[MD] suspended in language

[plattholden at gmail.com]

On 6 Nov 2009 at 13:30, Steven Peterson wrote:

Platt:
> > How about pursuit of multiple foundations? For example, a foundation of
> > truth you feel (I'm hungry), a foundation of truth you get from common
> > sense (I'm hungry because I missed breakfast), and truth you are told
> > (Feelings of hunger care caused by synapse activity in the brain.).
> > Perhaps multiple foundations was what Pirsig had in mind when he used
> > the metaphor of judging truths like paintings in a gallery.
> 
> Steve:
> Foundationalism in the paintings analogy would be the view that there
> is one "true" painting "out there" waiting to be discovered--one true
> account of the way things really are--and we can appeal to this
> account, once we find it, to tell us what is true and what is false
> and what is better and worse. Such a view holds language as a
> representation of reality while I see Pirsig as rather thinking of
> intellect as having evolved as a way of using reality.

Hi Steve:

I rather interpret the painting metaphor as presupposing multiple 
foundations for ascertaining truth, depending, as you say, on an 
individual's cultural "conditioning" as well, as Pirsig says, one's particular 
life history.

Steve 
> I don't think Pirsig holds to foundationalism. This is why I
> previously opened a thread called "ironistic metaphysics" to discuss
> what Pirsig is up to with calling his philosophy "*a* metaphysics" as
> though there can be more than one true account of the way things realy
> are where intellectual realities can be appreciated like paintings in
> a gallery and used for whatever purposes they are most useful for.

Platt
I've always thought that pragmatism requires some moral foundation of 
good and bad, desirable and undesirable, purposes and aims in order to 
judge whether something is "useful" or not. Without such a foundation 
what is to prevent an pragmatic attitude of "whatever works for you?" Or 
the idea that  "What's true for you may not be true for me?" Is this what 
pragmatism comes down to? Anything goes? Doesn't it require some 
moral criteria to appeal to that one might call "foundational?" 

> > Steve
> >> I think we can be justified in thinking that we have made progress and
> >> justified in hoping for more progress in the future. I don't think we
> >> should spend any time hoping for a foundation on which to base our
> >> claims that have made progress that will provide knock-down arguments
> >> that will convionce all comers of our beliefs. I think the best we can
> >> do is tell our stories to justify our belief that we have made
> >> progress and convince others to work for the comntinuation of such
> >> progress.
> >
> 
> Platt:
> > But as I see it Pirsig has made a valiant attempt to provide a foundation
> > on which one can claim "progress" -- namely, that which contributes to
> > the evolution of life. Do you think he's failed in that effort?

Steve 
> If what he was up to was trying to find a metaphysical foundation,
> then he failed since many people do not find it at all difficult to
> deny his premises.

I'm don't think the validity of a metaphysical foundation depends on 
popular acceptance. Do you? Otherwise you run into the ad Populum 
fallacy.    

Steve
> But we usually think of Pirsig as having created
> rather than discovered the MOQ, and I think Pirsig prefers this
> metaphore as well, which suggests to me that the MOQ is not intended
> as a way of stepping outside of history and culture and to possess the
> one true account of the way things really are. He himself suggests
> that better philosphies will come along.

Platt
The phrase "one true account" reminds me of the phrase "one right way 
to think." Both assume God-like virtue.  

 
> > Platt
> >> > Finally, do you agree with Pirsig's assertion: "Cultures can be graded
> >> > and judged morally according to their contribution to the evolution of
> >> > life." (Lila, 24)
> >>
> >
> > Steve
> >> Yes.
> 
> Platt:
> > Maybe Pirsig's metaphysics is foundational after all? At least its value
> > as a "story" seems exceptionally reliable and fruitful.
> 
> Steve:
> To hold the MOQ provisionally as a foundation why recognizing that it
> is the creation of a historically situated culturally contingent human
> being is what I think is meant by "ironic metaphysics."
> 
> Platt:
> > But I could be wrong -- a foundational belief true for all people at all
> > times, now and forever. :-)
> 
> Steve:
> I don't see how "I could be wrong" could serve as a foundational
> belief, but it does sound like a good thing to keep in mind.

Yes, I try to keep it always (an absolute) in mind.

Best,
Platt