[MD] Types of Patterns

Steve Peterson peterson.steve at gmail.com
Tue Jul 14 06:28:33 PDT 2009


Hi Bo,


Steve:
>> ...[Wim] considered Pirsig's idea of static latching which brought  
>> him to
>> thinking about how the different types of patterns are latched or
>> maintained. Biological patterns are maintained through DNA. Social
>> patterns are maintained through unconscious copying of behavior.
>> Intellectual patterns are maintained through unconscious copying of
>> rationales for behavior. Looking at how patterns are maintained can
>> help you distinguish what sort of pattern you are talking about. For
>> example, though ants have societies in some sense, their behavior is
>> rigidly controlled by their genes. they do not, as far as I know,
>> learn new behaviors from other ants the way mammals do. They do not
>> participate in any social patterns. There is no such thing as ant
>> culture which is passed down through other means than DNA. The
>> biological/social distinction is then very clear, at least in theory.
>> All we have to do is think about whether a behavior is a DNA encoded
>> response to an organisms environment or a copied behavior chosen  
>> based
>> on its social quality where terms like celebrity and status are
>> helpful in understanding what quality is.


Bo:
> Yes, I remember Wim (Nusselder) though no fan of his "latching"
> theory. Pirsig describes how the inorganic pattern - carbon - became
> the stepping stone between "inorgany" and biology and that was how
> far he brought it. To look for mechanisms beyond the stepping stone
> stage (i.e. the pattern of the lower level that makes up the building
> block of the upper) is futile.
> Pirsig postulates that the MOQ unites
> creation and evolution and venturing into evolution's (science's)
> ground isn't MOQ's business. Besides (I'm on thin ice here) DNA isn't
> the way the most simple organisms reproduce, doesn't virus use it's
> host DNA to produce itself? Now,  with only virus present it could not
> reproduce at all ... see I make a fool of myself.      .

Steve:
Ok, but I don't see what is so futile. Isn't it at all helpful to  
think about whether a behavior is genetically encoded or socially  
learned in distinguishing between social and biological patterns? It  
is to me.



Bo:
> Still worse - slanderous - is the "unconscious copying copying
> behavior". Social value is as active today as it was when the 3rd.
> level was "leading edge", only under/behind the mighty intellectual
> level, yet when the bells toll and intellect's latch slips we all  
> resort to
> the social level, but "unconscious copying" is not the  
> characteristic -
> rather what I call the social level's "expression" namely EMOTIONS.

Steve:
I agree that emotions probably are the stepping stone, the carbon  
atom, that was needed for an evolutionary leap in the creation of  
social patterns. What you are not explaining is why it isn't useful  
to think about how social patterns are propagated, which I think is  
through unconscious copying of behavior.

Bo:
> Anthills, beehives and other insect colonies  aren't societies in a
> Quality sense rather enlarged organism and they coordinate their
> actions by biology's expression  - SENSES!.

Steve:
Agreed about insect colonies, though I'm not sure what you mean by  
"expression."

Steve previously:
>> Perhaps the social/intellectual distinction is still difficult, but
>> considering whether a behavior is maintained through copying one to
>> another or whether we aren't even talking about a behavior but rather
>> a rationale for behavior can be helpful. What do you think?
>

Bo:
> Not difficult at all. The social "stepping stone" to intellect is as
> described in ZAMM "an increasing ability of abstraction with the
> Greeks" (I don't have the book on this machine or with me) that
> triggered the philosophical frenzy that developed into the SOM as
> further described in ZAMM. This would be translated into MOQ's
> intellectual level whose "expression" is REASON.

Steve:
Socially propagated language is the stepping stone that allows for  
the evolution of reason. Why is it not helpful in distinguishing  
intellectual and social patterns to think of reasons for behavior as  
distinct from the unconsciously copied social patterns? Also, I don't  
see what the philosophical frenzy over SOM has to do with  
distinguishing social and intellectual patterns. I think it is enough  
to say that the intellectual level is the set of all patterns of  
thought, our habits of mind, all the ways we created to give  
rationales for our behaviors.

Best,
Steve





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