[MD] Reductionism

[Ham Priday]

On Tues, 6/31 at 1:49 PM Ron wrote:



> These concepts about experience are in fact "real",
> what gives them reality is their Pragmatic conventionalism.
> To say that these concepts are illusionary does not mean
> that they do not exist, simply put, they do not exist
> as conventionally apprehended.

I have no idea what you mean by "pragmatic conventionalism" or 
"conventionally apprehended."  Apprehension of objects is universal 
experience, is it not?  What you seem to be saying is that concepts are 
illusionary because objects don't exist as they are experienced.  (You 
introduced "illusion" here; I didn't.)  Since all knowledge is derived from 
experience, including scientific knowledge, how do we know that our 
apprehension (conceptual universe) is illusional?

> Conceptual/perceptual understanding is created by their[?] limits
> of apprehension.  To be aware of this fact free's one from notions
> of absolute "truth".  Being free from thinking within one absolute 
> paradigm
> enables one to take on different perspectives, finding the mean,
> or value among many truths.  This, in light of classical western thought,
> is a huge philosophical breakthrough.  The foolishness is the belief in
> one absolute way to distinguish one absolute truth.

The limits of apprehension are those of the subject or individual observer. 
(I assume that's what "their limits" refers to.)   I don't view lack of 
certainty an asset and question your phrase "freeing one from notions of 
absolute truth."  We all seek the truth but can only know relative facts. 
Finding a mean or average value of Truth is like being a little bit 
pregnant, which is hardly a reliable measure of truth.  I agree that concede 
that absolute truth is inaccessible to man, but disagree that changing 
perspectives on something as fundamental as reality advances philosophical 
understanding.

Ron [in response to my statement that the MoQ falls short of classical 
metaphysics]:

> lt is "classical  metaphysics" which is limited, so of course it would see
> Quality as irrational and illogical, It does not recognize value.
> You keep wanting to measure millimeters in inches then complain that
> there is not enough clarity.

Am I reading you correctly?  The MoQ is founded on Quality.  How can you say 
that it sees Quality as irrational and does not recognize value? 
Measurements are not reductive and I'm not "measuring" anything.  I'm merely 
suggesting that from the reductionist standpoint the only meaningful 
division is the self/other (subject/object) dichotomy which is rejected by 
the MoQ.

> If the question is raised about the reality of physical existence
> then it only stands to "reason" that the fundemental nature is an
> assumption, the assumption your argument rests on.
> So if, by your own admission, the reality of physical existence
> is in question, it would seem your assumption is also in question.
> Being in question, it is hardly the "fact" of the matter now is it?

Ron, I'm sure you must know that empirical knowledge is factual, while 
metaphysical concepts are theoretical.  Unless existence is someone's dream, 
it must be derived from a source that encompasses its full potentiality.  It 
would seem to be a reasonable assumption, given the logic that nothing comes 
from nothng.  Of course my theory of Essence is "in question", but no more 
so than Pirsig's theory of Quality.  If we could know ultimate reality as 
certitude, there would be no need for philosophy or metaphysics.

I feel a little like Marsha who just complained "I haven't the slightest 
idea what you want".  Like everyone else here I'd like to see more clarity 
in the concepts expressed, leading to more accord among the participants. 
Isn't this what we're all aiming for?

Thanks, Ron
Ham