[MD] Subjectivity in the MOQ

[Ham Priday]

Platt and All --


> A major premise of the MOQ is the existence of a universal
> moral order, of good and evil, right and wrong. Understanding
> this moral order depends on understanding the constant conflicts
> between the evolutionary moral levels.
> What is right at the biological level (the law of the jungle) is wrong
> at the social level (laws of society), etc. Also required is the
> assumption of an indefinable moral force called Dynamic Quality.
>
> But when it comes to individuals, universal morality appears to
> revert to individual idiosyncrasies. In a word, morality becomes
> subjective -- a concept the MOQ otherwise attempts to deny.
>
> "The reason there is a difference between individual evaluations
> of quality is that although Dynamic Quality is a constant, these
> static patterns are different for everyone because each person
> has a different static pattern of life history. Both the Dynamic
> Quality and the static patterns influence his final judgment.
> That is why there is some uniformity among individual value
> judgments but not complete uniformity." (Pirsig--SODV)
>
> With one stroke Pirsig overthrows his premise of universal morality
> by admitting to moral relativity. ... Perhaps this is what our friend
> Ham has been banging about all along. So to all true blue MOQites
> I ask, "Where have I gone wrong in this post?"

Friend Ham is not sure whether this Pirsig "stroke" is a really a 
contradiction of "universal morality" or not, since the word "morality" 
doesn't appear in the SODV paper.  Clearly, our notions of morality vary in 
accordance with one's individual upbringing and cultural influences.  These 
may be considered the "static patterns" that "influence his final judgment." 
At least the author allows for subjective "judgment" which, in my opinion, 
is the determining factor of any morality system.  If we cannot judge or 
discriminate goodness from badness there is no morality, either subjectively 
or in the collective society.  For if Value remains unrealized, how or why 
should we choose to be moral in our behavior?  And, if morality is 
universal, how could we be free to choose immorality?

What I object to, from a metaphysical perspective, is the definition of 
fundamental reality as "the aesthetic continuum".  Here's an example from 
Andre's 3/13 post in the "Chance v. Dynamic Quality" thread:

[Andre]:
> A few posts ago I quoted Pirsig at length in the light of the
> chemistry professor analogy.
> First things first: DQ is not 'chance', nor 'intent', nor 'poof'',
> nor anything teleological in the theological sense. It is the
> undifferentiated aesthetic continuum.

Now, a "continuum" is an uninterrupted sequence or "gradient" of change --  
as in a prismatic spectrum or the set of real numbers, whereas everything in 
existence is relative and differentiated.  What is implied here is that 
Quality (Value) is such a continuum, i.e., a continuous range from good to 
evil, or beautiful to hideous, as it were.  That, indeed, is the perspective 
of the value-sensible subject in a relational world.  But it makes no sense 
as the fundamental or primary source of reality -- if this is what Dynamic 
Quality (Value) is alleged to be.  Instead it makes existential reality an 
"amoral universe" in which the value-sensible agent chooses what is 
desirable or undesirable, moral or immoral, in his/her interpretation of 
experience.  This valuistic continuum or gradient exists only so long as 
there is a cognizant subject to actualize it as finite objects (things and 
events experienced as "real").  Ultimate Reality is not a gradient but the 
absolute, undifferentiated source of what can only be realized incrementally 
by the sensible agent.

That, my friend Platt, is what I have "been banging about all along".  I 
can't speak for Pirsig, but I sense that you may finally be getting the 
drift of my value thesis.  And, while that is most gratifying to me, others 
here will have to weigh its relevance to the MoQ.

Essentially yours,
Ham