[MD] The question WHY?

[John Carl]

Ham,

Sorry for only responding to the parts of your posts that I prefer... but
them's the rules.


On Mon, Nov 16, 2009 at 1:17 AM, Ham Priday <hampday1 at verizon.net> wrote:

>
> Platt, Craig and All --
>
> I find it curious that the prolonged and controversial thread "An Inquiry
> into Usefulness" actually turns out to be a search for the answer to: "Why
> is there anything?"   It recalls Heidegger's question, "Why are there
> essents instead of nothing?" with which he begins his "Introduction to
> Metaphysics".
>

Platt and Craig each make valid points, but their dialectics are not geared
> to resolving the question.
>


Interesting observation.  How many dialectics have we witnessed that are
geared to resolving questions?  As opposed to trying to convert.




> To wit: On Nov. 11, 2009 at 1:17 PM, Platt wrote to Craig:



> [Platt]:
>
>> You seem to posit a reality beyond our recognition or understanding.
>>
>
> [Craig]:
>
> > Indeed I do.  Nothing is clearer than that this has always been the case.
>
>
[Royce]:


Suppose we wish to deny absolutism, and stress our finite limitations, our
ignorance.  We assert that only our finite fragments of experience exist.
 But if that is a fact, then it must be experienced:  on an assumed
Berkeleyan analysis, whatever is, must be *for* a consciousness.  The
supposition that there is no experience beyond our finite experiences proves
contradictory; in it entirety experience must constitute one
self-determinend and consequently absolute and organized whole....  The very
effort to deny an absolute experience involves, then, the actual assertion
of such an absolute experience."

[John]:

Good point Josiah!  And the absolute that is chosen unconsciously in such
cases  of overt denial of an absolute, is the self - the subject of SOM.
 Too bad that unconscious metaphysics tend to be bad metaphysics.




> [Platt]:
>
>  If there's a reality beyond our recognition or understanding, how in the
>> world will you recognize or understand it?  The examples you imagine
>> are all recognizable and understandable.  As for understanding Quality,
>> nothing could be easier: some things are better than others.
>>
>
> [Craig]:
>
>  Why is there quality rather than none?
>
>
> [Platt]:
>
>> Pirsig answers ... " . . . a world from which value is subtracted
>> becomes unrecognizable." (Lila, 9)
>>
>
>
[Craig]:

>
>  This answers the question "How do we know there is quality/value".
>> It doesn't answer the question "Why is there?
>>
>
>
[Ham]:



> Why IS there, indeed?



[John]:

Because it seemed like a good idea at the time.

[Ham]:



> This is the most fundamental question of philosophy. But to answer it, we
> must take our cue from experience itself.  This presupposes both a
> questioner and a referent to be questioned: i.e., Existence.  Right at the
> start we confront a dualism.  But our question would be meaningness without
> the predicate "is" [latin, 'esse'].  No matter how we interpret 'esse' -- as
> Source, Being, Existence, God, Mind, or Value, for example -- it alludes to
> that which IS, which is why 'esse' is ESSENTIAL, not only for the
> proposition "something is" but for the source or cause of that essent, as
> well.
>
>
[John]:

So according to Ham,  in the beginning was the is.

[Ham]


> This 'esse' or Essence is Ultimate Reality, that is to say, 'IS-ness" in
> its absolute sense.  Because we are obliged to seek an answer in experience,
> we don't find it.  What we find instead are "things" and "events" -- finite
> phenomena that are separated (negated) out of absolute Essence and which we
> know only valuistically.  But the fact that we know ANYTHING is predicated
> on the Essence from which this "knowing" is derived.
>
> Hence, the short answer to your question "Why?" is: Because Essence is
> fundamental.
> Is any other explanation really necessary?
>
>
[John]


Well, I like "it seemed like a good idea at the time" because its
succincter, ironic-er, and easier for (no offense) normal people to
understand.

But sure,  I like your essay on esse, e'say.