[MD] Percepts and Concepts

[Krimel]

[Ham]
Did you mean "precepts" and concepts?  (I don't know what a percept is --  
slang for perception, I guess.)

[Krimel]
A percept is the byproduct of perception, something perceived; sense data.

[Krimel]:
> But the problem with your approach is that you seem to think
> that Value is "out there" waiting to be realized. Well that and you
> think that emotion is a response to value. It is not. Emotion is the
> value. Emotion tells us immediately whether something is good,
>  bad or neutral. It motivates us to act.

[Ham]
Value is neither "out there" (the MoQ thesis) nor "in here".  It is the 
individual's primary sensibility of otherness -- that which is other to the 
self.  Because we are dependent on the brain and proprioceptive neural 
system for sensory information, we are never aware of "Pure Value" which is 
the metaphysical  source of sensibility.  Instead we realize value 
relationally as our attachment, desire or affinity for that which transcends

us.  Value colors our experience of differentiated things and events, which 
is why we tend to attribute value to objects.

[Krimel]
Not all sense data is of "otherness". When I am hungry or stub my toe for
example. I have no idea why you think there is a "metaphysical" necessity
for anything beyond a lack of food or a brick in the path to account for my
perceptions. 

[Ham]
Emotion IS a response to value but not Value itself.  The response mechanism

is tricky to analyze, and the fact that semantics are largely subjective 
compounds the problem.  For example, Pirsig describes "experience" as 
primary apprehension, whereas I define experience as the actualization of 
objective phenomena, which is secondary to value-sensibility and often 
involves the intellect.  Also, "emotional responses" generally connotes 
behavioral manifestations due to hormonal secretions, heart rate, blood 
pressure variations, etc.  Speaking as a reductionist, the fundamental human

interaction with Value is Sensibility.

[Krimel]
No comment, you are taking relatively simple stuff and erecting complex
unintelligible verbiage out of it.

[Ham]
Then you agree with me that the realization of Value is subjective, 
and that Value is the subject's connection to metaphysical reality (we'll 
call it "the environment" for the present).

[Krimel]
Kind of, but I think the term subject is a bad one. If we take this whole
s/o business seriously it makes no sense at all to talk about "subjects".
And I certainly do not think the environment has much to do with
metaphysics.

[Ham]
Fine.  Experiential existence is the world of appearances.  I'm a 
phenomenalist, too, so I can buy that.  But Pirsig's thesis is confined to 
this experiential world.  He offers no metaphysical foundation for 
evolution's "moving to betterness", and he reduces the human being to a 
"collection of interacting patterns".  If Quality or Value is fundamental 
reality, and its experience is primary, why does he reject man, the 
"experiencer", as its agent?

[Krimel]
I think phenomenology is a useful point of view until it becomes solipsism. 

I think Pirsig's account of "betterness" is just creative writing nothing
more. I think humans ARE a "collection of interacting patterns." I think
Pirsig is saying that "reality" is fundamentally undefined and you are
chasing your tail trying to "define" what that might be in any fundamental
sense, beyond static and dynamic; things that hold still and things that
wiggle.

[Ham]
If "percept" is James's special terminology, could you kindly explain its 
meaning?   Otherwise, I will confuse it with "precept", which is defined as 
"a principle intended as a general rule of action."  (I see that "percept" 
is defined in Webster's as "an impression of an object obtained by use of 
the senses."  Is that how James defines it?)

[Krimel]
This is not a special term in any sense. It's in the dictionary. You looked
it up; that's what it means. 


> [Krimel]
> The distinction between them is important. A percept arises from the
> physical interaction of an organism with the world. Energy is converted
> to neural impulses. In this direct interaction we come as close to contact
> with an external world as it is possible to come. This kind of interaction
> is common to all living things and we can see it spread across the realm
> of biology as a variety of strategies that have evolved to capitalize in 
> it.
>
> Any biological creature sufficiently complex enough to move, develops at
> its front end, sensors that detect physical stimuli. They also have the 
> ability to discriminate whether those stimuli have Value in terms of 
> should I move toward or move away from this.

[Ham]
You say "they" have the ability to discriminate; what does "they" refer to? 
The way your sentence is constructed, it appears to be the sensors 
themselves.  If that's your intention, the behavior you're describing is no 
more than a simple reflexive response, as in Pirsig's hot stove analogy.  It

reduces "value" stimuli to pain, fear, and the survival instinct, hardly 
examples of subjective value discrimination.

[Krimel]
"They" would be any "biological creature sufficiently complex enough to
move."

But reflex responses are not all the simple. When first discovered it was
though that they could actually account for all of human behavior. That was
in the 1800s and it turn out not to be true but they do explain a great deal
of our behavior including the hot stove example. 

Value is what we make of stimulation. From one especially fertile point of
view we are input/output systems. Sensation provides input. Output is
behavior.

[Ham]
The rest of your lengthy post is a neuro-physiological analysis of feelings 
and emotions which is a bit too specious for my taste.  

[Krimel]
So it seems clear but you just don't get it?

[Ham]
Possibly it was meant for David, who seems to have an aversion to concepts.
But inasmuch as I don't view Value or its realization as an organic or
synaptic process, I see little point in commenting on it.  Besides, the
philosophical ground is covered in the discussion above.

[Krimel]
Right you don't seem to have an aversion to the supernatural. Dave does. He
wants to keep the supernatural baby by renaming it and drinking its bath
water.

[Ham]
Thanks for your thoughtful response, Krimel, and Happy Independence Day.

[Krimel]
Backacha. 

I plan to spend the 4th watching our local fireworks. We go to the show and
walk toward the blastoff site until a fireman tells us we are too close and
makes us back-up a few feet. Then we spread our blankets, lay on the ground
and watch the sky flowers bloom... or I guess that's boom.