[MD] Morality, Abortion and the MoQ
Michael Poloukhine
moq at poloukhine.com
Mon Mar 23 12:48:50 PDT 2009
> Steve wrote:
> In considering the MOQ's take on the abortion issue it may be helpful
> to consider he MOQ's understanding of humanity. A human being is a
> forest of patterns of all four types. A biological homo sapien is not
> automatically human just for having the right DNA. A homo sapien
> without any social patterns is a purely biological entity--an animal.
> It is impossible for me to consider a zygote to be a person, and the
> MOQ can't see it that way either since a zygote cannot participate in
> social patterns.
>
> MP wrote:
> Is this an accurate reckoning of MoQ's understanding of the "evolution" of a
> human life, and more importantly how that human life compares to other life
> during its "evolution"?
>
> [Arlo]
> I think its ultimately problematic to consider "pre-social" human
> organisms to be nothing more than biological patterns. They are, of
> course, I'm not disputing that. What I am concerned about is law that
> is based on this notion alone. For example, if we abort "pre-birth"
> using the argument that the zygote or whatever is nothing more than a
> biological pattern, isn't this also what it is for quite a while
> after its birth? How is a newborn any less "just a biological
> pattern" than it was three days prior in the womb? If we draw the
> line where we *legally* consider the organism a "person" only after
> it becomes "social", then the moment of birth is arbitrary and must
> be tossed aside in that formulation.
MP: Arlo, if we can continue on this line and tone, I would very much appreciate
it and am willing and eager to drop cold all the rest of the opinionated back and
forth with you or anyone else to do so.
Yours is exactly my reaction to Steve's statement as well. It sure is problematic.
But I don't see the MoQ thinking that justifies your/my POV.
What is it (is there something?) about a fetus that makes it more than simply a
biological pattern in the MoQ? What makes animals (humans too) so fanatically
protective of their young if the Quality in the interaction would have them
protecting nothing more than a simple biological pattern? The protection of
one's young is not a social pattern; its instinctive. A mother animal will kill
another that she perceives as a threat to her young. A father animal will kill
another that he perceives to be a threat to his pregnant mate. That's killing a
higher evolved pattern to protect a lower evolved one. And its done like jumping
off a hot stove; you do it before you think about it. That's a reaction to Quality,
but it is in direct conflict to what Steve has laid out.
So what MoQ thing is going on that we see which contradicts Steve's otherwise
rather clear MoQ position? Is this protective instinct merely a vestigial
biological pattern that is a static latching of what once was vital to survival on
the basic animal level that now that we are evolved into the 4th level we don't
need? Is the drive to protect our young just a static pattern of one that was once
to us dynamic that we now need to get past?
My reaction to Steve's statement is one of two: either he's missed something in
the MoQ understanding of human life, OR MoQ is wrong about reality. Because
if he's right, I'm not sure I want anything to do with the MoQ. My children as
infants were NOT just a biological pattern. If I ever had pure Dynamic Quality
experience it was holding my first child the moment she was born. And if MoQ
tells me I was deluded, she was less valuable than my old cat... well... sorry,
then MoQ is morally bankrupt and I'm outta here.
I like to think Steve's wrong (with nonetheless much respect to Steve for coming
up with this puzzler of a position.)
But an MoQer would need to help sort that out, because I can't find an MoQ
argument to refute Steve's statement and admittedly don't have a more than a
beginner's grasp of the M. My gut is telling me it has to do with potential v.
actuality, but I'm not sure MoQ values potentiality over actuality. Again, MoQer
opinion is needed.
> [Arlo]
> Indeed, many argue socialization begins in utero, and the developing
> fetus begins responding to social input early on. Is THIS the target
> then for moral abortions? Others have argued that socialization does
> not occur until significantly later in the post-birth organism. My
> point here is not WHEN socialization occurs (people have been
> debating that for decades), but whether or not this is what is being
> suggested as the "measuring line" between when ending the life of
> the
> organism is moral and when it is not. If so, we need to define that
> line based on that line's merits, and "birth" is not it.
MP: Yes, exactly. We need to define that line in an MoQ moral framework to be
able to apply it to a greater discussion of abortion. This is what I've been saying
from the outset.
If we can draw this line using MoQ, then the next step is clearer; drawing the
line(s) between people, culture and society becomes far more MoQ
straightforward if we have achieved an MoQ understanding of what for all
intents and purposes is the definition of "human life."
MP
----
"Don't believe everything you think."
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