[MD] the meaning Hobbes's meaning

[MarshaV]

At 05:08 PM 3/6/2009, you wrote:

>Marsha, Platt, DMB [David Swift mentioned) --
>
>
>On Wed, 04 Mar 2009 Marsha said (to David Swift):
>
>>Philosophizing indeed, and with such a distinguished list as Hobbes,
>>Hume, Locke and Kant.  It's hard to believe there would be exact
>>agreement between these philosophers, especially in regards to a 
>>word like 'feeling' with its many definitions and multiple layers 
>>of connotation. Maybe you can offer some quotes as evidence to
>>establish their agreement of usage and definition. ...'Feeling' 
>>like all sq is sometimes conventionally useful and has a
>>beauty of its own.
>
>This led David into a query about the existence of 'TiTs' which has 
>little, if any, relevance to Marsha's statement.  However, DMB 
>chimed in with a comment that does:
>
>>I think that's right. Feelings and instincts would probably be a static
>>biological response to DQ. Hume was an empiricist and so is Pirsig
>>but there is an important distinction between the traditional forms of
>>empiricism and the radical empiricism of the MOQ. The former is
>>also called sensory empiricism because it holds that the external
>>objective world comes to us through the senses, through the sense
>>organs, and it does so from within the assumptions of subject-object
>>metaphysics. The radical empiricism of William James, which is
>>adopted by the MOQ, differs from this by both rejecting the
>>metaphysical assumptions and by expanding the notion of what
>>counts as empirical evidence. In traditional empiricism we experience
>>reality through the senses but in radical empiricism experience is reality.
>
>Thomas Hobbes was not only an empiricist but a "monarchist" who 
>advocated total submission of the individual to the authority of the 
>state.  Since his writing is formidable, I've quoted this paragraph 
>from SparkNotes to summarize his mechanistic philosophy:
>
>"Hobbes believed that all phenomena in the universe, without 
>exception, can be explained in terms of the motions and interactions 
>of material bodies. He did not believe in the soul, or in the mind 
>as separate from the body, or in any of the other incorporeal and 
>metaphysical entities in which other writers have 
>believed.  Instead, he saw human beings as essentially machines, 
>with even their thoughts and emotions operating according to 
>physical laws and chains of cause and effect, action and 
>reaction.  As machines, human beings pursue their own self-interest 
>relentlessly, mechanically avoiding pain and pursuing 
>pleasure.  Hobbes saw the commonwealth, or society, as a similar 
>machine, larger than the human body and artificial but nevertheless 
>operating according to the laws governing motion and collision."
>
>The statement that caught my attention in the MercuryNews.com review 
>of Denis Dutton's "The Art Instinct: Beauty, Pleasure, and Human 
>Evolution" is this one which quotes the author:
>
>"'A lot of what counts as philosophy is explaining and justifying 
>fundamental human intuitions', including 'intuitions about the 
>beautiful and the ugly.'  The problem has been that philosophy 
>'doesn't ask where the intuitions come from.'"
>
>I don't particularly like the term "intuitive" in reference to 
>esthetic realization, as it conveys the idea that "feelings" are 
>intellectually conceived formulations, whereas they are emotional in 
>nature and "intellectual feeling" is an oxymoron.  The feeling of 
>pain, as described in Pirsig's legendary "hot stove" analogy, for 
>example, is anything but an intellectual experience.
>
>Platt, who has actually read Dutton's book, was a bit lukewarm in 
>his appraisal of it:
>
>>Interesting if somewhat pedantic. To a Darwinian everything is
>>explained by evolution, just as to an MOQian everything is
>>explained by Quality. But, I think anyone interested in the arts
>>will find the book worthwhile
>
>The point I'd like to make is that the emotional response we call 
>"feeling" is not in any way deterministic or "programmed into" 
>sensory perception. Rather than a reflex action, emotional feeling 
>is the value-sensibility of proprietary (individual) awareness 
>itself.  DMB's suggestion that "feelings and instincts would 
>probably be a static biological response to DQ" does not do justice 
>to value, while "instinct" is the wrong connotation for 
>value-sensibility which, above all human attributes, is what makes 
>value appreciation free of biological and social influences.
>
>Again, this epistemology is foreign to MoQists who refuse to accept 
>the integrity of the individual subject.  Instead, they continue to 
>think of "subjects" as interacting patterns, "feelings" being among 
>them.  As a consequence, although the fact that we are all 
>value-sensible agents is self-evident to the rest of mankind, the 
>absurdity of "unrealized value" is lost on the Pirsigians.  Perhaps 
>someone will be bold enough to address this issue which strangely 
>runs counter to the Quality thesis.

Greetings Ham,

The self is an ever-changing, collection of interrelated and 
interconnected, inorganic, biological, social and intellectual, 
static patterns of value responding to Dynamic Quality.  I think I 
this addresses the individual as a conventionally convenient, 
user-friendly, useful concept, but Ultimately empty of independent 
(inherent) existence.  The conventional self, which is a collection 
of spovs, is an entity built totally of value/morality, and its 
interaction with Dynamic Quality (unrealized value) is valuing.  So 
sure, I don't see a problem with calling the conventional self a 
value-agent.  But maybe I'm misunderstanding your question.


Marsha










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Shoot for the moon.  Even if you miss, you'll land among the stars.........
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