolution.  Your statement:
>> >> "But the ultimate source of sensibility, value, change and
>> >> difference is itself immutable" is flat out contradicted by
>> >> description of the evolution of QUALITY by Pirsig.
>> >
>> > Unfortunately you may be right, Joe.  If Pirsig's Quality (even as
>> > DQ) is "evolutionary", it cannot represent the absolute, immutable
>> > source.  An esthetic property like quality, beauty, goodness or
>> > value does not equate to Essence, anyway, because it is relative to
>> > the subject.  Furthermore, implied in my use of "absolute" is the
>> > notion of perfection, and a perfect source is immutable because it
>> > has nothing better to "evolve to".
>> >
>> > I realized it was going out on a limb to suggest that Pirsig
>> > intended Quality to be the primary source of existence.  However,
>> > the author of MoQ equated Quality with Reality.  And since its
>> > equivalent connotation 'Value' is derived from the source and
>> > figures prominently in my ontogeny, there seemed to be a commonality
>> > of sorts between our philosophies.  But you have now astutely
>> > pointed out the incompatability.
>> >
>> >> My sense is that for Pirsig evolution is not speculation, but the
>> >> metaphysical description for levels of Quality. These levels become
>> >> the metaphysical basis for morality.
>> >
>> > Quite frankly, I have never bought into this theory.  Morality is
>> > not intrinsic to the universe.  The basis for morality is value
>> > sensibility, which is a subjective property.  That is why
>> > individuals collectively (in different cultures) adopt different
>> > moral systems.  The ability to discern value, as in worthiness,
>> > excellence and goodness, is a distinctly human function.  It is this
>> > finely-tuned human attribute which affords the individual free
>> > choice within a virtually infinite range of options.  If Value were
>> > universal, free choice would be impossible, and "evolution to
>> > betterness" would be an automatic progression (without man).
>> >
>> > Value, like intellect and passion, is not an extracorporeal realm of
>> > the cosmos but a sensibility realized only by human beings.  As an
>> > essentialist, I believe that value-sensibility is not only the
>> > essence of man but the meaning and purpose of his life-experience.
>> > What disturbs me about the Quality thesis is that Pirsig refers to
>> > man only in the collective or cultural sense, and his "cosmic
>> > morality" leaves the reader without a sense of individual purpose.
>> > Instead, man simply appears on the scene as a byproduct of nature,
>> > as if to fulfill a "level of quality", and is swept along in its
>> > inexorable movement toward betterness.  In my opinion, the thesis
>> > falls short of defining man's role in existence.
>> >
>> > Thanks for making this point, Joe.  I'll be interested to see if the
>> > Pirsigians can reconcile these differences, even if they have no
>> > reason to do so.
>> >
>> > Essentially yours,
>> > Ham