[MD] in defence of the "relative"

Steven Peterson peterson.steve at gmail.com
Mon Nov 16 11:02:17 PST 2009


"Well that's just like...your opinion, man"




On Sun, Nov 15, 2009 at 4:51 PM, Matt Kundert
<pirsigaffliction at hotmail.com> wrote:
>
>> What do you think Matt?  Is there a good reason why I should not call myself
>> a 'relativist'?
>
> But Marsha: don't you already know my answer?
>
> Every answer, reason I give, or you give, is relative to a
> set of considerations.  Right?  I've already elaborated at
> length in a number of different ways a single reason: most
> of the tradition of philosophical writings that extend
> outwards from Plato have tarred the term "relativism,"
> which makes it troublesome.  You have, in response,
> articulated over and over that you do not consider that a
> _good_ reason, which as a relativist is only to say that the
> set of considerations that my aforementioned reason is
> itself relative to is a set of considerations that you do not
> _consider_ (important, good, etc.).
>
> So what else would you have me say?  As a relativist,
> you should already _know_ that there are tons of good
> reasons to call yourself any number of things--it's just
> that not all of these are "in play" relative to the set of
> considerations you are using.  So what else is there?
> I've articulated the reason, you've said no thank you;
> I've elaborated the set of considerations, and you've
> said you don't care; and I've attempted to persuade you
> that these are considerations you might want to consider
> more carefully, and you've repeated that you don't care;
> and considering that _I_ don't care that much whether
> you call yourself a relativist or not, or anybody else
> really, _and_ the fact that I even lapsed into giving you
> support for it (though you have steadfastly not
> recognized it as such)--relative to this set of
> considerations, what else is there for me to say?  What
> else is there for you to know about what I think when
> you know what I think?  You already know that I think,
> with you, that the decency of "justified true belief" as a
> definition of knowledge is relative to a "frame-of-reference":
> all these things have been said in my responses.  I like
> humility, have been calling it fallibility, and yet I still don't
> want to call _myself_ a relativist.
>
> What do _you_ think Marsha?  Is there a good reason why
> I _should_ call myself a 'relativist'?
>
> Matt
>
>
>> From: valkyr at att.net
>> To: moq_discuss at moqtalk.org
>> Date: Sun, 15 Nov 2009 04:33:20 -0500
>> Subject: Re: [MD] in defence of the "relative"
>>
>> Hi Matt,
>>
>> Sorry, starting a paragraph with 'It' was poor style.
>>
>> The definition of relativity that Ron presented as the kernel of the
>> definition of relativism, "A state of dependence in which the existence or
>> significance of one entity is solely dependent on that of another."
>> Quality/experience/existence/reality is the interaction between unpatterned
>> experience and patterned experience. That most obviously is relativism, from
>> perceptual relativism to epistemological relativism to ontological
>> relativism to ontological indeterminism: There is no answer, there never
>> was, nor ever will be an answer.  ALERT ALERT ALERT  Knowing should be
>> accompanied by a certain amount of humility!!!
>>
>> What, Matt, you label as "a decent definition of knowledge" would be decent
>> dependent on your frame-of-reference: relative; "justified true belief" is
>> most obviously relative to any number of possible justifications. Maybe it
>> is because of relativism that adopting a practical approach to the possible
>> tensions and conflicts between the individual and the collective is
>> necessary. I may lean more towards the concerns of the individual, someone
>> else may lean more towards the concerns of the collective, but all should
>> carry in their hearts, imho, humility for the fragility of even our shared,
>> conventional knowledge.
>>
>> What do you think Matt?  Is there a good reason why I should not call myself
>> a 'relativist'?
>>
>>
>> Marsha
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: moq_discuss-bounces at lists.moqtalk.org
>> [mailto:moq_discuss-bounces at lists.moqtalk.org] On Behalf Of Matt Kundert
>> Sent: Saturday, November 14, 2009 4:21 PM
>> To: moq_discuss at moqtalk.org
>> Subject: Re: [MD] in defence of the "relative"
>>
>>
>> Marsha,
>>
>> Marsha said:
>> It says existence is indeterminate, like indivisible,
>> undefinable and unknowable, and the knowledge (patterns)
>>  is interdependent, as in relative.
>>
>> Matt:
>> I take it "it" here refers to "relativism," as in "relativism
>> says existence is indeterminate..."?
>>
>> That being the case, I take pragmatism to be saying the
>> same thing.  That is because I construe "Quality is
>> undefinable" as "mu": unask the question, i.e. this isn't a
>> good topic to ask questions about.  Existence qua existence,
>> Aristotle's Platonic-like quest for what being/existence was
>> as it relates only to itself, isn't profitable because, as you
>> say, things are interdependent--so when you construe
>> something as _independent_, dependent only on itself, you
>> come up with a null class, you come up with things that
>> appear "indeterminate, like indivisible, undefinable and
>> unknowable."  Same thing happened to Kant in the Critique
>> of Pure Reason: he found that if you treated something as it
>> was in itself, it became unknowable.  Hence his dualism
>> between noumena (the unknowable thing-in-itself) and
>> phenomena (knowable, relatable stuff).  That's how I
>> unpack "the same thing" that you said.  You might differ.
>>
>> Marsha said:
>> Now why don't you tell me what pragmatism says about
>> knowledge and existence?
>>
>> Matt:
>> In my words, it says that knowledge is interdependent,
>> by which a decent definition of knowledge might be
>> "justified true belief."  "Belief" stands in for the fact that
>> a _person_ is required for knowledge--somebody must
>> think something.  "Justified" stands in for the fact that
>> the only route we've in practice discovered to yield things
>> that are true is by sharing our thoughts with our
>> community, and then by a process of trial-and-error
>> called "justification," built up good cause for believing
>> such-and-such to be true.  "True" stands in for the fact
>> that you cannot reduce "truth" to "justification," even
>> though justification is the only route we know of to truth.
>>
>> Matt
>
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