[MD] John Carl's Critique of Pure Experience. Inst02

Sun Jul 26 11:19:13 PDT 2009

I don't know about intelligent reasons.  I define concept as "patterned
brain stimulation" - which just about includes everything.  Other people
define "concept" as
"words".   Thus I do believe in their non-conceptual experience, I
just don't believe in mine.
Hey!  Cool bumper sticker/t-shirt idea.

On Sun, Jul 26, 2009 at 11:08 AM, MarshaV <valkyr at att.net> wrote:

>
> John,
>
> You do not need to answer.  I will assume that you do not deny the
> possibility of non-conceptual experience, but have an intelligent reason
> for
> not accepting it.
>
>
> Marsha
>
>
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: moq_discuss-bounces at lists.moqtalk.org
> [mailto:moq_discuss-bounces at lists.moqtalk.org] On Behalf Of MarshaV
> Sent: Sunday, July 26, 2009 1:48 PM
> To: moq_discuss at moqtalk.org
> Subject: Re: [MD] John Carl's Critique of Pure Experience. Inst02
>
>
> But you wanna disagree with the state of non-conceptualized experience?
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: moq_discuss-bounces at lists.moqtalk.org
> [mailto:moq_discuss-bounces at lists.moqtalk.org] On Behalf Of John Carl
> Sent: Sunday, July 26, 2009 1:16 PM
> To: moq_discuss at moqtalk.org
> Subject: Re: [MD] John Carl's Critique of Pure Experience. Inst02
>
> Nah... I don't wanna.
>
>
>
>
> On Sat, Jul 25, 2009 at 8:09 PM, MarshaV <valkyr at att.net> wrote:
>
> >
> > John,
> >
> > The MoQ states that experience comes before conceptualizing self and
> > object,
> > do you disagree with this?
> >
> >
> > Marsha
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: moq_discuss-bounces at lists.moqtalk.org
> > [mailto:moq_discuss-bounces at lists.moqtalk.org] On Behalf Of John Carl
> > Sent: Saturday, July 25, 2009 7:25 PM
> > To: moq_discuss at moqtalk.org
> > Subject: Re: [MD] John Carl's Critique of Pure Experience. Inst02
> >
> > Not if you define concepts by experience... how could there be?
> >
> > On Sat, Jul 25, 2009 at 2:04 PM, MarshaV <valkyr at att.net> wrote:
> >
> > >
> > > John,
> > >
> > > Are you saying that you to not believe there is experience that is
> > > non-conceptual?
> > >
> > >
> > > Marsha
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > -----Original Message-----
> > > From: moq_discuss-bounces at lists.moqtalk.org
> > > [mailto:moq_discuss-bounces at lists.moqtalk.org] On Behalf Of John Carl
> > > Sent: Saturday, July 25, 2009 4:31 PM
> > > To: moq_discuss at moqtalk.org
> > > Subject: [MD] John Carl's Critique of Pure Experience. Inst02
> > >
> > > Kreug]
> > >
> > >
> > > And therefore all philosophical reflection, as an intellectual movement
> > > away
> > > from a more concrete analysis into abstract conceptual analysis,
> > invariably
> > > must return "...back once again to the *same practical common-sense* of
> > our
> > > starting point, the pre-philosophic attitude with which we originally
> > > confront the visible world" if it is to remain faithful to our lived
> > > experience.3<
> > > http://williamjamesstudies.press.illinois.edu/1.1/krueger.html#
> > > _ftn3>
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > John]
> > >
> > >
> > > But...but...but... what if our "common sense starting point" is as
> > abstract
> > > as concrete?   What I mean is, what if this latching onto the one
> > > "concrete"
> > > thing you can grasp is just as much an intellectual abstraction taken
> on
> > > faith as the most soaring idealistic conceptions?  Then preferring the
> > > concrete to the abstract is just a preference for minutiae.
> > >
> > >
> > > Kreuger]
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > It is in concrete experience that the world as given, within the
> > > "aboriginal
> > > flow of feeling" that is the "much-at-onceness" of pre-conceptual
> > > phenomenal
> > > experience, that we discern the deeper features of reality-such as
> cause,
> > > continuity, self, substance, activity, time, novelty, and
> > > freedom.4<
> > > http://williamjamesstudies.press.illinois.edu/1.1/krueger.html#_ft
> > > n4>This
> > > "pre-philosophic" attitude through which we initially face the world
> > > is
> > > captured in James's development of the concept of "pure experience" as
> > the
> > > foundation of his radical empiricism.
> > >
> > >
> > > John]
> > >
> > >
> > > So the deeper features of reality are discerned in the pre-phenomenal
> > > experience.  Cause is pre-phenomenal.  Self is pre-phenomenal.
> >  Substance,
> > > activity, time, novelty and freedom are all "out there", waiting to be
> > > discovered and used.  It's just asinine.  Pirsig describes it that way
> > > exactly.
> > >
> > >
> > > Every time "something" happen in my experience, my brain fires off some
> > > kind
> > > of electrochemical response.  It might be as noticeable as a hot stove
> or
> > > as
> > > subtle as a butterfly's kiss.  I get some kind of response in my
> > organistic
> > > being from the outside world.  When this happens, I often get a formal
> > > pattern that falls into my category of "known concept".  Sometimes it's
> > not
> > > recognizable but I  still call it a  concept - content of
> consciousness.
> > > I
> > > might not have a word for it, which means I'll probably have a hard
> time
> > > remembering it or sorting it or intellectualizing about it, but
> something
> > > happens, some definite pattern falls under the purview of my mind.  You
> > can
> > > spend your time analyzing how this happens, what sort of patterns
> emerge
> > > and
> > > give them all kinds of labels... but the one label that does not fit,
> > that
> > > does not make any sense whatsoever is "pre-conceptual experience".
> Such
> > a
> > > self-deluded idea as the basis for a metaphysics is ludicrous.
> > >
> > >
> > > He must be using "concept" differently than "brain wave pattern" the
> way
> > I
> > > do.   Which I think is a shame, because you can really get hung up on
> > words
> > > if you don't differentiate between word-concepts (known intellectual
> > > patterns) and thought-concepts. (content of consciousness)
> > >
> > >
> > > Krueger]
> > >
> > > *5*
> > >
> > >    James's brand of radical empiricism therefore looks to ground his
> > > empirical philosophy on the raw material of experience as given. Of
> this
> > > methodological principle he writes: "The postulate is that the only
> > things
> > > that shall be debatable among philosophers shall be things definable in
> > > terms drawn from
> > > experience."5<
> > > http://williamjamesstudies.press.illinois.edu/1.1/krueger.html
> > > #_ftn5>
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > John]
> > >
> > >
> > > To a philosopher, it's all debatable -  the definable and the
> indefinable
> > > alike.   What's not experience?  Just because it occurs only in my
> mind,
> > is
> > > that not an "experience"?    Perhaps the only "pure" experience we can
> > > realize is that purely in our minds.  Thus "terms drawn from
> experience"
> > > can
> > > be shortened to "terms".    True, albeit tautologically.
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > Kreuger]
> > >
> > >
> > > James was suspicious of the idea that conceptual or propositional
> thought
> > > functions as the primitive-and thus irreducible-interface between self
> > and
> > > world.   On this conceptualist or "intellectualist" line, as James
> refers
> > > to
> > > it, all thinking and experience involves concepts. No concepts, no
> > > experience.
> > >
> > >
> > > John]
> > >
> > >
> > > I guess I must be an "intellectualist" because that's the way I define
> > > "concept" - any thought or experience or brainwave pattern.
> > >
> > >
> > > Kreuger]
> > >
> > >
> > > James instead argues that the phenomenal content of embodied experience
> > *as
> > > experienced* outstrips our capacity to conceptually or linguistically
> > > articulate it.
> > >
> > >
> > > John]
> > >
> > > He's saying the we experience a lot that we don't consciously
> experience?
> > >  Ok, I got no problem with that.  Just don't call it a concrete
> > foundation
> > > is all.
> > >
> > >
> > > Kreuger]
> > >
> > >
> > > In other words, James insists that many of our basic experiences
> > > harbor *non-conceptual
> > > content*. That is, many of our experiences have a rich phenomenal
> content
> > > that is too fine-grained and sensuously detailed to lend itself to an
> > > exhaustive conceptual
> > > analysis.7<
> > > http://williamjamesstudies.press.illinois.edu/1.1/krueger.html#_f
> > > tn7>
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > John]
> > >
> > >
> > >  Exhaustive conceptual analysis can be exhausting, like trying to count
> > how
> > > many hypothesis can dance on the pins of your head -  an infinity of
> > them,
> > > is the answer.  So?  Like trying to quantify the ten thousand things.
> > >  Don't
> > > go there.
> > >
> > >
> > > "Non-conceptual content" is a concept that has no content.  I can see
> > that
> > > this is going to have to be continued.  Where did you guys get this
> guy?
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