[MD] Reductionism

[Ham Priday]

Krimel, John, Craig, Gav, Platt, et al --


This thread has been pecked at repeatedly since at least the end of May when 
I lost all previous  posts in a computer crash.  Like many other topics on 
this forum, the only consistency in the discussion is the general lack of 
agreement.

If reductionism is reducing a concept to its simplest terms, and what we are 
really talking about is epistemology (how we know), then there must be some 
understanding of what a "knower" is.  As Gav and Craig have pointed out, 
Krimel's systems analysis clearly doesn't provide any insight here.

[Krimel]:
> Experience BEGINS with transduction of energy into
> neural impulses.

[Gav]:
> Experience cannot begin with 'transduction of energy into neural
> impulses', because 'transduction of energy into neural impulses' is a
> concept *derived from experience* as all concepts necessarily are.

[Craig]:
> I think what Krimel means is that the experience of EACH
> INDIVIDUAL "BEGINS with transduction of energy into neural
> impulses".  'Transduction of energy into neural impulses' is a concept
> derived from experience, but the concept was around before most
> of us began experiencing.

I don't know why Gav and Craig call "the transduction of energy" a concept, 
since it is actually a process.  But it does demonstrate that a systems 
approach won't work as an epistemological theory.  Nor does Platt's 
assertion that "experience, consciousness, psychic energy, reality, and 
Quality" are "all names for the same thing" help to clarify the issue. 
Still, the beginning of experience is fundamental to understanding "how we 
know" anything.

At the risk of offending the anti-SOMists, I would suggest that experience 
begins with subjective  sensibility which, in temporal terms, occurs at the 
birth of an individual.  All knowledge is sensible in that it is revealed to 
the subject's conscious (psychic) awareness.  Whether concepts are derived 
from experience (or vice-versa) is immaterial because we are aware of what 
we experience, and to say that conceptual knowledge is not part of our 
experience is absurd.

Now, John raised an interesting point on 6/13 that appears to have been 
overlooked.  He was challenging dmb's statement that "In the MOQ, there is 
always a discrepancy between concepts and reality."

[John]:
> ALWAYS a discrepancy between concepts and reality?  ALWAYS???
> How do you know this?  What possible proof could you offer to make
> such a statement?  I mean, if we all, every person on the planet, just
> spent all our time conceptualizing every waking moment (in fact, I guess
> we do) then wouldn't the bare fact of probability offer the possibility
> that every once in a while, somebody got it right?  If so, it would be
> very difficult to prove, but obversely, it is also impossible to prove 
> contrary.
> How would you know?
>
> And if we're talking about concepts, well sometimes the reality I'm
> conceptualising IS a concept.  I'm talking about an emotional state
> or a thought pattern which, since I'm referring to my own creation,
> I oughta be the best judge on whether the concept of my reality concept
> is real enough.
>
> My concept of reality contains no discrepancy between concept and reality
> when the reality I conceptualize is a concept I create.

John is on to something of significance to epistemology.  In short, there is 
no difference between the reality we conceptualize and the reality we know. 
If existential reality is our subjective concept, then the known and 
experienced reality is derived from conscious (psychic) sensibility.  Since 
the universe is the experiential creation (concept) of the individual, 
differentiated existence is solipsistic.  But inasmuch as individual 
experience conforms to the laws and principles of nature, it is universal. 
It should also be understood that neither subjective awareness nor its 
objective concept is the true Reality.

I submit that this S/O epistemology clears up some of the confusion in this 
discussion without contradicting the MOQ.  Krimel can still apply his 
systems theory to experience, Gav can continue to regard experience as 
conceptual, and Platt can hold on to his "equivalency principle" of Quality.

Are we any closer to Reductionism, or have I just muddied the waters?

Respectfully,
Ham