[MD] Emotions

[John Carl]

On Sun, Nov 8, 2009 at 11:32 AM, <mark_maxwell at talktalk.net> wrote:

>
> For the sake of clarity, it should be noted that the social patterns,
> denoted by the
> MOQ, tend to refer only to behaviour that is learnt through imitation (such
> as rituals and social customs) rather than ‘hard-wired’ genetic behaviour
> (as, for instance,
> observed in ant colonies). As with his definition of ‘intellectual’, Pirsig
> justifies this
> ‘cutting-off’ point on the grounds that if the term ‘social’ is expanded
> too far, it
> becomes meaningless.
>


Well I like his explanation because he's makeing it clear that divisions are
made based upon Quality, an important distinction from other's view that
Quality is defined  by what happens to follow a pre-ego-attached division
already made.


I put forth this formulation of emotion and social bonding being rooted in
mammalian behaviour as a good division because it does not expand society
too far, it denies social patterns to ants and bees, for instance.   Society
is constrained  to  mammalian proportions.  I like this formulation for a
lot of reasons.

1)  It's easy to remember where the exact line is drawn, at least for a guy.
 Now where does society come from? Oh yeah, boobs.  Handy mnemonic devices
you got there baby...

2)  Human mammals are distinct in their carriage and presentation of mammary
glands, the only animal that carries them up top, thrust forward and out
front, leading the way.  Every other mammal keeps 'em down and protected and
much more subtle.  Thus the physiology of man coincides with  his advanced
social development in a most aesthetically pleasing manner and a
philosophical congruence to match.

3)  At the other end of mammalian development, we have a fascinating animal
known as the Platypus.  Once considered proof of the whimsical God, it is to
an MoQist the delightful symbol of the universal truth that exceptions are
what make rules.  Thus the Platypus as mammal's last stand (they serve up
milk but no teat) represents something physically real as well as
metaphysically significant.


Mark]


> (3) The narrative of ZMM is dominated by the compassion of the narrator for
> his son
> even though he doesn’t talk about it as such, and when Phædrus says Lila
> has quality
> he is speaking compassionately and is held in contempt for this by Rigel
> [the lawyer
> character epitomising social values in LILA]. Rigel is arguing that
> Phædrus’ compassion
> for Lila is damned foolishness. Phædrus struggles in subsequent chapters to
> show that
> it is intellectually sound


I think your literary illustration brings out some good points, but I think
you miss the main one.  Pirsig's tales are the story of intellect wrestling
with social rejection and in both cases (toward Chris AND Lila) his
compassion is not something which flows naturally from a social-bound ape as
we read about all the time, but in a forced and unnatural manner of the
intellectually-bound professor analyzing himself and his own emotional
reactions.  And sharing with us the  insight gleaned, simultaneous with the
recognition of social incompleteness:  "He never was the type of person that
relates well to other people."  An interesting admission from such a
profound analyzer of social relations *with* other people.

Near the end of Lila, the dialogue that plays in his own head,
congratulating himself on his compassion for Lila, a truly compassionate
person wouldn't realize this.  A compassionate person's compassion flows
without realization or need for comment.