[MD] The question WHY?

[MarshaV]

John,



Copleston:  The very denial of an absolute intelligence in us could have no
meaning but for a tacit appeal to its presence. An implicit knowledge of God
in this sense is proved by the very attempt to deny it.' 

RMP:  This is casuistry.  If you deny knowing anything about rutabagas in
Russia, does the fact that you are denying it prove that you really do know
something about rutabagas in Russia?
      (Copleston)  


Plug in 'absolute' or 'God' for 'rutabagas in Russia'.  Is there a problem
with RMP's logic and calling this technique casuistry?  Regardless what
Platt said to me, I do not remember ever stating that there were
'absolutely' no absolutes. I might have made a general statement that there
were no absolutes, but not a categorical statement.  I did say that I
thought 'absolutes' to be any empty category.   

Did I get my words tangled?


Marsha






-----Original Message-----
From: moq_discuss-bounces at lists.moqtalk.org
[mailto:moq_discuss-bounces at lists.moqtalk.org] On Behalf Of John Carl
Sent: Tuesday, November 17, 2009 11:49 AM
To: moq_discuss at moqtalk.org
Subject: Re: [MD] The question WHY?

Salutations, Ham:



>> Sorry for only responding to the parts of your posts that I prefer
>> ... but them's the rules.
>>
>
> Who's rules?  Yours?


No, yours.  Ours.  Life's.  As  valuing agents reality is formed from what
we prefer, isn't that the essence of the MoQ?


>
>  Interesting observation.  How many dialectics have we witnessed
>> that are geared to resolving questions?
>> As opposed to trying to convert.
>>
>
> Good question.  I for one would like to witness more of the former.
>


Well there's one easy way to witness more resolution, and that's to create
more resolution.  I'm willing, you're willing.  It shouldn't be difficult.


>>
> I don't follow Royce's logic.  I know that he is an "absolutist".  But how
> does the supposition that there is no "absolute experience" constitute an
> "absolute whole"?  How does the "effort to deny absolute experience"
involve
> "the assertion of" it?  Does he mean only that we can't deny something
> without imagining its existence? I accept that as a rhetorical or
> intellectual premise, but not as an experiential principle.  Perhaps you
can
> explain the argument Royce is trying to make...and, while you're at it,
what
> you mean by the following:
>
>

>  And the absolute that is chosen unconsciously in such
>> cases of overt denial of an absolute, is the self - the subject of SOM.
>> Too bad that unconscious metaphysics tend to be bad metaphysics.
>>
>
>

Ok, I don't always follow Royce's logic either.  It can be twisty at times,
but worthwhile.  The above was a summary of his thinking by others so a bit
is lost in translation.  Lemme give it another shot in his exact words, and
then I'll try and explain it fully in my own:


"If every reality has to exist just in so far as there is experience of its
existence, then the determination of the world of experience to be this
world and no other, the fact that reality contains no other facts than
these, is, as the supposed final reality, itself the object of one
experience, for which the fragmentariness of the finite world appear as a
presented and absolute fact, beyond which no reality is to be viewed as even
genuinely possible.  For this final experience, the conception of any
possible experience beyond is known as an ungrounded conception, as an
actual impossibility.  But so, this final experience is by hypothesis
forthwith defined as One, as all inclusive, as determined by nothing  beyond
itself, as assured of the complete fulfillment of its own ideas concerning
what is,-- in brief, it becomes as absolute experience.  The very effort to
deny an absolute experience involves, then, the actual assertion of such an
absolute experience."

The Conception of God, pg 43

John]

Ok the best way to sum this up, I think, is that when you say "there are no
absolutes" is itself an absolute.  I think Platt said that to Marsha
already, so no great insight, but a bit deeper explication by JR, and tying
the absolute to experience.    "Absolute Experience"  seems to me to be an
adequate meeting point between you and Platt.  You with your essense, him
with his experience.

What I meant by the statement of "unconscious metaphysics tend to be bad" is
the problem which stems from absolute relativism is that the self is then
taken as the absolute basis of being - which you point out below as being a
problem.




> To be clear, I define conscious experience as the awareness of the
> individual.  No finite entity, nothing locked in a space/time framework,
can
> be absolute.  This is what relates consciousness to a unique organic being
> and makes the self a free agent.  If you're suggesting that the self is
> absolute (within itself) -- in other words, that it is an integral whole
--
>  you would be misusing the term "absolute".  By definition only Essence,
the
> Primary Source, is absolute.  No individual entity or created thing is
> absolute, not even the infinite universe.
>
>
The relation of the Absolute Experience and the Individual Experience is
also unpacked in Royce's writing, but we'll stick to one thing at a time.  I
did find an interesting bit in my skimming this morning  about the relation
of dynamic and static within the Absolute that seemed very Pirsigian to me.


So many thoughts!  So little time.

Yours,

John
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